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The NHS is the centrepiece of the UK welfare state. For fifty years it has provided the 
majority of health-care in the UK. However the running of the service has not been 
marked by a smooth operation. Repeated reforms have occurred since 1948 in attempts to
increase the efficiency and effectiveness of the sendee. These reforms have been credited
with varying degrees of success. Even the most radical reforms, initiated in 1990, have 
been marked by some failures - particularly in respect to the provision of services to ‘at
risk’ groups such as the elderly, leading to criticisms of a lack of coherent policy making.
The reasons that underlie the success of the NHS in the midst of failure are complicated,
but one hypothesis is that the structure of the NHS does not reflect its basic functions.
Those functions can be broken down into 2. First is the relief of suffering from illness;
second is the support of the industrial and economic base of the UK. The existence of
this pluralistic purpose implies that the management of the service requires balancing the
forces of economic, state and civil society requirements for the NHS. This management
is embodied in a complicated institutionalisation of care, covered in chapter 1. The 
empirical evidence gathered in the thesis, in chapters 2 and 3 both from literature and
case studies, would indicate that at least part of the problems seen in the NHS result from
a failure to balance this institutionalisation. However, the situation is made more
complex as the result of this imbalance creates further increased demands from some of
the elements in the management of the service. Therefore the failure to balance the
interactions that surround the NHS increases the pressures on it - which in turn increases
the imbalance leading to a feedback loop magnifying the problem. The source and
V
problems of this feedback are best exemplified by a case study of the most recent reforms 
-covered in chapters 4-11 of this thesis. This case study demonstrates that the way in 
which the 1990 reforms were formulated and implemented took little notice of the 
impact of the changes on the street level NHS managers - with the results that the 
reforms did not represent a coherent policy. The result of the lack of coherence is that the 
changes have not generated efficiency gains, and in some cases have diverted resources
away from those most in need. The underlying cause of this is the predominance of non­
market forces in the decision making process - i.e. the values of the purchasers and the 
power of the providers to influence decision making. The linkages between these features
of the post reform NHS are described in chapter 12.
It is likely that the only way in which the circle of problems in the NHS can be addressed
is re-establishing the corporate relationship that surrounds health care. However unlike 
previous relationships the evidence suggests that the relationship should be established at
a policy level, rather than the current trends for a local level relationship. The NHS is not
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Chapter 1 - Introduction
1.1 Key points for this chapter
The aims of this chapter is to introduce the UK welfare services from the perspective 
of the organisational and social developments they have undergone in the 1980’s and
1990’s, explain the background to these developments and propose the analytical
methods to be used to examine the impact of the development on the delivery of
services.
1.2. Introduction
The 1980’s and 1990’s are a time of revolution in United Kingdom (UK) public 
policy. For the first time since 1944 major policy debates have been held over the 
future of welfare state services that have resulted in fundamental organisational
change (Ham C 1992). These changes follow a period of turmoil in the welfare state,
a period that reached a climax in the early 1980’s.
The welfare state in the UK until the early 1980’s was based on the ‘post-war
settlement’ of 1946 under which a Consensus was established which made welfare
services free at the point of delivery and distributed on the basis of need. This
Consensus provided a stable welfare state until the social and economic conditions of
the late 1970’s forced major change. Since then successive governments have sought
to replace the Consensus, with the result that the structure and function of the welfare
services has been reformed (Deakin N 1994).
The reformed welfare state of the 1980’s and 1990’s is a decisive break with the past; 
a move away from the welfare state of Beveridge and Keynes towards different 
methods of supplying and distributing welfare services. In many cases this shift 
involves an emphasis being placed on market mechanisms to increase the efficiency 
of service delivery and target those most in need (Barry N 1994)
The reasons for the departure from the Consensus lie in the ‘crisis’ that surrounds the
welfare services. This crisis is attributed to the increased pressure placed on services
due to
1. A change in the economic and social structure of the UK, with a move away from 
heavy industry into service industries. This shift implies that the nature and 
patterns of welfare services should also change to accommodate the more flexible
patterns of labour within the service industries.
2. The increasing availability of health-care technology.
3. The increasing proportion of elderly in the community.
4. The overload on the administrative systems brought about by the other factors,
(DeakinN 1994).
Added to these concerns are the perceived risks that the welfare state might induce, or
has induced, a dependency culture with an associated decline in enterprise and
innovation (Thatcher M 1993).
That there is a crisis in the welfare state is not in doubt, however many commentators
indicate that the crisis that surrounds the welfare state may have ideological overtones
(Deakin N 1994). The ideological politics introduced by the Conservative 
Government of the 1980’s has had a profound effect on British life. The welfare state
is seen by some as expensive and an un-needed burden on the taxpayer (Barry N
1994).
On a background of crisis, the waves of welfare reforms in the 1990’s have had one
proclaimed aim - the improvement of the efficiency of the welfare services and the
minimisation of the economic and tax burden associated with the welfare state (Ham
C 1996). However as has been noted by some observers the reforms of the welfare
state have not always had the intended results, and gains in efficiency have not always
been achieved (Patton C Birch K Hunt K Jordan K 1998) (Glennerster H 1998).
These failures have been attributed to the way in which the reform process has been 
conducted. In a review of the welfare reform process Hoggett indicated that recent 
welfare reform has a higher degree of centralisation and formalisation than might be 
anticipated given the basis of reform, a feature that may contribute to reform failure
(Hoggett P 1997).
The repeated anxieties over the direction of reform have opened the debates about the 
relationship between aspects of social policy, governmental objectives and the role of
the organisations that support and deliver care. These debates address the
fundamental nature of the welfare services in the UK and question the role of
government in deciding the distribution of welfare benefits.
Central to these debates are questions about how policy regarding welfare services 
should be formulated and implemented. Of principle focus are the mechanisms for
achieving change in the welfare services to match the pressures applied to services by 
the change in labour patterns, technology and demographics. Manziman and Sabatier
have indicated that positive change in the welfare services can only be achieved if the
totality of function in the welfare services is considered. Their studies of the
education services indicated that ideologically driven reforms often had unexpected
results due to ad hoc changes that were made to the reform programme by the
implementers. These ad hoc changes resulted in either the reforms losing effect or in 
some cases the failure of the educational system to protect at risk children (Sabatier P 
and Manziman D 1979). The results of Sabatier and Manziman have led to questions
about the UK reforms. The fact that the reforms of the UK welfare state are
ideologically motivated is well known (Kavanagh D 1990; Hoggett P 1997). Is it 
possible that the unexpected effects of UK welfare reform relate to ideologically
driven reforms and ad hoc change as described by Sabatier and Manziman in
education reform? It is to this question that this thesis will be addressed.
This thesis critically appraises health-care policy in the UK from 1948 to 1997 with a
focus on the major reforms seen in the 1990s. The aim of this thesis is to understand
the National Health Service (NHS) reform process, suggest why reforms fail and to
postulate what alternative approaches may result in successful reform. The thesis will
concentrate on using a method that analyses the NHS as a social institution in an
attempt to explain the impact of policy on both the outcomes of the service and how
the service operates. It is hoped by integrating the role of the service as an institution
in the analysis the link between policy and outcome can be clarified and the reasons
for the failure of reform become apparent.
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This thesis hopes to show that the complexity of function of the NHS, and the welfare 
state in general, suggests that a single ideology can never establish policy that will
allow radical change. The complexity of function in the welfare services implies that 
policy makers focussing on a single ideology cannot grasp the range of interactions
that makes the welfare state work. Therefore a.mechanism is needed to bring together
the complex process of reforming the welfare state - including the NHS - if reform is
to succeed (Hoggett P 1997). In this manner the welfare state resembles the legal
system, where the independent consideration of legal issues, by the law Commission,
is the accepted way in which the impact of changes in laws can be assessed taking
into account the wider social implications (Zander M 1994).
In the chapters that follow there is an emphasis on factual data about health-care 
provision and policy, largely from official government documents, combined with
directed case studies. However, the approach is far from being an exercise in the
presentation of data. In the construction of the arguments conscious thought has been
given to collection of information directed towards the role of the organisations that 
act on health care policy. No apology is made for what may be seen as a functionalist
or objectivist bias, as by creating a fact-based environment it is easier to tease out the 
major factors and examine them critically using validated statistical methods.
1.3. Why Study the UK National Health Service.
The UK National Health Service (NHS) is an ideal case study for looking at the
formulation of social policy in the UK. The NHS has been a central feature of UK
welfare and the NHS was one of the major features of the post-war welfare state
(Honigsbaum F 1989). Therefore the reforms of the NHS have shadowed welfare
s
reforms since 1948 and changes in the NHS represent a barometer of state action as
events in the NHS closely follow the crisis in the other welfare services (Frazier D
1984). This is reflected in the four reorganisations that the NHS has undergone since 
1974. In addition there are other advantages. The NHS has been described as a British
religion, and changes in it are the centre of attention and are readily documented 
(Honigsbaum F 1989). This provides a rich source of material for analysis, as the
workings of the NHS are directly observable in the decisions of Health Authorities.
1.4 The Hypothesis
The hypothesis contained in this thesis is a modification of the hypothesis used by 
Sabatier and Manziman in the study of education services (Sabatier P and Manziman
D 1979).
In the search for efficiency the NHS has undergone a series of ideologically motivated 
reforms aimed at improving the efficiency of health care provision. These reforms
have required ad hoc modifications in the face of problems that cannot be accounted
for in the ideology. These ad hoc changes to the reform have been dominated by the
organisations that are involved in the implementation of the refonns and so have led 
to the loss of consistency between policy and implementation, such that the refonns
fail to meet objectives.
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1.5. The Methods to be Used to Analyse the NHS in this Thesis
In order to test the hypothesis proposed in section 1.4 the selection of the analytical 
method is crucial. The method selected must enable a comparison of the structure and
function of the NHS with regard to the importance of the organisations that influence
the service, across a number of reform episodes that are not always separate in time.
In the past, study of the NHS has focussed on the achievement of change relative to
the outcomes of the service with regard to specific populations or diseases
(Glennerster H 1998). However, such approaches have the disadvantage that the
results of these exercises cannot be directly related to policy and organisational
influence (Torfing J 1998).
In this thesis it has been decided to analyse the NHS as though it existed as a
physically constituted institution, an institution that consists of a number of discrete
organisations, with the aim of providing and distributing health care. This analytical 
method implies that the participants in the institution - the state, economy and civil
society - have adopted specific roles and structures to facilitate the operation (Elster J
1992). While it is recognised that in reality no such structure exists, this analytical
method has been selected as it enables an analysis of the NHS to be made that focuses
on policy and can accommodate the change engendered by the changing social
political and economic environments.
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1.5.1 Background to the Analytical Method
The analytical method of examining the NHS as an institution has roots in the
function of the NHS as part of the welfare state.
The welfare state can be interpreted in a variety of ways. In its original form the 
wohlfartsstat of Bismarck was taken to mean the provision of compulsory social
insurance as an instrument to counteract communist insurgence (Torfing J 1998).
However contemporary commentators would cast the idea of the welfare state into a
more comprehensive role as an integrative part of social policy aimed at remedying
the defects of economies based on free markets (Frazier D 1984). This broader
definition defines the welfare state as being concerned with the provision of the 
economic, social and political conditions that permit the modem capitalist state to
exist in conditions of the overall maintenance of high wealth - reflected in the value
of the countries economy - and social harmony. A particular role for the welfare state
is the assurance that none of the members of that state are deprived of basic human
rights - such as food or health care - by the operation of market forces (Torfing J 
1998). This implies that a number of external influences, such as market factors, must 
be accommodated in welfare state decision making (Burrows R and Loader L 1994).
Despite the apparent importance of external influences in the distribution of welfare
state benefits the analysis of the market factors that surround welfare decision making
is neglected (Jessop B 1996). A variety of mechanisms by which the welfare state and 
markets interact have been proposed, but only a few tested. The established views of
welfare state - market interactions include
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The feminist (the role of the welfare state in promoting inequality).
The Marxist (the role of the welfare state in promoting or mitigating class conflict).
The socialist (the institution of the welfare state as providing returns to workers)
(George V and Wilding P 1996).
These viewpoints are all equally valid in examining facets of welfare development, 
however none can explain the totality of development, as each focuses on a particular 
segment of society. However, the common theme among these views is that the
welfare state acts to regulate the impact of markets on segments of society (Burrows
R and Loader L 1994; Titmus R 1958). Therefore can the welfare state be viewed as a
regulator of capital development?
1.5.2 The Regulationist View of the Welfare State
In modern society the majority of the population is dependent on a continuation of 
work in exchange for wages. In turn the efforts of workers is turned into profit to 
enable the continuation of the cycle. This wage-profit cycle is often termed the mode 
of capital accumulation (Aglietta M 1979). However, this cycle is unsustainable 
without government intervention and regulatory mechanisms in the form of society
norms, patterns of policy and strategic conduct are needed (Aglietta M 1979).
The regulationist view postulates that the welfare state is created by the interaction
concerned with the provision of suitable economic political and social conditions to 
extend the development of market forces, by preventing market developments 
denying the access of citizens to welfare services. If market developments were 
allowed to develop without the presence of a welfare state it is likely that a significant
9
underclass would be created. This underclass would not only be a significant
economic burden, but its presence would act as a threat to the continued supply of 
labour and act to destabilise society. Therefore the welfare state is a part of the 
regulatory mechanisms of market development and capital accumulation. This view
of the welfare state has an advantage in that it can provide a direct link to economic 
and industrial policy. Another advantage is that the regulationist view avoids any 
emphasis on the high welfare state expenditure as it places expenditure in the context 
of the services provided being central to a thriving capitalist economy (Torfing J
1996). As such, this context on welfare services allows the NHS, as part of the
welfare state, to permit the development of the free market even where the market 
may give rise to a distortion of equity. Therefore the provision of health care can be 
seen as an integral part of any society based on a capitalistic economy (Doyal L and
Fennel I 1979).
1.5.3 How Does the Welfare State Regulate Capital and Market Development.
Initially it was proposed that the mechanism of regulation of the effect of the free
market by the welfare state could be explained on the basis of a procedural
relationship. Two procedural relations were proposed, Parliamentarism and
Corporatism (Jessop B 1996;Therbom G 1992).
A. Parliamentarism
Parliamentarism controls welfare development and regulation by rule of law. The 
regulation of state provision by rule of law defines the rights and obligations of 
citizens in accordance with legally binding statutory instruments. It therefore
represents state provision at the highest level. However in relation to welfare, and
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particularly health-care service provision, it is very hard to determine the levels of 
care that should be provided and guarantee these on a legal basis. Witness for 
example the deliberations of the Dekker committee in Holland, which has failed to 
define a legally sound suitable minimum standard of care due to the complexity of
health care provisions (Honigsbaum F Calltrop J Ham C Holmstrom 1995). Therefore 
Parliamentarism alone cannot define the boundaries of care (Teulings C and Hartog J
1998) and so Parliamentarism can not define the regulatory mechanism.
B. Corporatism.
Corporatism relies on the representation of workers and employers by structural 
bodies, e.g. Trade Unions, within a state framework, e.g. the Confederation of British
Industry (CBI). In this explanation welfare state developments are procedurally 
determined by the state in accordance with the rules within the state framework.
However, this explanation suffers from similar problems to Parliamentarism in that
the boundaries of care cannot be defined by the state alone (Teulings C and Hartog J
1998).
In face of these failings it appears that the regulatory mechanisms of the welfare state
do not have a basis on procedural rules and therefore the effects must be achieved by
the organisations involved in the welfare state taking a dynamic, active, role in market
development (Torfing J 1998).
Initial efforts to explain the dynamic regulatory function of the welfare state in 
controlling the effects of markets focussed on the state. In particular these efforts
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looked at the welfare state in terms of regulating economic exchange within the 
market. This analysis - performed by Wilensky (Wilensky HL 1975) - found that 
welfare expenditure is influenced by state ideology, but found that rich countries 
relatively spend more than poor ones. This argues that it is the market that drives
welfare provision, not the state driving the market as suggested by the hypothesis and
so this analysis route was stopped (Torfing J 1998).
Flora and Alper proposed an alternative explanation in the early 1980’s (Flora P and
Alper J 1982). This account focused on welfare developments as a result of social and
economic exchanges relating to the acquisition of workers rights, i.e. regulation of
market effects by the state and citizens. In a regression analysis Flora and Alper
demonstrated a correlation between economic regulation and social change - as would
be predicted from this hypothesis. However, the model would also predict a threshold
of state expenditure over which welfare services would develop, as a result of the
civil society gaining economic power. Empirically no such threshold has been
demonstrated. In addition it is apparent that socialist governments have not
introduced welfare states earlier than more liberal regimes - a factor that also weakens
the hypothesis (Jessop B 1996).
The failure of the analysis based on the direct intervention by the state and citizens of
a country, the so-called structuralist approaches, led investigators to focus on the role
of the economy in regulating the supply of welfare. In particular the emphasis was
shifted onto market regulation by employers, with the state acting as an agent to
assure future market development. These can be summarised as the agency based
approaches stemming from the Marxist perspective (Jessop B 1996).
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The agency-based perspective assumes the state assures monopoly of capital by the 
dominant social order in order to maximise the value of the economy (Jessop B 
1996). The government achieves this by interaction or intervention to maintain a 
balance in order to achieve stability. O’Connor proposes that the state can achieve 
this by providing a positive feedback loop to the accumulation of capital (O'Connor 
1973). This position has been critiqued as being simplistic in the role of the state - as 
it has been demonstrated that the state plays a more active role, for example the fiscal 
support given to the currency during the sterling crisis in 1990 (Torfing 1998). An 
alternative approach to the agency hypothesis of welfare state development is more 
firmly based in the capital theory of Marxism (Kolakowski L 1978).
In classical Marxist capital theory - 3 modes of capitalism operation are recognised.
1. Laissez-faire
2. Monopoly capitalism
3. State monopoly capitalism.
These three modes of operation represent a natural evolution in capitalism. The
laissez-faire mode, with minimal state intervention has the effect of concentrating or 
monopolising capital such that a few hold the majority of capital. This leads naturally 
on to the stage of monopoly capitalism. This in turn leads to a breakdown of the profit
cycle and the stagnation of the economy. Therefore the state intervenes to ensure the
continuation of capital accumulation (Jessop B 1996). As part of this state
intervention, welfare services are provided in order to provide a deal with the labour
force so that capital can continue to circulate (George V and Wilding P 1996).
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Marxist capital theory has been criticised because of the inconsistencies about the 
role of the state (Laclau E and Mouffe C 1985). The evolution of capitalism from 
laissez-faire to state monopoly capitalism calls for the state to introduce changes, such
as the welfare state, in order to maintain the ideology of capitalism based on internal
demands. In practice this has not been shown to occur and any new bargain with the 
labour movement has been the result of external pressure such as war, rather than
internal ones (Laclau E and Mouffe C 1985; George V and Wilding P 1996).
The failure of the structuralist and agency perspectives of the regulatory actions of the
welfare state led investigators to concentrate their efforts in a combination of both the
structuralist and agency approaches, i.e. regulation of market effects by a combination 
of state, economy and civil society. These efforts initially focused on interactions 
based around the state provision of social benefits and the state regulation of private
and public bodies to regulate market effects (Gough I 1979). The interactions were
initially explained on the basis of social class development (Esping-Andersen G 
1990). The hypothesis of Esping-Andersen has been criticised by studies that have 
shown that welfare development cannot be explained on the basis of a class-labour 
struggle alone. The United States of America (USA) & UK at the turn of the century
had identical market and class structures. However, state health care development -
along with many other welfare developments - in the USA lagged behind the UK. 
This difference between the USA and UK cannot be explained by capital structures,
government ideology, Trade Union practices or the labour pool structure (Orloff AS
and Skocpol T 1984).
14
Orloff and Skocpol proposed that the developmental differences in welfare services in 
the USA and UK could be explained on the basis of the state management of welfare
benefits via the actions of a civil service. In an analysis of the US and UK welfare 
systems the differences between the countries could be explained on the basis of the 
presence of a professional civil service in the UK. However this analysis was not able 
to explain how the regulatory system might work (Allum P 1995) (Orloff AS and 
Skocpol T 1984). Torfing extended the explanation of Orloff and Skocpol by looking 
at the political and economic environments that surrounded the welfare state. He
realised that the regulatory mechanisms that surround the welfare state could not be
static. As the external economic and political environments changed, due to
technological change and the globalisation of the world economy, the regulatory 
mechanisms of market effects would also have to change. This would give the
regulatory mechanisms the characteristic of rationalising the welfare state in the face 
of market change. Torfing hypothesised that the basis for this ability to rationalise the
regulatory process within the welfare state must be the introduction of ambiguity and
strategy into the decision making process by allowing the population and economy to
interact with the management of the welfare state. By allowing ambiguity and strategy
Torfing was able to accommodate the uncertainty of economic and political
developments into the regulation of market development by the welfare state while
the state remains the driver of welfare development (Torfing J 1998)
The foundation of Torfing's view of the welfare state as a rationalising - regulatory
instrument was been laid in the post Second World War development of welfare
services. The stated aim of welfare development post war was to ensure economic 
prosperity while providing for social justice in the form of redistribution (Gough I
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1979). These aims defined that the distribution of welfare benefits was to be 
dependent on the state’s role in promoting stability, the economic corporation’s role 
in ensuring capital development and the civil society’s role in providing the labour 
force. Therefore the welfare state can be seen as the product of three interactions
(Janoski T 1998)
1. The interaction between civil society and corporations - the so-called labour 
compromise under which the workers agree to swap their efforts for wages.
2. The interaction resulting from economic intervention between the economic 
corporations and the government, under which the government agrees to 
support the efforts of commerce in exchange for taxation and other support. In
most modem societies this takes the form of Keynesian economic
intervention.
3. The interaction between civil society and the government, resulting in the
provision of welfare benefit.
These interactions are often graphically depicted, Figure 1.1
FIGURE 1.1 THE TRIAD OF HEALTH CARE PROVISION. 
Modified from (Janoski T 1998)
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It is important to note that in this model ‘the state’ includes the bodies involved in 
administering the local state - for example local health authorities - as well as 
governmental agencies and the civil service. Likewise the definitions of civil society 
and corporations are equally broad. Civil society is defined as the class structures and 
other organisations that define society, and corporations include not just the free 
market bodies that are centred on profits, but other private sphere bodies - including
churches, hospitals and Trade Unions (Torfing J 1996;Aglietta M 1979).
Torfing postulated that for the welfare state to function effectively in mitigating the
effect of the market, the interactions of the state, economy and civil society must be
in balance, i.e. the demands of one party in the interaction must not unnecessarily
outweigh the others. If one party were to be dominant then the benefits of the welfare
state would be skewed and the welfare state would cease to have a regulatory role.
The balance of state economy and civil society, however, is dynamic, and achieving a
balance results from the development of the interactions in the face of changing
economic and social environments, this balance he termed the tripartite regulatory
relationship. The tripartite regulatory relationship, in Torfing’s hypothesis, serves to
explain both the development of welfare services and to whom the services are
delivered (Torfing J 1996)
Torfing’s believed that the tripartite regulatory relationship was a result of the
strategic compromise in setting up the welfare state. In order that economic and
political uncertainty could be accommodated within the system the state management 
of the welfare state, via a civil service, of a dynamic relationship of state economy
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and civil society was in effect mandatory as a mechanism. Without the presence of 
this mechanism the structure of the welfare state would require revisiting with every 
economic, political and technical development (Torfing J 1998).
Torfing looked to the Danish Welfare system to confirm his hypothesis. The Danish
system is based on the Fordist Scandinavian system. The Scandinavian system also
draws heavily on a home grown version of Keynesian economic exchange and
Beveridge style social benefits. These influences led to a partially state funded system
of social and health care benefits in a highly institutionalised framework that supports
the principles of mass production. However, the elements of mass production are
small in Denmark and the welfare system has a fairly large element of non­
manufacturing elements, like the protection of rural workers. Therefore the 
development of the Danish welfare state can be seen as a product of political strategy, 
partly based on Keynesian economics with a commitment to universal benefits and 
full employment (Torfing J 1998).
Torfing’s research confirmed that many of the decisions made in the Danish welfare 
state were the products of a welfare state regulating market developments but 
incorporating in its structure elements of strategy and ambiguity that can 
accommodate uncertainty in the political, social and economic environments. 
Torfing’s analysis of Denmark also provides evidence that the major mechanism by 
which regulatory control be the welfare state is achieved is by a tripartite relationship 
in which the organisations involved have adopted specific roles (Torfing J 1998).
Torfing’s view of the welfare state provides the link between policy, policy 
implementation and the failure of the welfare state to achieve objectives. If the
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tripartite regulatory relationship can be shown to exist in a welfare system, then the 
failure of the welfare state to meet objectives should be reflected in an imbalance in 
the tripartite regulatory relationship. This imbalance in turn must be reflected by an 
imbalance in the policy and implementation processes that underlies the welfare state, 
as the tripartite relationship is a direct product of state policy modified for political, 
social and economic circumstance. Therefore the key to proving the hypothesis
introduced in section 1.4 is the demonstration that
1. The NHS can be viewed as a tripartite relationship
2. The tripartite relationship that surrounds the NHS is not in balance
3. The imbalance in the tripartite relationship causes the failure to meet objectives
4. The imbalance in the tripartite relationship is a function of policy and policy
implementation.
1.5.4 The Welfare State and the NHS as an Institution
Torfing's view provides the basis on which to prove the hypothesis introduced in 
section 1.4. However his research does not outline an analytical method. As was
mentioned above it is the intention of this thesis to analyse the NHS as an institution.
In the context of the current study an institution is a group of organisations that are 
working together to achieve a common aim, in our case the state, economy and civil 
society are working together to achieve the functioning of the welfare state. The 
analysis of institutions is a broad analytical method designed to determine the power 
structure of an institution in terms of its component organisations. Institutional 
analysis offers a number of advantages. In particular it allows for the function of an 
organisation to be presented at a general level while allowing for management
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decision making to be divorced from the principles of operation. This permits a 
simplification of the analysis and avoids any emphasis on technical efficiency. 
Therefore when it is applied to a state body it provides a direct link to government 
policy, as the principles of operation are often the direct product of policy.
Analysing the NHS as though it were an institution implies that the partners in the 
tripartite regulatory relationship have adopted specific roles, and seek to influence
decisions made about a specific range of welfare issues. Furthermore it is implicit in 
this method that the players in the tripartite relationship have adopted an 
organisational structure that enables them to have influence.
The analysis of state bodies as institutions relies on the organisations within the state
body adopting Institutional Isomorphism (Morgan G 1990). Institutional Isomorphism 
means that the organisations within a state body, such as the NHS, have adopted the 
characteristics of commercial organisations to maximise influence. Institutional 
isomorphism has been described in other scenarios of organisational regulation in the 
presence of uncertainty. Allen described the appearance of Institutional Isomorphism 
in the UK mining industry in the 1960’s and 70’s in response to uncertain 
technological and economic situations. Morgan then used an institutional analysis, 
based on determining the roles of organisations within the nationalised coal industry, 
to confirm that this analytical method can be applied to isomorphic institutions, in
situations of uncertainty, in state organisations (Allen VS 1981; Morgan G 1990).
The analysis of the NHS as an isomorphic institution is an important tool. The use of 
an institutional analysis enables the ambiguity and strategy that makes the welfare
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state possible to be analysed out - as the analysis focuses on the principles of 
operation that underlie the structure. Second it provides a way to look at the 
underlying tripartite structure - as any imbalance in the tripartite structure will be 
evident in the institutional analysis as differences in the organisational power
structure.
While the validity of Torfing’s ideas about the tripartite structure of the UK welfare
state are the subject of chapters 2 and 3 of this thesis, the conditions permitting the
NHS to be viewed as an isomorphic institution have a basis in reality - although no
formal institutionalisation exists. There is considerable evidence that social welfare
structures (including health-care) institutionalises policy formulation in the context of 
a civil, political and economic relationship (Doyal L and Pennel I 1979). This
institutionalisation reflects the key forces at work in deciding the outcomes of social
policy (Torfing J 1996). In other words the institutional relationship decides the
outcome of social policy as the institutionalisation of the services provided controls
who gets access to the service (Doyal L and Pennel 1 1979).
The institutionalisation of the NHS arises as a result of the way in which the welfare 
state features in post-war developments in the UK. Economic prosperity in post war
Britain was provided by the adoption of the Keynesian system of economic 
intervention - which encouraged the maximum exploitation of productive capacity -
but was subject to amendment for the economic, political and social structure of the
UK (Keynes JM 1936).
The state’s ability to utilise the Keynesian system was dependent on the labour
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compromise between state labour and employers figure LI. This compromise in the 
post war UK was characterised as Fordist (Orloff AS and Skocpol T 1984) - the 
compromise of labour to accepting higher wages for abandoning artisan methods of 
production, in favour of mass production. This leaves employees with spare capital 
that could be consumed in other ways (Ford H 1926). The Fordist compromise had a 
profound effect on the shape of health care and other welfare systems in the UK. 
These social schemes now had to support mass production methods. This was a major
change away from systems based on private insurance or altruism to systems based on 
the concept of solidarity. Therefore a new civil-society state interaction was needed,
however this interaction would have to accommodate the amendments to the
Keynesian system. Therefore, in place of private care bodies a range of state 
institutions arose with civic duty. These bodies were now populated by civil servants,
to allow the required flexibility (Orloff AS and Skocpol T 1984). The situation of
the interaction is shown in Figure 1.2.
Fordist Compromise
FIGURE 1.2 THE TRIAD OF POST W.W.ll UK WELFARE PROVISION.
This triad required that the organisations that are participating in the welfare state 
adopt forms that facilitate their role in influencing the welfare state (Doyal L and 
Pennel I 1979) and thereby legitimises the analysis of the NHS as an institutional
isomorph.
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The view of the modem welfare state as an institutionalisation of the forces
controlling, directing and benefiting from the service is not the only way in which the
modem state can be considered. Other analysis frameworks do exist, including the
Welfare Society Framework - where the welfare state is seen as the product of the 
forces at work within the total populace. An alternative analysis is the State Affluent 
Society Framework - where the welfare state is a product of the intervention of the 
state in assuring an affluent society (Torfing J 1998). These frameworks are 
legitimate instruments to use, however the institutional analysis methodology 
provides the best analytical tool with which to consider the development of the 
welfare state from the total society viewpoint. In the other views one or other of the 
parties involved in the welfare state are assumed to be passive players for the purpose 
of the analysis. Therefore for the purposes of this analysis it was decided to proceed
with the institutional analysis proposed.
1.5.5 The Conduct of Institutional Analysis on an Isomorphic Institution such as 
the NHS
To achieve an institutional analysis on a state body three schemes are possible.
The first scheme is the top down approach, where policy is examined from the 
government down to the operations level. This approach has two major drawbacks
(Sabatier P 1998).
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1. The complexities of the task - as many individual agents are involved.
2. If social policy were a product influenced by external parties then such an 
approach would miss the important interactions between the agencies.
The second scheme is the bottom up approach - looking at operational decisions. This 
approach - while having simplicity - might lead to too great a focus on local issues, 
therefore the overall impact of what drives change and the impact change should have 
would be lost (Sabatier P 1998). However it is apparent that if institutional imbalance 
exists that the most likely manifestation will be in the local decision making.
The third scheme is a hybrid of the two approaches. It involves a top down analysis of 
the important themes of political values - for example, the effect of the Welfare State
on the workforce - permitting a definition of the decision making environment. This
is coupled with a bottom up analysis of how decision-makers respond. In this case the
bottom up analysis will involve an abstraction of the salient features of the decision
making process - which makes the results generalizable. In this way the origins and
substance of policy analysis can be directly married with the impact of operational
decisions in a manner that can be more broadly interpreted (Torfing J 1996).
This thesis will concentrate on the third approach and will follow the analysis plan 
outlined by Sabatier and Sabatier and Manziman (Sabatier P 1998) (Sabatier P and
Manziman D 1979). This involves
1. The definition of the institution
2. Defining the objectives of reform
3. Defining the policy process in institutional terms
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4. Defining the implementation process
5. Characterising the outputs of policy after implementation
6. Establishing a causality between the output, the implementation and the
institutionalisation
These steps will involve some special analytical techniques. These will be detailed
within the following chapters
1.6. Testing the Hypothesis - The Analysis Plan
In order to consider the hypothesis proven in institutional terms it must be shown,
using the analytical methods that were introduced above, that
1. The NHS is subject to tripartite regulation and can be described as an institution
2. The development and implementation of health care policy in the UK is
inconsistent with the manner in which the NHS exists as an institution in accordance
with Torfing’s ideas of tripartite regulation.
3. The NHS reforms have failed to achieve aspects of social policy.
4. That the failure of reform can be linked to demonstrated imbalances in the
institutional analysis.
The Institutional analysis performed within this thesis is to determine the relative 
strengths of influence of the organisations that make up the tripartite relationship by
1. Considering the strengths of the organisations in terms of achievement of aims
and supporting the mode of accumulation seen in the NHS
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2. Determining the influence of the organisation in shaping decision making about 
the delivery of services
In order to achieve this several analytical steps will be performed in accordance with 
Sabatier’s plan (the details of the analytical methods are contained within the 
chapters).
First the NHS will be considered in two time periods - pre 1982 and post 1982. The 
period 1948-1982 will be used to confirm that Torfing’s ideas on tripartite regulation 
apply to the NHS. The second period will be used to perform a top down analysis in
institutional terms of policy formulation. Next the actions of decision-makers in the 
NHS will be reviewed looking for the organisational influences determining the 
direction of decision making. Finally these analysis will be combined looking for 
links between institutional imbalance and the outcomes of policy. In particular this 
final stage in the analysis will seek to establish the existence of a feedback between a 
failure of reform to meet objectives, institutional imbalance and inconsistent policy 
with respect to the organisations that support the NHS - Figure 1.3.
Failure to meet Objectives
Institutional imbalance <- Failure of Policy to 
accommodate organisations 
that support the NHS
FIGURE 1.3 THE LINKAGE BETWEEN THE ELEMENTS OF THE HYPOTHESIS
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1.7. Plan of Thesis
In order to provide answers to the posed questions this thesis will consider each of the 
questions in a series of parts, Figure 1.4.
FIGURE 1.4 PLAN OF THESIS
Introduction
The NHS as an Instituion
The 1990 NHS Reforms
Institutional Impact of the reforms Service Impact of the reforms
Establishing a Link Between insitituional and Service Impact
Southampton Case Study }
Results and Conclusion
Chapter one and two of the thesis will review the development of the NHS, from its
inception in 1948 to 1982. The purposes of these chapters are to
1. Give the history of the NHS from an institutional perspective (Chapter 2)
2. Confirm that Torfing’s hypothesis of the role of political strategy and ambiguity on 
the development of health care services since the Second World War applies to the
NHS (Chapter 3)
3. Confirm that the conditions for an institutional analysis are fulfilled.
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The thesis will then explore the reform of the NHS beginning in 1982 (Chapter 4) and
continuing into the 1989 reforms, both in terms of the ideology, (Chapter 5), and the 
implementation of the reforms, (Chapter 6). The exploration of the recent NHS 
reforms will conclude with an assessment of the impact of the reforms (Chapter 7),
both in terms of the impact on services and the institution.
The purpose chapters 4-7 of the thesis is to confirm that the elements relating to the 
hypothesis are present. That is the formulation of policy within the NHS was 
ideologically motivated and considered without the impact of the implementing 
organisation and that the reforms have failed to deliver policy expectations.
The final chapters of the thesis establish the causal link between the elements of the 
hypothesis. Chapter 8, a description of the case study created in Southampton Health 
Authority, looks at the impact of policy making on decision making in the NHS. This
is followed by an introduction to the analytical method to be used. The method 
chosen for this stage was Judgement Analysis. Chapter 10 implements Judgement 
Analysis on the case study and the results are reported in Chapter 11. Chapter 12 
focuses on the way in which the institutionalisation has influenced decision making
and the links between the institutional imbalance and modes of accumulation and
service failure.
The thesis ends with chapter 13 with a review of the implications of the results of the




The underlying theme of this thesis is that the process of health care policy 
formulation and implementation in the UK distorts decision making such that the 
objectives of the NHS reforms fail to be met. This hypothesis will be examined using 
an institutional analysis of decision making by the tripartite regulatory organisations 
that surround the NHS. This process will begin with an assessment of the applicability 
of such an analysis to the NHS, and proceed into the main analysis. In order to capture 
all of the dimensions of decision making this analysis will consist of both bottom up 
and top-down elements.
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Chapter 2 - A regulationist View of UK Health care development 
Part 1. The development of Health care services in the UK Pre-War 
until 1982
2.1 Key Points from the Previous Chapter
The NHS has undergone repeated reform since its inception in 1948, with the pace of 
reform gaining momentum and culminating in the 1990 reforms. These reforms have 
not always succeeded in achieving the political, social and economic aims of health 
care policy. The hypothesis in this thesis is that these failures are due to a lack of
consideration of the incumbent influences when formulating how changes in policy
are designed and implemented. The result of this lack of consideration is that 
although policy begins as a radical change the subsequent processing of policy leads 
to less radical options being implemented due to the impact of external influences on 
policy. These less radical options often preserve the status quo of policy and so result 
in policy failure.
The major organisational influences on social policy in the UK are the roles played by 
the state, economy and civil society. The major force behind these influences the 
NHS is the ideology of protecting the vulnerable from market developments. It has 
been hypothesised that the ideologically driven reforms have led to the failure of the 
state to evolve a policy that is consistent across these bodies which has led to the 
failure of the policy to achieve its objectives. The analytical framework chosen to test 
this hypothesis was to consider the NHS as an institutionalisation of state, economy 
and civil society - linked in the so-called tripartite relationship. Torfing first
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described this analytical framework. This framework was selected on the basis of its 
ability to explain the development of the welfare state post war therefore before 
proceeding to use this framework for an analysis of the recent reforms it is important 
to test its suitability in the NHS.
2.2 Objectives for this Chapter
This chapter is aimed at reviewing the history and origins of the NHS from an
organisational viewpoint prior to assessing the suitability of the selected analytical
framework in the following chapter (Chapter 3). Therefore this chapter seeks to
identify the nature, history and evolution of the organisations involved in the
development and management of health care services before and after the
establishment of the NHS.
2.3 The Background to the Foundation of the NHS
The NHS was launched on the 5th July 1948. It was the first health care system in the 
Western World to offer free medical care to the entire population of a country (Ham
C 1996). Prior to the development of the NHS, a mixture of private insurance and
means-tested state provision had provided health-care across the populace (Frazier D
1984). The transformation of the insurance-based service into a universal state-
provided service seemed dramatic. However, the changes were based on a series of
developments that gradually transferred the responsibility for the provision of health
care from individuals to state organisations (Honigsbaum F 1989). The key milestones
in these developments are given in Table 2.1.
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County Asylum Act 1845 Creation of asylum
Public Health Act 1848 Local authorities responsible for 
sanitation
Metropolitan Poor Act 1867 Creation of infirmaries
Midwives Act 1902 Registration of midwives
Education (Administrative 
Provision) Act
1907 Creation of the school medical 
service
National Insurance Act 1911 Free GP services to the poor
Maternity and Child 
Benefit Act
1918 Local authorities responsible for 
child welfare
Local Government Act 1929 Local authorities responsible for 
infirmaries
(Source (Gilbert BB 1966) (Ham C 1996))
The reasons behind the changes are complex but are based on concerns regarding the 
stability of the UK industrial and colonial aspirations. For many years, prior to the 
First and Second World Wars, the declining health of the working population had 
given considerable worry to industrialists. It was felt that the decline in the health of 
workers was a serious threat to the prosperity of the country as unfit workers were 
unable to produce at maximum capacity (Doyal L and Pennel I 1979). This was 
coupled to anxieties by the medical profession about the provision and payment of 
care for the high levels of illness in the lower social classes. The inability of many 
workers to pay for the care they needed led to many families doing without essential 
care and a drift of the medical profession towards more affluent practice which 
further denied access of the underprivileged to health care (Vaughan P 1950).
The industrial and medical concerns about the health of the working population had 
emerged in the early nineteenth century and proved a powerful and effective voices
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(Gilbert BB 1966). Initial lobbying resulted in the 1834 Poor Law Amendment. This 
amendment provided for the creation of workhouses. The law accepted that there was
an underclass of individuals who could not afford basic medical care and decided that
some care should be provided. However, the discussion about the state provision of 
services led to fears of the development of a dependency culture. So the standard of 
the workhouses was kept low, with no minimum standard of care defined, to act as a
deterrent to the working population seeking medical care (Frazier D 1984) (Abel-
Smith 1964).
Mirroring the changes in the development of workhouses, the 1845 County Asylum 
Act provided for the creation of asylums for the management of the mentally ill. The 
creation of these units was the responsibility of local magistrates, although again the 
services offered were generally of a poor standard, (Jones K 1972).
The 1834 and 1845 Acts provided care for the most needy. However, concerns about 
the industrial and colonial stability of the UK soon re-emerged due a shortage of fit 
recruits to join the armed services during the Crimea campaign (Frazier WM 1950).
This crisis emphasised the need to extend the availability of medical care and to
improve the standards of living more widely (Frazier D 1984). The most significant
result of this realisation of need was Chadwick’s Public Health Act of 1848. This Act
aimed to provide adequate water supplies, sewage disposal and a General Board of 
Health. The role of the General board of Health was to ensure the adequate provision 
of health care and preventative health services, for the lower social classes. However, 
progress in instituting this Act was somewhat patchy and, as a result, in 1867 the
Metropolitan Poor Act was passed. This Act established the formation of infirmaries
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outside of workhouses that could be funded by charitable contributions and could
provide health-care for all social classes. This Act together with the 1834 Poor Law
Amendment were the primary acts to enforce the principle of the duty of the state to
provide health-care for the poor (Frazier WM 1950). However, the Act did not give
guidance as to the standards and range of services that should be offered and for the 
most part health care remained under private control. Private practice pre-NHS was 
largely insurance funded and based around private general practice together with 
voluntary hospitals. The care offered by these organisations was termed “outside 
relief’ (Brand JL 1965). The two systems were often seen to lack consistency. This 
was particularly evident at the infirmary level where the poor were often denied 
access as they could not obtain referral notes from insurance funded primary care 
services (Abel-Smith 1964). An attempt was made in 1911 to regularise the process
with the National Insurance Act. This Act was concerned with the development of a 
unified GP service and provided free care from GPs to the low paid and unemployed
male workers and certain classes of female workers such as servants. The Act,
however, exempted higher paid workers, non-working females and families. This
resulted in the development of an irregular and inconsistent service as Doctors were 
paid on the basis of capitation rates determined by a Local Insurance Committee
rather than on the illness present in a community and the numbers of families the
Doctor agreed to care for, (Brand JL 1965).
In an attempt to redress the balance of care towards females and families other
changes were implemented. The Midwife Act (1902) and Education Act (1907)
aimed to raise the standards of care for the pregnant women and young children
(Donnison J 1977). These changes were backed by fiscal policy and in 1918 maternity
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and child benefit were introduced (Lewis J 1980).
Despite the policy changes the development of uniform and integrated health care
was seen to be slow (Abel-Smith 1964). This was attributed to the lack of
organisational structure. The 1929 Local Government Act aimed to unite parts of the 
service by transferring the operation of workhouses to the local authorities. However,
again this act did not define the ranges and standards of health care to be made
available and so the services remained erratic. However, the Act set precedence and it 
is said that this Act was the direct precursor of the NHS (Frazier WM 1950).
The outbreak of the Second World War was a major turning point in the development 
of health services in the UK. As part of the war effort, the Emergency Medical 
Service was established (Harris J 1981). The aims of this service were to provide
treatment for militar/ and civilian casualties and to co-ordinate services to use
resources efficiently. The Emergency Medical Service highlighted the poor state of 
many of the nation’s hospitals and gave an insight into the advantages of a co­
ordinated service under a central state organisation in managing and improving the
health of the entire population. The advantages of this co-ordinated service were
acknowledged in the Beveridge report (Beveridge W 1942). This report recommended 
a continuation of the Emergency Medical Service. This report, however, suggested
that the final structure of the services should be the result of a re-evaluation of the
health care process as part of the post-war economic restructuring of the country.
Accordingly discussions about the final structure of the NHS were started in 1944
when the future of the post-war welfare state came under scrutiny (Honigsbaum F
1989).
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2.4. The Establishment of the NHS
2.4.1 Background
In the middle of 1944 government departments were asked to produce white papers 
covering the range of services to be provided under the new welfare state. The 
guiding principles behind these new services were the need to provide free, universal 
welfare services with access available to all of the UK population. This guiding 
principle was termed as ‘The Consensus’. The need for the Consensus was 
determined by concerns about the stability of the UK post war - particularly in the 
face of a perceived communist threat (Frazier D 1984). In addition the Consensus was 
seen as essential to ensuring the success of the economic restructuring of the UK 
based on demand side and Keynesian economic levers, (Curwen P 1997).
Given the importance of the Consensus to the economic and social health of the UK, 
it was obvious that if the changes promised were to be achieved radical organisational 




3. Improve health-care quality.
There was wide acceptance of the need for organisational change however the way in
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which this was to be achieved was less clear. The major problem regarding the 
development of the NHS was the conflict between the need to co-ordinate services
and the organisations that would provide the administrative structure of this new
service. This conflict had been recognised as early as 1925. The Royal Commission
report on National Health Insurance (Royal Commission on National Health
Insurance 1926-1928) favoured the end of the insurance system, replacing it with a
publicly funded system. The British Medical Association (BMA), however, was 
staunchly in favour of an extension of the insurance-based system and sought to 
maintain the independent nature of medicine (Vaughan P 1950). The BMA also
argued that the model of insurance-based systems represented the model that most
European countries adopted and therefore were in the best interest of the public.
However, by 1944 some significant departures from the principle of private health­
care had occurred. Most notably the 1867 Metropolitan Poor Act that had placed 
medical care as a public service. The principle of a public service had also been re­
enforced by the 1920 Dawson Report that suggested that the only way to ensure the
health of a population was to make health-care freely available (Timmins N 1995).
The Dawson report also advocated the development of a unified health service, for 
both treatment and prevention. The need to supply services that prevented ill health 
was a weakness in the arguments for an insurance-based service. Under the 1848 
Public Health Act, local authorities were made responsible for the provision of 
preventative medical services. Since local authorities had a long tradition of public 
service, a move to an insurance-based system of health care would require a radical
rethink of local authority provision in the UK (Jewkes J and Jewkes S 1961). So
despite the importance of the Consensus the restructuring of the service was
constrained by historical developments.
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Given this background, and in accordance with the principle of The Consensus, in late 
1944 a white paper was produced outlining the development of a NHS (Ministry of 
Health and Department of health for Scotland 1944). This paper called for the NHS to 
be under state control, with local authorities being the major driver of services
(Honigsbaum F 1989). However, not everybody supported the development of the 
NHS according to the principles outlined in the 1944 paper. The insurance based
system left many parties with a vested interest in maintaining the status quo and at the 
time the negotiation regarding the formation of the NHS was proceeding, there was a
bewildering array of providers and insurers of health-care (Abel-Smith 1964). Central
to the system was the General Practitioners (GPs). The General Practitioners retained 
the rights of independence in the system, often working alone and relying on 
capitation fees for income. The General Practitioners regarded themselves as distinct
from the hospital sector. The hospital service itself was also in a state of flux. Here
there was confusion over the grading of doctors with the term specialist or consultant 
being retained only by the teaching hospitals. In many smaller hospitals General 
Practitioners were also the hospital doctors (Abel-Smith 1964; Ministry of Health and
Department of Health for Scotland 1946). The irrationality of this system was widely 
accepted as a price paid for the provision of flexible services (Doyal L and Pennel I
1979). However, the system did not promise the quality and the universality of
services contained in The Consensus. In addition the system was not able to guarantee
access to services as many of the smaller infirmaries relied on charitable donations to
fund services. With the depression years followed by the onset of a wartime economy
these funds had all but dried up (Abel-Smith 1964).
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So despite the agreement on the need for a new health care system, and the problems 
with the old system, the strength of feeling about the future structure of the service led 
to the discussions about the future of the NHS becoming stagnated. As a result in 
1944 a compromise of a mixed service was proposed. This would be basically private 
insurance based but with a safety net for the poor (Klein R 1995). The retention of the 
insurance system would at least in part allow the new service to build on existing 
structures. However doubt was expressed as to whether a co-ordinated service would 
be achievable with a mixed system and the Government opted for a contribution 
based service(Honigsbaum F 1989). In order not to inflame the passions of the 
powerful medical and insurance lobby, the Government stopped short of a state run 
service, leaving the door open for the insurance companies to control the new service 
and pay doctors accordingly. In this aspect the NHS can be seen as a compromise: a 
product of factors and pressures exerted on the government ministers at the time the
NHS was developed (Honigsbaum F 1989).
2.4.2 The Establishment of the NHS in 1948
The Labour government of 1945, under Attlee and Bevin, reviewed the wartime
discussions about the NHS and modified them. The resulting NHS Bill in 1946 
enforced the belief that the only way to provide an efficient service based on the 
Consensus was to nationalise the hospital services and provide a centrally co­
ordinated service (Bevin A 1961). In effect this Bill proposed for salaried hospital 
medical staff to be overseen by local authorities. The government also endorsed the 
suggestion that the planning of health services was to be in the hands of local 
authorities - albeit overseen by central government. These proposals were met with
39
fierce opposition from both inside and outside the government. It was argued that a 
central service was too bureaucratic and would lead to a weakening of local
government (Jewkes J and Jewkes S 1961). The BMA was also firmly against the 
proposal for salaried doctors arguing that such a system would lead to a reduction in 
choice and quality of care (Vaughan P 1950).
In the face of this opposition a compromise was again found (Bevin A 1961). Bevin 
proposed a change in the way in which General Practitioner services were to be
organised. The proposal did not enshrine the principle of salaried General
Practitioners but retained the insurance committees although these were renamed as
Local Executive Committees. All GP’s would be in contract with these boards. The
compromise also proposed that GPs in Health Centres would be paid on a mixture of
salaries and capitation fees. On this point the BMA rebelled. They sensed that this
was the beginning of salaried doctors. Their view was enforced by further proposals
to set up Medical Practitioner Committees to control where doctors could practice.
The resolution of these issues was achieved after some negotiations and backtracking. 
The proposal for part salaried doctors was changed to training GPs only, although the
Medical Practitioners Committee was eventually formed (Jewkes J and Jewkes S
1961).
After ail the negotiations the new service was formed in July 1948. The final
structure of the organisation is shown in Figure 2.1. This structure was the product of 
all of the negotiations and compromises that had taken place since 1946.
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FIGURE 2.1 THE STRUCTURE OF THE NHS, 1948-74
* Superseded by the Department of Health and Social Security 
(Source (Pater JE 1981))
2.5. The Structure of the NHS 1948 - 1974
The service was organised in three parts consisting of the General Practitioner
services, Local Authorities and Hospitals (Pater JE 1981).
2.5.1 General Practitioner Services
General Practitioners, together with the services of dentists, opticians and 
pharmacists, were administered by executive councils. These councils took over from
the insurance committees, and consisted of local professional, local authority and
ministry appointees. These councils were not management bodies but administered 
the contracts to the practitioners and handled complaints. This structure ensured that 
the independent nature of the primary care services was maintained.
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2.5.2. Local Authority Services
These services included maternity and child welfare clinics, health visiting, health
education, vaccination and ambulances. The key officer was the Local Medical
Officer of Health and funding was derived from taxation and local rates. As a result of
the NHS Act many of the hospitals previously controlled by local authorities, for
example the infirmaries and workhouses, were transferred into the control of the 
newly created Regional Hospital Boards and Hospital Management Committees.
2.5.3 Hospital Services
Under the 1948 act new bodies - the Regional Hospital Boards, Hospital Management 
Committees and Boards of Governors, administered the hospitals. Special status was 
granted to the teaching hospitals. The boards of governors of teaching hospitals were 
to be directly accountable to the Ministry of Health, and special funding was offered. 
However, the vast majority of hospitals came under the Regional Hospital Boards and 
Hospital Management Committees. This situation retained the discrepancies seen in
the old infirmary system of care, but was a compromise to ensure the support of
senior hospital physicians
2.6 The Development of the NHS 1948 - 1982
2.6.1 The NHS 1948 - 1960
One of the assumptions in setting up the NHS was that there was a finite quantity of
illness in the population, (Beveridge W 1942). It was thought that the introduction of
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a free service would lead to the long-term, reduction of illness. Therefore after an 
initial rise the numbers of patients seeking care would gradually decline. Only four
months after the service was launched it became apparent that the demands on the
service were unlikely to decline and the presumption was false (Klein R 1995). The
demand for services became so large that in 1949 a prescription charge was levied,
followed in 1950 by dental and optical charges and a ceiling on NHS expenditure.
Despite these measures increases in cost continued and in 1952 the Guillebaud Report 
was commissioned in the face of claims about extravagant expenditure (Ministry of
Health and Department of Health for Scotland 1956). The Committee was asked to
address if modification of the organisation of the service could result in cost
reductions and also to advise the Chancellor of the Exchequer of what steps could be 
taken to prevent the rising costs. In the end the Committee reported that no evidence
of extravagance could be found and that the structure of the NHS contributed to the
overspends, (Ministry of Health and Department of Health for Scotland 1956)
The response of the government to the findings of the expenditure review was to
attempt to make sure that the funds allocated to the service were spent more
efficiently. First the method of funding was changed. Up until 1956 health services
were funded on the basis of the sums demanded. Post 1956 the amount of money
available to the service was capped. This money was allocated from the Department 
of Health. How this money was spent remained the role of the periphery, but the 
Ministry now retained the right to influence the spending (Ministry of Health and 
Department of Health for Scotland 1956). Health policy therefore, post 1956, was to 
be the product of centralisation rather than decisions being made at local level 
(Ministry of Health and Department of Health for Scotland 1956).
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The financial constraints of the 1950s had severe effects on the direction of the
service. One of the founding principles of the NHS was an attempt to achieve a re­
distribution of services (Ministry of Health and Department of Health for Scotland 
1944). The fiscal problems in the 1950s led to a focusing of financial matters on the 
control of budgets rather than on the re-distribution of medical services. The effect of 
this was that the emphasis shifted from the planning of services to the rational use of
resources - although rationing was not yet on the agenda (Pater JE 1981).
2.6.2 The NHS in the 1960’s
By the late 1950’s the problem with the funding of the NHS was firmly a political 
issue. Correspondingly during the 1960s’ and 70s’ successive governments pledged 
extra funding to the NHS in an attempt to win political favour by tackling the 
problems caused by poverty and ill health (Klein R 1995). Therefore the period 1960 
to 1975 represented an era of growth in the NHS (Timmins N 1995). This growth, 
however, had to be handled very concisely if the delicate balance between the
medical and political parties in the NHS was to be maintained. Therefore, increased 
funding was combined with an increased emphasis on the efficiency and rationality in 
the use of resources in the NHS. The early 1960’s saw the appointment of economists 
to the NHS as well as to other governmental departments, and new methods of fiscal 
policy were developed. Most notably the Public Expenditure Survey Committee 
(PESC) system was established in 1961 (Curwen P 1997). This was an attempt to 
inject a greater influence of the state in the running of the NHS by the use of 
mathematical and accountancy methods (Klein R 1995). The change to centralised 
planning led to an increased emphasis being placed on cost benefit methods and on
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unified planning themes such as Programme Planning and Budgeting (PPB) and 
Programme Analysis Review (PAR) (Lord Fulton (Chairman) 1962) (Glennerster H 
1998). There were, however, countervailing pressures to the achievement of the
central control of finances within the NHS.
1. Medical Technology
The increase in financial support seen in the 1960’s was mirrored by an increase in 
the availability of medical technology (Rivett G 1998). The 1960s were an era of
tremendous medical advances. Hip replacement surgery and renal dialysis became
available, as did medication for the management of mental illness. These advances
were only available at a price and coupled with the increasingly aged population the 
growth in NHS funds was in danger of being outstripped by demands (Baggot R 1994)
(Rivett G 1998).
2. Staffing Pressures
The advances in technology resulted in a change in the professionals who used it. 
Many new skills and professions developed in the health service and staff came to
value their position more. Additionally the national wage settlements in the NHS,
which failed to keep pace with inflation, had the effect of a real-terms decline in the 
wages of NHS workers. These factors combined to increase a sense of militancy 
among NHS workers and the 1960’s and 70’s were marked by an growing number of
industrial disputes in the health service (Lord Walton of Detchant 1998).
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3. The Lack of Planning Levers
In order to meet the demand of medical technology and staff wages, planners were 
forced to consider controlling demands instead of planning the system. However the
tools that were available to control demand at a state level were limited. This was
because the demand at a local level was under the control of the doctors and patients,
and these groups were insensitive to the levers applied from the Ministry of Health 
(Klein R 1995) (Ministry of Health and Department of Health for Scotland 1956). 
Therefore any centralisation of demand would require a change in the doctor patient 
relationship. This however raised a further problem, that of the conflict between the 
demands of the doctor - to give therapy to an individual - versus the NHS, which 
functions to provide health care population. This conflict between the absolutist and
utilitarian ethics was as great as it was complex. The medical profession was against 
the utilitarian ethic as they argued that it could lead to the situation where patients
may receive sub-optimal therapy, white the NHS argued that it could not support,
financially, the absolutist movement(Vaughan P 1950; Platt R 1963).
The only solution to the organisational and technological problems in the NHS was to
introduce the rationing of services as a function of planning and demand management
(where demands could be controlled) (Webster C 1998). The first attempt at planning 
a rationed service was the 1962 Hospital Plan for England and Wales, published by
Enoch Powell - then Minister for Health (J Enoch Powell 1966). It was an attempt to
devise a national plan for distributing hospital beds according to need. It established 
national norms for hospital beds and called for a £500 million investment in services. 
The pattern of service was also to change with services being provided on a District
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General Hospital basis. District General Hospitals were envisaged as large hospitals 
providing about 600 beds serving 100 - 150,000 people. This plan reflected the 
feeling of the time and served to marry the needs of the medical profession and the 
rationalistic planners. This was evident when the plan was re-visited in 1969. The 
Bonham Carter Panel, the panel who reviewed the 1962 plan, had no fewer than 12 
doctors on it (Department of Health and Social Security 1969). This panel 
recommended that the new hospitals should be larger in order to support the 
consultants working in the hospital. This plan, however, was never accepted as
official policy as politicians became concerned at the social impact of building 
technological palaces to the detriment of local services. In effect members of 
parliament were left with the political fall out from the closure of local facilities and 
therefore hospital building began to slide down the political agenda (Klein R 1995). 
The shrinkage of the building programme coincided with increased salary and other
demands from NHS workers and faced with the choice of buildings or industrial
unrest, the politicians increased the salaries (Crossman R 1972).
The National Plan for Hospitals was responsible, indirectly, for an increase in
organisational problems within the NHS. The plan - as discussed above - can be seen 
as an attempt to introduce control and prescriptive planning. This move was resisted
strongly and two reasons for its inappropriateness were put forward. The first of these 
was that due to the diversity of local populations, a national plan could not be upheld.
The second related to the future needs of the health service. It was argued that it was
not possible to set local priorities so that future needs could be met (Allen D E 1979).
These conflicts over the 1962 hospital plan only served to emphasise a growing 
disparity between the central structures in the NHS - the Ministry of Health - and the
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peripheral operational structures. This disparity concentrated on the accusations that 
the centre was not sensitive to the operational needs, while the centre accused the 
periphery of being too focussed on the local issues and not seeing the bigger picture. 
These frustrations spilled out into open debate in journals such as the BMJ (Lord 
Walton of Detchant 1998). This atmosphere of mutual frustration would be one the 
key themes of the development and change in the NHS in the 1960s and 197O’s(J
Enoch Powell 1966; Klein R 1995).
2.6.3. The Structure of the NHS 1974-1982.
A reform of the NHS was instigated in 1972, with the aim of unifying the hospital and
general practice arms of the service in an attempt to resolve some of the 
organisational problems in the service (Klein R 1995). The reforms were 
implemented in 1974. The revised structure is shown in Figure 2.2 (Department of
Health and Social Security 1972).
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FIGURE 2.2 THE STRUCTURE OF THE NHS IN ENGLAND, 1974-82
(Department of Health and Social Security 1972)
Regional Health Authorities (RHA) took over from Regional Health Boards. The 
RHA had a wider range of responsibilities than the Regional Health Boards, and had 
different geographical coverage. Beneath the RITA were the Area Health Authorities
(AHA). The members of the AHA were appointed partly by the RHA, partly by local 
authorities and partly by members of the non-medical and nursing staff. The AHA 
chair was appointed by the Secretary of State. The function of the AHA was the 
planning and management of services. This included the co-ordination of the three 
arms of the service. Teams of specialised officers supported the AHA. These were
the Family Practitioner Committees and the District Management Teams. The Family
Practitioner Committee administered the Dentists, General Practitioner, Optician and
Pharmacist contracts. The AHA, local professionals and local authorities, appointed 
FPC members. District Management Teams were responsible for the secondary care
services.
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The arrangements for Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland were different. In Wales
the Welsh Office took the function of RHA. In Scotland the Scottish Office dealt
directly with fifteen health boards that were comprised of a number of districts. In 
Ireland there were four area boards accountable to the Department of Health and
Social Security.
The reforms also attempted to bring about changes in the medical profession -
manager relationship. Doctors were given a stronger voice, centred more at the
District Management Team level, but with supporting managerial committees at RHA 
level (Klein R 1995). The patients were given a stronger voice with the advent of
Community Health Councils (CHC). Local Authority power was in effect weakened, 
with local representatives only being at the RHA level. The re-organisation however
was not successful in combining the hospital service with that of primary care due to 
a strong lobby from the General Practitioners. However, the 1974 reorganisation did 
attempt to inject some efficiency into the primary care services, by looking to reform
deputising services and the appointments system. These changes were adopted from a
report submitted to the department of health in 1973 (Department of Health and
Social Security 1973).
2.6.4 The NHS 1974 Until 1982.
The years 1974-80 were marked by a deep economic depression (Curwen P 1997).
This period was remarkable for the deep political and ideological unrest engendered
by the financial crisis, with a large number of strikes and frequent swings of national
mood (Harmon MD 1997). To a large degree, however, the NHS remained untouched
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by this new harsh political environment. This is largely an effect of its popularity 
with the populace (Klein R 1995). Resources continued to grow, largely through 
decreases in capital expenditure (Ham C 1996). The mood, however, within the NHS 
remained one of financial stringency. The demands of an ageing population
continued to grow, as did the wages bill. So despite the relative increase in funding 
the NHS was actually running a considerable financial deficit (Le Grand J and Vizard
P 1998).
In 1976 a new planning system for the NHS was introduced to cope with the new 
demands. Health Authorities were now requested to produce strategic plans, reflecting
national and local priorities (Department of Health and Social Security 1976). This 
was accompanied by the production of a document containing national norms and 
priorities. This document, Priorities for Health and Personal Social Services in 
England, reflected the prescriptive planning process and laid down systems for the 
number of beds, nurses, etc. in each geographical area. The document was not only 
designed to stimulate planning, but also to look at geographical distribution
(Department of Health and Social Security 1976). The ‘Priorities’ document did not
fit well with the financial and economic environment reflective of the time. The
proposals were found to be lacking the expertise at local level to develop the plans 
and, without the capital expenditure being made available, increasing amounts of 
patient resources had to be devolved to keeping the hospitals going (Klein R 1995).
The situation was compounded by industrial relations problems within the NHS.
Doctors, angered by declining living standards, took industrial action in the middle of
the 1970s, as did ancillary and nursing staff (Lord Walton of Detchant 1998). Patients
too were becoming more organised with the formation of support groups. These
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groups - such as MIND the mental health charity - set about lobbying policy makers 
for increasing resources (Klein R and Lewis J 1976)
It is hardly surprising that these difficulties led to an increase in the organisational 
problems within the NHS. These problems were reflected as an organisational stasis 
with planning as its first casualty. A Royal Commission was established in 1979 to 
address the problem of the inability of the NHS to plan the use of resources (Royal 
Commission on the NHS 1979). The Commission’s report commented on the power 
of the professionals within the service and attributed some of the problems to this 
cause, but also noted that the failure of the 1974 reforms to deliver change was also a 
factor. It commented that there was widespread disillusionment with the new 
structure due to its complexity and bureaucracy. In practice the refonns had done 
little to assist the organisational problems, and due to the extensive checking 
procedures on NHS plans introduced in 1976, the bureaucracy inhibited the function 
of the service. Particular concerns were voiced about the lack of accountability of the 
new structure and the inability to monitor expenditure. The cause of these problems 
was said to be the AHA (Royal Commission on the NHS 1979). It was felt that 
AHA’s had not come to terms with its role and possessed a philosophy out of tune 
with the rest of the organisation. These findings were underlined by the so-called 
“Normansfield Hospital Inquiry”, held in 1978-79 (Commission of inquiry into 
Normansfield hospital 1978). This was an inquiry into the conditions in a psychiatric 
hospital, where self harm and abuse amongst inmates provoked a national scandal. 
The report highlighted the organisational stasis between professionals and 
management as the principle problem, but criticised the AHA for its failure to control 
the situation. This report also questioned the role of the CHC and suggested that many
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of the problems could have been avoided if the CHC had been allowed to fulfil its
role as representative of the populace.
Faced with these problems the 1979 Royal Commission made 117 recommendations. 
(Royal Commission on the NHS 1979). These included the abolition of the Family 
Practice Committees and removal of the AHA team of management. It also suggested 
a move away from the national planning approach. The findings of the Commission 
were agreed on by the incoming Conservative Government in 1979. This government 
was committed to limiting government expenditure and to the value of public 
enterprise and immediately set about reducing central domination of the NHS. It 
published a consultation document (Patients First) in 1979. This called for a reduction 
in administration - a move widely welcome and it came as no surprise when ‘Patients 
First’ founded the basis for the 1982 reorganisation of the service (Department of 
Health and Social Security 1979).
2.7 Politics Policy and the Development of the NHS Until 1982
The 1982 reorganisation marks the end of the first stage of NHS evolution. Pre 1982 
reforms were committed to maintaining a semblance of commitment to the concept of
universal health care as embodied in the Consensus. The 1982 reforms - as we will
discuss later - formed a watershed as implicit in the changes was a move away from 
the Consensus ideals. This therefore is an appropriate place to stop and analyse the 
development of the first phase of NHS development in light of the institutional 
framework proposed in chapter 1. Before doing this in the following chapter it will 
prove useful to recap the ideological basis for the developments seen in the NHS.
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At the end of World War Two all of the political parties were committed to the end of 
the fragmented health care system that had predominated pre-war (Honigsbaum F 
1989). However ideologically there was no agreement on how this should be achieved 
(Klein R 1995). The incoming Labour Party was committed to the use of demand side
management to achieve both economic and social aims for the NHS, and proceeded to 
do so despite the mounting evidence that demand side tools were not the best way to 
manage the NHS (J Enoch Powell 1966). In the era up until 1974 this reluctance to
abandon ideological aims was manifested by the repeated restructuring of the NHS in
the search for a structure that would allow demand management to be effective. In 
pursuing this route the governments of the era looked internally for solutions and 
therefore policy was manufactured - by on large - in isolation. Examples of this
include the failure to include broader industrial interests in the foundation of the
service (Frazier D 1984; Deakin N 1994). Indeed during this period many 
opportunities to integrate policy into public life were ignored. A good example of this 
is the Plowden Committee recommendations, and the subsequent development of the 
Public Expenditure Survey Committee (Deakin N 1994). This system of creating five 
year plans to manage resources gave the opportunity to link public needs with 
anticipated growth. However, the opportunities afforded by the scheme were largely 
missed (Lowe R 1993).
The failure of successive governments to correct the problems posed by the NHS and 
instead the repeated reliance on reorganisation has been blamed on the actions of the 
civil servants (Lowe R 1993). The Civil Service appeared to lack the management 
skills to develop the mechanism to ensure alignment between social and policy aims
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(Deakin N 1994). In these circumstances it has been promoted that the NHS 
developed along administrative lines - i.e. 4Whatever’s Best Administered’ (Deakin 
N 1994). The NHS was not the only welfare institution to suffer this fate. Similar 
tales are recounted in the relationship between various governments and local 
authorities (Deakin N 1994; Higgins J Deakin N Edwards J and Wicks M 1984).
Therefore the ethos of ‘Whatever’s Best Administered’ was prevalent in whatever
political party or welfare institution was being considered in the years until 1982.
2.8 Conclusions from Chapter 2
The NHS was the first national health care service in the world to offer a universal
health care system. This was based on a post war Consensus agreement about the
need to provide universal care free at the point of delivery to a UK population
recovering from the effort of the Second World War. However, the foundation of the
NHS had a pluralistic purpose, as the NHS was also part of the wider post war
economic restructuring of the UK. The achievement of these aims has proved more
difficult to obtain than was at first thought and the governments of the period, 
committed to the use of Keynesian economic tools, have found it impossible to
balance the economic and social demands of the NHS. This lack of balance has been
manifest as organisational and financial problems. These problems have been
recognised by the governments of the time, and in an attempt to remedy these 
problems a variety of reforms, centred about the increasing use of rational planning,
were tried in the years up until 1982. These fixes involved shifting power between the 
state and the medical profession in an attempt to gain a structure that could be directly
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administered using Keynesian economic tools. Although many of the reforms did 
show some short-term benefit, they were not long-term fixes, particularly in the face 
of worsening economic conditions. The adherence of successive UK governments to 
the use of Keynesian economic tools in the NHS is evidence for the fact that ideology 
played a major role restructuring and function of the NHS up until 1974. This is in 
line with the hypothesis introduced in chapter 1, as it supports the idea that much of 
the change seen in the NHS has been ideologically motivated.
However, if we are to assert the entire hypothesis then the problems seen in the 
ideology motivated NHS should be compounded by evidence of a strong institutional 
network surrounding the NHS and influencing policy. In addition if the hypothesis on 
policy making in isolation is correct then the nature of the reforms and the reasons 
why they failed should be explainable by a lack of balance in the framework and a 
failure to fonnulate coherent social policy. If this is proven then it would argue for the 
validity of the framework developed by Torfing. This validation is the subject of the 
next chapter.
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Chapter 3 A Regulationist view of UK Health care development 
Part 2 an Institutional analysis of Developments until 1982
3.1 Key points from the Previous Chapter
In the last chapter we reviewed the development of the NHS from the historical 
viewpoint. This highlighted that the NHS was the product of developments achieved 
over the century prior to the Second World War. The effect of this development was 
that the NHS, founded on the Emergency Medical Service in 1948, is a product of a
number of long-standing political economic and social concerns. In these
circumstances it proved impossible to create a new service and some compromises
were needed in the negotiations that established the NHS. These compromises caused
weaknesses and inconsistency in the operation of a service that aimed to both pacify a 
war-torn country and assist its economic development. In addition the NHS was based 
on a supposition that there was a finite quantity of ill health and that the need to fund 
the sendee at high levels would be short lived and aftet a period the demand for 
funds would gradually decline. Shortly after the establishment of the service this 
supposition proved false. Therefore, from the outset of the service the NHS ran into 
organisational and financial difficulties. The principle tool used to control the NHS 
was the use of demand side management coupled with rational planning. This 
approach was founded on the Keynesian ideology of the economy. The use of this 
ideology and its associated economic tools proved difficult - as control of demand lay 
at the periphery of the service and was a function of the doctors and patients 
expectations. Therefore a series of administrative changes were used to make the
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service more amenable to demand management. These changes, however, served to
uncover organisational difficulties within the NHS - which further diminished the
power of demand side tools. Therefore a cycle was established by which more reform 
fuelled demands for more reform. The situation culminated in the Royal Commission
of 1979 that recommended radical change.
3.2 Key Objectives for this Chapter
This chapter aims to establish the suitability of the analytical method based on the
ideas of Torfing and adopted in the Introduction to this thesis as a method to
understand the reasons behind the failure of NHS reform to establish change. The
centre of this analytical method is to view the NHS as an institution and to examine
the workings of the institution to see if it can explain the failure of reform. The first
step in this analytical process is to confirm that the NHS conforms to the idea of a
tripartite regulatory structure. This is to be achieved by
1. Confirming that a tripartite relationship of identifiable players with defined roles
underlines the activities of the NHS and that these organisations have adopted
structures that facilitate influence.
2. Indicate that the players in the interactions were subject to ambiguous roles and
open-ended political strategy, but acted in a rational manner - in order to allow for ad
hoc developments in the NHS.
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3. Indicate that the interactions can be simplified into an institutionalised tripartite 
relationship and that the actions of this relationship were responsible for the problems
and reforms seen in the NHS until 1982.
3.3 The Organisations Surrounding the NHS Development
3.3.1 Who Were the Tripartite Players in the NHS 1948 - 1982?
As discussed in the previous chapters the forces motivating the development of the 
NHS spanned 100 years. These forces can be summarised as (Doyal L and Pennel I
1979)
1. Economic - for example the concern of the industrialists for a supply of fit 
workers and the supply of fit soldiers for colonial expansion
2. Social - concerns over the stability of society, for example the new deal offered to 
returning soldiers after the second world war
3. Political - the change towards a socialist style of government.
Therefore from the outset the NHS can be seen as an organisation concerned with the
aspirations of state, economy and civil society (Doyal L and Pennel I 1979;
Honigsbaum F 1989).
This role of the NHS in fulfilling the aspirations of state economy and civil society is
enduring, whatever the era of the NHS. By the 1960’s the UK had a tradition of
formalising the inter-relationships between the state economy and the community. For
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example the 1960’s saw the end of informal ministerial relations and substitution with 
consultative committees, such as the National Council for Economic Development 
(NEDC; James S 1997; Wickham Jones M 1997). The NHS was part of this move as
the discussions extended to cover all aspects of the welfare state (Doyal L and Pennel
I 1979). Later, during the Wilson administration, with the formation of the
Confederation of British Industry (CBI) the relationship developed further. The role 
of the CBI was to assist in decision making in the economy. The CBI involved 
representatives of the government, the corporations and the civil society. The civil
society was represented by the Trades Union Congress (TUC) (Tomlinson J 1998). 
The role of the CBI in government decision making was referred to as the Corporatist
Arrangement. The Callaghan Government’s Social Contract further enhanced the
Corporatist Arrangement. This was an attempt by the then government to regulate the 
role of civil society in the relationship and to enhance the power of the selective role 
of the welfare state (Ellison N 1997; Wickham Jones M 1997).
Therefore, with the passage of time, the nature of the relationship between the state 
economy and civil society changed to reflect an administrative, rather than co­
operative structure, but non-the less the partners of the relationship remained 
unchanged. However, by the late 1970’s the role of the civil society declined to that of
a passive partner controlled by the power of the CBI and TUC (Deakin N 1994;
Davies JE 1974).
From these discussions it is apparent that a tripartite relationship did surround the UK
NHS in the years between 1948 and 1982 and the interactions of state, the economy
and the civil society represent this arrangement.
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3.3.2. Who Represents, and What Characterises, the Tripartite Relationship
An intense complexity and ambiguity of institutions mark the provision of health care 
services. A schematic representation of the complexity is given in Figure 3.1, and the
roles of each institution discussed below.
1. The State
The state clearly represents the government, but there is a broader reflection of the
state in policy making, state institutions include the Prime Minister and associated
offices; the ministers and associated committees; the executive committees; the
Whitehall Civil Service and the local state representatives (James S 1997). In terms of 
the NHS the Regional and District Health Authorities and the hospital administrative 
staff represent the local state (Klein R 1995).
In occupying this position the role of the state is very ambiguous. The State
interactions can be broken down into two (Allum P 1995). First is the state - state
interaction, second is the state civil society/economy interaction.
A. State - State Interaction
The State - State interaction is the interaction between the Ministers and the Civil
Service, Figure 3.1. The role of the Civil Service in the management of the UK
constitution is well-understood (James S 1997; Hennesy P 1995). The Civil Service
controls the access to data by ministers, presents the options and provides advice. The
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Civil Service also provides the interface between the pressure groups and ministers - a 
difficult task. As such it is recognised that the Civil Service plays a major role in the 
presentation of policy options. This is a role filled with ambiguity as they often act as 
presenters, administrators, implemented and modifiers of policy (Honigsbaum F
1989; Hennesy P 1995).
B. The State Interactions with External Bodies such as the Economy and Civil Society
The state economy and civil society interactions are marked by ambiguity in a similar
fashion to the state-state interaction. The State interaction in relation to health care
policy was limited by the parlimentarist nature of decision making in the UK welfare 
state up until 1976 and the corporatist arrangement thereafter. Under both of these
arrangements the external state interactions with the Civil Service are identical to
those faced by ministers. In both corporatist and parlimentarist arrangements the
economy and civil society rely on the Civil Service to present and analyse information 
to the policy makers. What interactions occur outside the realms of the Civil Service,
in relation to health-care, is by and large the result of the activity of the Community
Health Councils and patient interest groups and so will be covered below.
The problems with the ambiguity of the State interactions are best illustrated by the
role of the Civil Service in the formation of the NHS. The Civil Service, in the fonn
of the treasuiy, played a major role in shaping the future of the NHS by arguing that
the service should be shaped in accordance with its funding potential, not the needs of 
the civil society (Honigsbaum F 1989). Many of the subsequent investigations into the
funding of the NHS were also treasury led. However, at the same time as the treasury
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was expressing concerns over the expenditure it was actively supporting expansion of 
the NHS, and advocating a greater role for the Civil Service in its operation (Klein R 
1995). Therefore, the role of the treasury in the establishment and maintenance of the
NHS was and is ambiguous (Honigsbaum F 1989). The Civil Services’ role in the
development of the NHS has come under much scrutiny. Particularly the way in 
which it has been perceived that the Civil Servants manipulated the direction of the
NHS to suit their own rational ends, while failing to contribute to the solution of its
problems (Deakin N 1994).
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Prime Minister
CIVIL SOCIETY STATE RELATIONS -------
CIVIL SOCIETY ECONOMY RELATIONS ------------
Economy state relations
Intra-state relations —
FIGURE 3.1. THE INSTITUTIONS INVOLVED IN HEALTH CARE AND THEIR COMPLEX 
RELATIONSHIP
derived from (Janoski T 1998)
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2. The Civil Institutions
For the most part the public is not institutionally organised, however the exceptions to 
this are the patient interest groups, the Community Health Councils and the bodies 
representing the Labour organisations - such as the TUC. However, as we will see the 
interaction of the TUC is indirect and forms part of the economic policy relationship
(Klein R 1995; Allum P 1995).
The primary concern of the interaction between the civil society and the economy is 
in defining the Fordist compromise under which the labour force agrees to swap its 
effort for wages (Ford H 1926). In the period up until the middle of the 1970’s this
interaction was under the control of the Unions (Curwen P 1997). The NHS as the
largest employer in the UK was no different in this respect and much can be gained
from studying the role of the Unions in the NHS.
At the outset of the NHS the Trade Unions were put in a privileged position in having 
special councils set up to negotiate pay (Honigsbaum F 1989). These ‘Whitley 
Councils’ brought together spokesmen of both employees and employers. These 
Councils handled the negotiations with 55 professional associations or Trades Unions.
These Councils were aimed at assuring a degree of industrial peace and to provide a 
basis for the exchange of labour for wages in the NHS. They were not, however,
successful. In 1973, 117.8 days were lost in strike action per 1000 employees. The 
root cause of this unrest lay in the incentives for employees to maximise their income,
even though this would reduce the funds available for patient care. These incentives
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arose due to the nature of the employment contracts within the NHS that specified no 
performance measures and permitted frequent negotiations with the employers (Klein
R 1995; Lord Walton of Detchant 1998). Indeed the future of the Unions depended on
the success of their negotiations. So successful were the Unions that by the mid-
1970's over 60% of the workforce in the NHS was unionised (Rivett G 1998). The
action of the Trade Unions was further enhanced by national policy. The National 
Board for Prices and Incomes Policy introduced local pay bargaining in 1974 
(Wickham Jones M 1997). This move increased, indirectly, the power of the Unions. 
The Union negotiations paid benefits, for example between 1974 and 1976 a series of
pay rises increased wage costs of the NHS by 25% (Rivett G 1998; Klein R 1995).
At the same time as pressuring for maximal pay increases the Trade Unions were also 
pressing for a larger role in decision making. This trend was particularly evident in
the area of mental health and chronic disease management. In these areas nursing
staff questioned the decisions made by medical staff and in at least one incident
ancillary staff formed a council to manage a hospital unit (Klein R 1995). This 
incident occurred with the full support of the Unions involved, and serves to
demonstrate the ambiguous nature of both the Unions and the non-medical staff
involved in the NHS.
The Unions also attempted to influence policy on a national level. For example they 
looked to influence the levels of funding and the provision of pay beds within the
service. In 1973 the National Union of Public employees launched a series of strikes 
aimed at ending private beds in NHS hospitals. This attack was ideological and based
on the dislike of privilege available through private care (Klein R 1995). However, it
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also serves to highlight the ambiguous nature of the Trade Unions - pushing for a 
maximal wage for Union members, while limiting NHS services and incomes (Klein
R 1995).
The problems of ambiguity of role were mirrored in the CHC. Community Health
Councils (CHC) were invented as a consumer voice in health care (Webster C 1998).
However, the role was never precisely defined and national reports such as those on
the mismanagement of patients at a hospital for the mentally ill at Ely, which defined
a role for the CHC were ignored (Klein R 1995). The constitution of the CHC was
overtly politicised with two thirds of its membership being decided by the local 
government authorities or the Regional Health Authority. Therefore political strategy 
played a large role in the action of the CHC. The role of the CHC was therefore
ambiguous, as it was uncertain if they were reviewing the action of the service as
consumers or citizens (Klein R and Lewis J 1976; Lord Walton of Detchant 1998).
The situation was little different in the interest groups. A report in 1979 listed over
200 patient interest organisations in the UK (Klein R and Lewis J 1976). Many of
these existed to support research into specific disease areas. However, many 
proclaimed a voice for special needs groups and in doing so sought to influence 
policy. For example, MIND focused on the needs and policies surrounding mental 
illness. However these groups did not really represent the Civil Society in health care,
as by and large they were involved in limited areas and were led by middle class
activists (Klein R 1995; Klein R and Lewis J 1976). The development of pressure
group politics in the UK is ambiguous for while the aim of the groups was to
influence policy in specific areas, many of these groups were state funded, for
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example MIND (Klein R 1995).
3. The Economy Institutions
The economic institutions involved include the employers, the doctors and other 
health-care professional and the pharmaceutical industry (Doyal L and Pennel I 1979).
The economic interaction of most concern to the NHS is the interaction between the
doctors and other hospital workers, the pharmaceutical industry and the NHS
management structures. Of indirect, but important, concern is the way in which the 
state interprets health care as supporting the other industries in the UK (Doyal L and
Pennel I 1979).
A. The State Doctor Interaction
The doctors represent an economic corporation as General Practitioners are
independent contractors in the NHS and many consultants continue to provide private
care (Klein R 1995). As was mentioned in the previous chapter at the outset of the 
negotiations to establish the NHS, two strategies for the development of the service
were possible. The first was to build a new structure of the entire Service; the second
option was to build on existing structures, such as the Insurance Committees. In the 
1946 NHS Act the latter approach was adopted - by on large driven by political
necessity and the pressure from the Civil Service to make the system manageable
(Honigsbaum F 1989). In doing so a large concession was made to the medical
profession. As part of this deal the medical profession was given a central role in
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policy making via a Central Health Services Council. In effect, remarked one back­
bencher, turning the NHS Act into a Medical Services Bill, and giving the medical
services a monopoly on provision within the service (Honigsbaum F 1989; Timmins
N 1995).
Despite this, the position of doctors in the service is ambiguous and subject to 
political strategy. The doctors on one hand were able to influence policy at the highest
levels within the NHS. However, on the other hand there is evidence that the NHS
exploited its position “as sole employer" of doctors to drive down the incomes of
doctors. The clever use of salary reviews, such as the Spans Commission in 1957, the
use of arbitration, and the non-implementation of policy achieved the depression of
medical incomes (Klein R 1995).
In allowing the doctors to retain medical freedom and a monopoly in the NHS there is
further evidence of ambiguity and political strategy. In most cases the Regional
Hospital Boards contained a majority of doctors. This allowed the doctors to both
define the remit of the boards and control the strategy. Implicit in this was the bargain
that while the finances of the NHS was controlled from the centre the clinicians had
control of deciding the way in which money was spent. However, this situation was a
two-edged sword, for while autonomy was maintained, the profession had little role in 
deciding how money was spent on new buildings or equipment. This lack of
influence was apparent in areas such as renal dialysis, where in the 1970's, only about
half the level of service was being met for dialysis services, compared to other
countries in Europe, due to the failure to invest. The arrangement that left doctors 
without say in technical allocation allowed the politicians to pass the blame onto the
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medical profession (Klein R 1995).
The actions of the medical profession also had a considerable role in supporting 
private markets. This is best exemplified by the discussions on abortion. In 1967 the 
Abortion Act was passed legitimising abortion in the UK. However, the imposition of
the Act on the Ministry of Health was considered an infringement of clinical freedom,
and so no guidance was issued. This left Regional Authorities with the final say, and 
considerable disparity emerged. By 1971 43.4% of all abortions were performed in
the private sector - an astounding figure given the social nature of the bill, and 
demonstrating the power of the commercial interests of the medical profession (Klein
R 1995).
The ambiguity of the role of the medical profession could have been resolved by 
restructuring the incentives to medical practitioners. In 1963 the BMA pressed for the 
revision of the General Practitioner funding and salary arrangements. The BMA at 
this stage was prepared to negotiate around one of the major NHS desires, that of the 
Health Centre. However, when faced with the opportunity, the government choice
was to press home other demands - such as the private bed issue. This incident
serves to re-enforce the nature of the open-ended political strategy being applied, as 
here a strategic decision was clearly influenced by ideology (Vaughan P 1950)
(Webster C 1998).
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B. The State Pharmaceutical Company Interactions
The pharmaceutical industry in the UK is currently a £50 billion industry (Wells F
1998). A significant proportion of this is obtained from the NHS. Currently the
pharmaceutical bill for the NHS is about 10% of overall expenditure - about £3
billion - of which about a third comes from UK companies. Therefore the NHS is an 
important source of revenue to the pharmaceutical industry and plays an important 
role in maintaining the free market of medicinal drugs (Wells F 1998).
The UK pharmaceutical industry negotiates with the British State by means of a profit 
regulation scheme - the PPRS. This scheme allows research and development
expenditure to be discounted against profit before the price of the products is set. This
scheme is credited with bringing many innovations into the NHS. However, it also 
protects the industry and the arrangement has been accused of artificially inflating the 
charges for new drugs (Reekie D 1998). Therefore the pharmaceutical industry has a
protected position within the NHS favouring its economic status. The government has
acted on many occasions to protect this status for example by supporting the freedom 
of doctors to prescribe. Even where limitations have been imposed, this has been done 
with the agreement of the industry (Doyal L and Pennel I 1979).
C. The Role of the NHS in Interactions with Industry.
There is little doubt that British industry supports the NHS as it alleviates the need for
employers to ensure the health of their workers. Therefore the NHS is central to 
supporting British industry. However, this relationship is ambiguous, as the employers
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often resent the social security payments that they make in order to support the 
service and call for a greater role in its running (Doyal L and Pennel I 1979). The 
government has, on several occasions, agreed to review the expenditure on the NHS 
in the face of commercial concerns - although this was predominately concern of
administrations after 1989, as we will comment on later.
3.3.3. Conclusions About the Nature of Tripartitism in UK Health-care 1948 - 
1982.
The finding of a complex and ambiguous network of policy and decision making 
inferences surrounding the NHS provision is similar to Torfing’s findings in Denmark 
(Torfing J 1998). In his analysis, of the Danish health care system, the major players 
in health care provision policy were identified as the state, civil society and the
economy, with each of these being constructed from a defined range of organisations
- an image mirrored in the NHS. The concordance between the Danish health care
system and the NHS would argue that the NHS is analysable according to Torfing's 
outline. However, the results do not define the basis for the institutional analysis. In 
order to perform the institutional analysis it is necessary to confirm that the NHS can
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FIGURE 3.2. THE INSTITUTIONS INVOLVED IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE NHS UNTIL 
1989
In order to prove that this institutionalisation is valid it is necessary to demonstrate
that the primary interactions between the elements can be characterised by the
exchanges we introduced earlier. In other words, with regards to the provision of care
the state - economy interaction can be explained on the basis of the Keynesian 
economic principles; the state- civil society interaction can be explained on the basis 
of the Beveridge welfare systems and the economy civil society interaction can be
primarily encompassed by the Fordist exchange.
3.4 The Roles and Aims of the Relationship Members
3.4.1. State Economy Interactions.
In the UK the objective of state economy interaction in the years leading up to the
election of the conservative government in the l98(Ts, was the maintenance of a
mixed economy while supporting Keynesian style economic interventions (Curwen P 
1997). This was achieved using demand side management, with counter-cyclical
short-term fiscal management - in order to maintain low interest rates (Wickham
Jones M 1997). The state economy interaction therefore hinged on a balance between
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efficiency and equity - based on a concern that while market allocations may be the 
most efficient, the distribution may be unfair from the social viewpoint. Therefore in
the period 1948-1982, economic profit was subjugated to public interest (Curwen P 
1997). This policy had two distinct phases. In the years up until 1974 the strategy was 
dominated by a parlimentarist element. This amounted to a strategy of nationalisation 
where the inequitable aspects of supply and demand could not be managed (Wickham 
Jones M 1997). During this period many services were nationalised - including the
medical, steel-working and mining industries. In the years 1974 until 1982 a
corporatist strategy was followed, where the employers were given an increasing role
in the management of the interaction (Reitan EA 1997).
Whatever the approach to resolving state-economy interactions the NHS up until 1982
was nominally concerned with the distribution of wealth in an equitable manner from
the economic, social, political, and control of unemployment perspectives (Deakin N 
1994). The Keynesian system proposes to meet these aims by a trade off between
public and private provisions in order achieve both efficiency and redistribution. The
role of the health care services in realising these aims was the continued support of
the labour force, by providing healthy workers either through maternal care or health
maintenance of existing workers (Doyal L and Pennel I 1979). In addition, the
subsidiary aims of the interaction were to achieve a move towards the equitable
distribution of health care, and make health care accessible to all of the populace
(Doyal L and Pennel I 1979). These roles confirm that the NHS was a part of the
Keynesian economic system.
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3.4.2. Economy Civil Society Interactions.
The function of the economy civil society relationship in the UK during the period of 
Keynesian economics was to establish the value of the Fordist Compromise (Curwen 
P 1997). The years leading up to the election of the conservative government in 1979 
were marked by collective bargaining as the basis of determining the economy - civil 
society relationship (Bamber GJ and Snape EJ 1993). As discussed, the civil society is
represented by the Trades Union Congress - which covered more than 84% of the 
working population Unions in the years up until 1979 (Lloyd C and Siefert R 1992). 
There is, however, no direct involvement of the TUC in the collective bargaining
negotiations - these are left to the local Unions, over which the TUC had limited
control (Bamber GJ and Snape EJ 1993).
In many cases the local collective bargaining took the form of closed shop 
arrangements often with a multi-employer implication. These negotiations by and 
large took no account of the state economic policy, with the supply and demand of 
labour controlling the bargaining process (Bamber GJ and Snape EJ 1993). The two 
exceptions to this have been the state intervention in low pay by wage councils and in 
the years 1974 - 1979 where the Labour Government instituted a form of corporatist 
pay restraint to help the economic situation (Curwen P 1997; Tomlinson J 1998).
The NHS functions within the civil society economy relationship in two ways. First it 
acts to stabilise the relationship, by providing a safety net to those who need health 
care. This therefore acts to remove the provision of health care from the negotiations 
that surround the Fordist compromise (Doyal L and Pennel 1 1979; Williams Fiona 
1994). The other function of the NHS in the civil society-economy relationship was
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that of a major employer, and the resultant negotiations to maximise the salaries to
staff (Klein R 1995), Both of these interactions left the NHS in a very ambiguous 
situation, however the driving force was a maximisation of the Fordist compromise - 
in line with the institutionalisation proposed.
3.4.3 State Civil Society Interaction
The UK State and civil society interaction is concerned with the maintenance of a 
stable society and economy. It is characterised by a stability dating back over 300
years to the settlement of 1688. In this year the end of the Glorious Revolution
established parliament as the primary authority in the country (Allum P 1995). This 
settlement was based on the democratic election of geographically unique 
representatives. This system has given the state a degree of stability but has created
problems in the concept of democracy in the wider sense, as there is no direct
representation for the majority of the electorate. Indeed it has been remarked that the
British State has never been a democracy, but a hierarchy (Dahrendorf R 1965). Given
this background, the state and society interactions have developed in a piece-meal 
manner, responding pragmatically to new challenges.
The culmination of the development of the UK State is the party system (Allum P
1995). Here different parties represent different factions of society, for example The
Labour Party represents the working class via the Trade Unions. The development of
the party system has, however, not influenced the hierarchical conduct of high politics
(that of Westminster) and low politics (that of political struggles). Both high and low
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politics are conducted in an atmosphere of the “Leader Knows best”. Under these 
conditions the state civil society interaction is quite minimal and has three aims:
1. The maintenance of the party in power by creating a favourable opinion.
2. The facilitation of an agreement between civil society and the economy.
3. The provision of suitable economic conditions to facilitate the state economy
interaction.
This minimal interaction gives the state a fundamentally parliamentarian nature with
democracy added by a balance of the alternation of political ideologies in the
electoral process. This alternation is based on a one-member one-vote first past the
post democracy. The truth is that at one time or another one political party has
always predominated or the parties have formed a coalition. Sartori proposed a fairer 
definition of the UK party system in 1980 (Sartori G 1976). He proposed that the UK
state-civil society interaction is a competitive party system. Therefore the British
political parties are a broad church around a central ideology which helps to
maximise their competitiveness, patronage and appeal. However the competition is 
limited and agreement across the political parties makes the majority of decisions
(Hennesy P 1995).
The state and civil society interactions that do outside of the parliamentary system are
dominated by the interaction between interest groups and public administration.
Britain has the largest number of interest groups of any of the Western World State 
due to the history of group interaction (Allum P 1995). Group activity in the UK is
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very institutionalised with many groups playing a direct role in the implementation of 
policy. An example is the road safety campaigns that were left to the automobile
associations such as the RAC. It is a similar situation in health care where interest
groups not only focus on lobbying the government but also play an active role in the 
decisions about policy. This role is widely recognised and reflected in the state aid 
given to many charity bodies involved in health care (Klein R and Lewis J 1976).
All of these features argue that the NHS and other welfare organisations have a 
stabilising role within society - as part of a Beveridge style social intervention. For 
example the threat of civil unrest was a major factor in the development of the NHS, 
(Doyal L and Pennel I 1979) (Frazier D 1984). Latterly the NHS has continued in this
role of stabiliser by acting as a safety net to those who fall ill or are old. In this 
manner the NHS acts to stabilise the economy and state and the economy and civil 
society interactions (Doyal L and Pennel I 1979).
3.4.4. Conclusions of the inter-relationships
From the previous two sections it is possible to draw the following conclusions
1. The provision of health care services in the UK is under the influence of a
combination of state - economy and civil society elements.
2. This interaction is complex, but can be simplified to the interactions identified by 
Torfing in that the elements of the relationship appear to conform to an 
institutionalisation defined by specific interactions
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However, before accepting the institutional method as legitimate for the analysis, the 
framework must be shown to explain, at least in part, the development of the service.
3.5 Is the Tripartite Relationship that Surrounds the NHS in Balance and 
Can Any Imbalance Be Related to the Development of the Service?
From the preceding discussion it is apparent that the NHS plays a major role in 
supporting the tenets of capitalism and there is little doubt that the NHS has been a 
successful and efficient service that has benefited the elderly, women and children
(Doyal L and Pennel I 1979). However the evidence suggests that the tripartite
relationship that surrounded the NHS be not in balance. By the middle of the 1970’s
the NHS was heavily in debt and the waiting lists had grown to huge proportions
(Ham C 1996). Furthermore, technologically, the NHS was lagging behind Europe 
and the service was failing many of the special groups it was designed to protect -
particularly the sufferers of mental (Jones K 1972) (Webster C 1998). The situation in
the NHS demonstrated by these observations argue for a service not in institutional
balance. Why was the balance failing?
The NITS in 1948 was the product of discussions between the State, the medical
profession and the approved societies. As a result of professional negotiations, the
service was divided into separate parts with different management structures covering
each. It has been suggested that the reason behind this structure was the commercial
and medical interests in hospital areas and the apparent lack of profit in industrial
services, (Doyal L and Pennel I 1979) (Webster C 1998). However the differentiation
of the management structures had another effect as it meant that the social aspects of
medicine became dissociated from the treatment arm. Therefore the institutional
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integration of the service was lost (Frazier D 1984). This failure of integration 
enabled the imbalances of the service to develop.
The problems associated with the lack of integration were compounded by the 
ideology that established the service. The way in which the structure of the NHS 
evolved suggests NHS represents a nationalised health service rather than a socialised 
one. The NHS is Nationalised in the sense that the state took over the responsibility 
for the provision of medical services in a similar way to the way in which the state
absorbed the coal and steel industries. This contrasts with a socialised service that
would focus on the needs of users instead of health services becoming part of the 
general productive processes. This lack of focus on the social aspects of care at a
policy level led to the imbalances seen in the service. The imbalance of the NHS in
favour of the economic functions is best illustrated in a number of case scenarios
(Klein R 1995)
1. The continuation of a private market in health care
When the NITS was established the private market was allowed to continue (Frazier D
1984). Hospital consultants and other doctors were allowed to retain an element of
private medicine in addition to their NHS contracts. This was part of the deal under
which doctors accepted the NITS (Bevin A 1961). However the option of private
medicine has considerable impact on those patients who could afford private services.
This left open the option for private companies to “insure” their workers by private 
schemes in order to escape the perceived inefficiencies of the NHS and provide an
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incentive to workers (Calnan M Cant S Gabe J 1993).
The relationship between private practice and the NHS is complex. Many forms of 
private practice could not exist without the resources of the NHS, as it is true that in 
some specialities private patients do not pay the full cost of their treatment due to 
NHS subsidies (Rivett G 1998) (Leading Article 1974). The continued existence of a
private practice linked to the NHS brings into question the economic nature of the
service as it means that the NHS supports not just demand side but also free market 
capital accumulation (Williams Fiona 1994). The existence of the private market also
calls into question the claim that the NHS provides a comprehensive service
regardless of financial circumstance. Finally the NHS supports the innovative mode of
capital accumulation - typical of Post Fordist organisations - by the physicians who
provide a private service (Doyal L and Pennel I 1979). All of these features serve to
strengthen the role of the economy in the tripartite relationship, to the detriment of the
civil society relations.
2. The interaction of the Pharmaceutical industry and the NHS
The protected status of the pharmaceutical industry within the NHS has been
described above. However the presence of this protection reveals further insights into 
the state - economy interaction. The NHS is dependent on the pharmaceutical
industry for the supply of medicines. This situation reveals a paradox. A Keynesian or 
Fordist health care system would call for the NHS to promote the reproductive
function of labour at a minimum cost (Williams Fiona 1994). However the nature of
the relationship between the NHS and the pharmaceutical industry permits the
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industry to maintain high returns on investment (Reekie D 1998). Therefore the NHS 
supports the innovative mode of accumulation. The NHS also supported the global 
market development of the pharmaceutical industry - as about 75% of the drugs used 
by the service were owned and developed by foreign companies. The position of the 
phannaceutical industry is protected by the presence of patent laws and the presence 
of protected and regulated marketing (Reekie D 1998). Again the findings would 
appear to suggest that the state - economy interaction has a predominant role in the 
management of the NHS (Doyal L and Pennel I 1979).
3. Inequalities between services
Since the inception of the NHS the hospital sector has maintained its priority of
expenditure. In 1948 the percent spent on hospital sendees was about 55%. By 1974 
this had risen to over 65%. This was despite the fact that the overwhelming amount of 
care was delivered in the primary care sector This pattern underlies the fact that the
acute specialities were more generously funded than the chronic sectors (Frazier D
1984; Baggot R 1994; Rivett G 1998). The inequality in speciality spend is a
reflection of the amount of resources allocated to the innovative specialities. These
specialities interface both with the pharmaceutical companies and the doctors. Again
this suggests that the economy relation was the major interaction in the NHS.
The facets 1-3 above would suggest some of the problems seen in the NHS could be
explained by the imbalance in the institutionalisation. In particular the imbalance in
favour of the state economy relationship appears to underlie many of the problems.
But is this imbalance in the state economy interaction, or the state economy- civil
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society interaction? Further evidence of the role of the economy can be found in the 
measures taken by the State to manage the oil crisis of 1974 (Curwen P 1997; Harmon 
MD 1997). In 1974 when faced with a fiscal crisis, brought about by the doubling of
the price of oil the government responded by
A. Revisiting the allocation of NHS resources
The national distribution of resources was examined by the Resource Allocation 
Working Party (RAWP) (Department of Health and Social Security 1977). This group 
devised a formula to redirect resources to the most populated areas. However the 
approach did not distribute resources to the inner cities where medical need (Le
Grand J and Vizard P 1998).
B. The emphasis on the individual
The early 1970’s saw the decline of the universal service. The governments now
talked of‘civilised selectivity’ in the provision of health care (Timmins N 1995). This
message was clearly portrayed in the govermnent document Prevention and Health: 
Everybody’s Business (1974) calling for the public to treat minor illnesses and adopt 
healthy lifestyles (Webster C 1998) (Department of Health and Social Security 1976).
The motion of civilised selectivity was taken further in 1974 with the publication of 
Priorities for Health and Personal Social Services (Department of Health and Social 
Security 1976). This document signalled an informal end to the Consensus, as it
called for the targeting of resources to the elderly, children and the mentally ill
(Webster C 1998).
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The development of the NHS during the period of economic depression in the 1970’s 
shows a pattern of increasing the support for the state economy interaction as both of 
these measures were aimed at containing expenditure so that resources could be 
diverted into the economy (Glennerster H 1998). The return to the emphasis on the 
individual marks health care coming full circle to the industrial pre NHS era. Clearly 
in a time of rising unemployment the costs of maintaining of the workforce does not
matter as there are plenty of workers to take the place of those who leave the
workforce due to illness (Doyal L and Pennel I 1979). However, the government took
steps to ensure that the profitable sectors of the health care industry were protected.
For example at no time during this era was drug and pharmaceutical expenditure
challenged (Rivett G 1998). Instead an emphasis was placed on reducing equipment
and buildings expenditure (Timmins N 1995; Klein R and Lewis J 1976).
Taken together all of the evidence suggests that the organisational imbalance in the
state-economy relationship is the cause of the organisational stagnation seen in the
NHS (Klein R 1995). In essence this imbalance arises due to the working of the
British State. The Ministers of Health were responsible to Parliament for the NHS
expenditure. Therefore, the Ministry constantly asks for information, over which it 
has no control and therefore has to rely on the hospitals and doctors to supply the
information (Ministry of Health and Department of Health for Scotland 1956). In
turn, these (economic) bodies complain of interference (Doyal L and Pennel I 1979).
The most prominent example of this effect was the National Hospital Plan,
formulated in the 1970’s to ensure uniform provision of health facilities. This plan
failed, firstly due to a lack of information and, secondly due to the concerted efforts
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of the medical profession and hospital staff. The failure of the National Hospital Plan 
exemplified the organisational stagnation seen in the NHS due to the lack of a 
balancing third party - the civil society - providing an incentive, either electoral or 
consumer led, to change practice. It is of interest that at the time the NHS was being 
criticised for stagnation the service was at its most popular with its users - a fact
forgotten by the state representatives involved (J Enoch Powell 1966).
As further evidence that the problems in the NHS were due to the strength of the
state-economy interaction, the tackling of the organisational problems in the NHS
underlie the refonns seen since 1948 - as covered in the chapter 2 (Klein R 1995).
However as none of these addressed the fundamental imbalance - that of the strength
of the state- economy relationship it is not surprising that the organisational
stagnation continued.
There is evidence a failure to produce coherent policy due to post policy modification 
by external parties may be responsible for the imbalance. Examples include the 1962
Hospital Plan and the controversy surrounding the Abortion Acts (Klein R 1995). 
Furthermore, the health service was not the only welfare state body where these
problems emerged. For example, the development of the Community Development 
Projects formulated in the 1960’s with the idea of tackling poverty. These groups 
were set up to explore the use of demand side and Marxist methods in inner city
poverty. These pilots proved to be a hot seat of militancy and interacted with both the
local community and local authorities - so much so that the scheme was ended.
Higgins commented that the demise of these pilots was due to lack of balance in the
objectives. Taken together it would appear that the lack of balance between the
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institutions surrounding the NHS could be directly equated to the way in which policy 
was formulated (Higgins J Deakin N Edwards J and Wicks M 1984; Deakin N 1994).
3.6 Chapter Conclusions
The conclusions of this chapter are
1. There is a significant institutional framework that surrounds the NHS, and that
this institutional framework of state, economy and civil society has well defined
roles and a significant impact on the distribution of services and the
implementation of policy. This is best shown by the position of the medical
profession - over whom the government had no control but was responsible for
the distribution of services.
2. The relationship is characterised by the open-ended nature of political strategy
and the ambiguity of the institutions compounded by the rational actions of the
representatives of the institutions. This statement is best exemplified by the
position of the Trades Unions - which were both drivers and beneficiaries of the
NHS.
3. The interactions can be simplified, however, into the institutionalisation proposed
by Torfing in his review of the Danish Welfare system. In the case of the UK this
institutionalisation can explain the primary interactions of the tripartite
relationship of state economy and civil society
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4. That the problems seen in the NHS and the development it has undergone can be 
explained on the basis of institutional activity and power. This is evidenced by the
power of the state- medical interactions that surround the NHS and the fact that
many of the reforms were targeted at the reform of this interaction. However the 
way in which the NHS was institutionalised implied that although reform was 
mooted the lack of control over the medical profession and hospitals made the 
implementation of reform difficult
5. There is evidence for the lack of coherent policy making in the NHS - as 
evidenced by the problems associated with mental health and hospital planning 
services. The review has also highlighted that policy making in isolation is a 
feature of the NHS in the period from 1948-1982. This is evidenced by the 
exclusion of the economy from the set up of the service and the exclusion of the 
civil society from the development of the service. Furthermore the imbalance seen 
in the institutional framework appears to result from the policy making in
isolation
These features would argue that an institutional analysis of the NHS based on a 
tripartite relationship is valid (Rosenhead J 1992)and argue that Torfing’s analysis 
can be applied to understand NHS developments (Torfing J 1998). On the basis of 
these findings the analysis of the institutional relationships that surrounds the NHS 
appears to be in the right direction and it was decided to continue with this analytical 
method to review the more recent developments.
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Chapter 4 -The NHS 1982 - 1989
4.7 Key points from the Previous Chapter
The actions and reforms of the NHS in the period 1948 till 1982 can be explained on 
the basis of an institutionalisation of state economy and civil society. This 
institutionalisation explains principle interacting parties in the development of the 
NHS and the primary interactions of the relationship between these three elements.
Furthermore the problems in the NHS seen in the period up until 1982 can be in part 
explained by the imbalance of the institutionalisation. These features are a validation
of the use of the ideas of Torfing and provide background to the role of institutional 
analysis as a suitable analytical framework to explain the underlying problems with
the 1990 reform process.
4.2 Objectives for the Current Chapter
1982 marks a significant change in the NHS reforms. It signifies a move away from 
the Consensus and lays a platform for future events. This chapter aims to provide a
background to the changes seen in 1982, comment on the content of these changes 
and provide a link to the reforms seen in 1989-90. Central to these is a check that the
assumptions of the institutional analysis still hold.
4.3. Background
Although 1989 is quoted as the start of the radical reform process in the NHS the
seeds of reform were sown in 1982. 1982 marks the end of the 1948 Consensus on
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health care provision. It began with the commissioning of the Griffiths report - 
published in 1983 (Griffiths R 1983). This report is credited with initiating the
process of beginning the revolution in the NHS. Prior to this date the NHS was
committed to the provision of universal health care, free at the point of delivery - as
was promised in the Consensus (Beveridge W 1942). Therefore NHS reform revolved
about the maintenance of the Consensus by focussing on demand control and rational 
planning. These moves caused considerable centre-periphery tensions as a result of 
the strength of the state-economy-civil society relationship. This tension was believed 
to be the cause of the NHS’s problems and so a series of organisational ‘fixes’, in an
attempt to alter the power of the organisations involved, was embarked upon (Klein R
1995). The Griffiths report switched attention from the process of organisation to the 
dynamics of supply. In particular, emphasis was placed on the efficiency of services, 
and the targeting of services to those most in need. This targeting caused a subtle
change, for prior to 1982 services were universal but available on the basis of
demand, after it they were ‘rationed’ explicitly on the basis of need (Glennerster H 
1998). The reasons behind this change are not difficult to see. Caught between
increasing demands and economic constraints ministers appeared to have only one 
option, that of increasing the efficiency of NHS services by reducing the waste of 
unneeded, duplicated or redundant services. This change came at a price. A service 
based on need implied a centrally managed service, and a role for central government 
to force efficiency. This change was at odds with the concepts of medical freedom, as 
it implied a change away from the universal right to treatment. This was bound to be
perceived as a threat to the independent practice of medicine in the NHS. In former
times such a perception would have been avoided at all costs, but a unique set of
circumstances combined to increase government resolve to commit to the change
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(Webster C 1998).
1. The government was in a strong position. In 1982 the Thatcher administration 
recorded an election victory - repeated in 1987. This gave the government the 
confidence to proceed with the changes driven forward by the leader Margaret
Thatcher (Thatcher M 1993).
2. By the mid-1980’s the society that the NHS supported had changed radically. The
society of 1948 was just recovering from the war and resources were scarce. What
work was available was by and large male dominated and manual process orientated.
Beveridge in formulating the NHS had made the assumption that this was to be the
standard working practice, and in essence would not change. However, by 1980 the
majority of the working population was not in manual industries and nearly as many
women as men were in employment (Curwen P). These changes not only implied that
two wage families were the norm, but also that society had become more diffuse, with
fewer class boundaries. By 1982 the limitations of the NHS with respect to society
change was becoming apparent as demands on the service for less invasive, and more 
supportive services grew (Klein R 1995). The changes in society implied that the
Consensus would no longer be appropriate. However, the formation of a new
agreement on the role if the NHS was going to be a difficult task (Kavanagh D 1990).
A change in the NHS was made more difficult by increasing interest of the public in 
politics. The action of politicians were now centre stage in public life, and for 
anybody dissenting with the prevailing views, there was a wide audience of the media 
waiting to publicise the story. This made politicians veiy cautious about tackling one
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of the sacred cows of British life - the right to universal health care. However, here
too the government was fortunate. The changes in political and social life emphasised
the role of the individual in assuring their success and welfare - allowing for a change
away from universal services (Lowe R 1993; Hutton W 1998; Urry J 1988).
Despite these changes, however, the time for radical reform was not ripe. The early
1980’s were marked by economic concerns and therefore welfare state was seen as an
essential safety net. Therefore while many recognised a change away from universal
care was needed, the atmosphere of radical change was not yet prepared. In these
circumstances it was anticipated that the political price of reform would be high
(Jenkins S 1995).
There are other reasons why radical change could not be embarked upon. Overall the
Thatcher policies can be summarised as the increasing use of state power to create
and regulate an economy and social structure based on markets (Le Grand J and
Robinson R 1984). This implied reducing the power of providers, by the increasing 
the regulation of provider activity, and transferring much of the power to the
consumers. The power of consumers was to be mediated by the use of intermediary
bodies such as local authorities or independent bodies - such as school governors for 
opted-out schools. In the early 1980’s these bodies were not in a position to accept 
this responsibility (Urry J 1988), and the economic circumstances implied that little 
public funding would be available to create these bodies (Klein R and Lewis J 1976).
Given the lack of leverage to create radical change the 1982 reforms settled on
creating an atmosphere and framework for change. Central to the Conservative
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ideology was the concept that the state should live within its means and provide the 
services it could afford, to those who needed it (Glennerster H 1998). In order to 
achieve this, in 1983 the financial management initiative (FM3) was established 
(Prime Minister and Chancellor of the Exchequer 1988). The FMI led the charge-to
efficiency by producing a range of performance indicators. These indicators were, in
many ways, the products of the administration that the government was seeking to
remove, so as in previous changes ambiguity was inherent (Hennessy P 1991). 
However, despite this these indicators were to take on a new meaning as tools for 
public accountability and political levers for change - rather than the original intent, 
as tools for accountability to governments. So the public were made aware of these 
indicators and encouraged to use them by increasing pressure on the service providers 
to conform to ‘Standards of Service’ (Glennerster H 1998).
The trend to a consumer focus in service provision was recognised as a two-edged 
sword. While the trend increased service responsiveness it was apparent that it could
also fuel demand. While the state was not in full control of the NHS this could lead to
a greater fragmentation and duplication of services (Klein R 1995). The infrastructure 
of the NHS in the 1980’s could not support this increase in demand as the economy 
grew very slowly and the government did not meet its election pledges of increasing 
welfare expenditure in this period and so the NHS was financially strapped (Curwen P 
1997).
The overall impact of the social and economic problems associated with NHS reform 
acted as a damper (Thatcher M 1993). Therefore taking the political, social and 
economic limitations to reform into account the reform of the NHS got off to a
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cautious start with a review of the service and a re-organisation.
4.4 The Basis of NHS Reform in the 1980's
The balance of the political, economic and social challenges provoked by the NHS 
led the Conservative government to commit to 4 themes of change (Klein R 1995;Le
Grand J and Robinson R 1984).
1. A commitment to centralisation
2. The development of stronger management structures
3. The expansion of private services and contracting out
4. The development of primary care as an alternative delivery system
These elements provided a pragmatic basis for change in the 1982 reform process. As 
stated above if care was to be directed towards those most in need strong management 
was needed to bring together the disparate elements of the service. New tools are also 
required to gain efficiency in the NHS, as the change represents a move away from 
demand side management. One such tool was the use of competition. This could be 
achieved through the use of private firms. Finally primary care was seen as the major 
reason why the UK NHS was cheaper then its European counterparts, and by 
developing the role of primary care further it was anticipated that further efficiencies 
could be made. With these ideas in mind the reform process was instituted in 1982.
The foundation of these changes was a consultation document produced in 1979
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called Patients First (Department of Health and Social Security 1979). This in turn 
was based on the preceding Royal Commission report (Royal Commission on the
NHS 1979)
4.5 The Re-organisation of the NHS in 1982
4.5.1. The Structure of the NHS 1982-1990
The changes in the NHS began with reorganisation. The new structure is shown in
Figure 4.1. The central feature of this reorganisation was the removal of the AHA tier
of management. The major management body of the NHS was now the District-
Health Authority (DHA). The DHA was charged with the planning and control of
sendees in the NHS. In many ways the reorganisation was also a reaction against
professional values. Doctors and nurses were given a much-reduced voice under the
new system. The reorganisation also marked a change in emphasis with the
technological dream of large District General Hospitals being abandoned (Department
of Health and Social Security 1979).
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FIGURE 4.1 THE STRUCTURE OF THE NHS, 1982-90
(Department of Health and Social Security 1979)
4.5.2 The Development of the NHS 1982-1990
The new structure of the NHS had an emphasis on value for money and selectivity in 
services. Accordingly, with the restructuring of the service in 1982 the emphasis 
changed from central management to the direct local management of services. The
1982 reorganisation, therefore, can be seen as the physical embodiment of the 1982
Griffiths report that gave emphasis to harnessing the dynamics of the NHS 
organisation to achieve productivity (Griffiths R 1983). Taken together the two
reports emphasised care on the basis of need, rather than on the basis of universal care
(Kavanagh D 1990).
This move met considerable resistance from the medical profession, as the drive to 
efficiency was seen as restrictive to the traditional freedoms of medical practice. 
However, the more the medical profession resisted changes the more the Conservative 
Government was determined to resist. This set up a cycle of antagonism and
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confrontation that laid the foundation of Working for Patients white paper that 
underpinned the 1990 refonns of the NHS (Thatcher M 1993).
4.5.3. The Effects of the Reorganisation
The effects of the reorganisation can be documented in terms of the effects the
changes had on the degree of centralisation of the service, the effects on the
management of the service, the role of the private sector and the involvement of
primary care. The effects of the reorganisation on the performance of the NHS cannot
be assessed, as the refonns were short-lived (Webster C 1998).
1. The centralisation of the service
The reorganisation of the NHS in 1982 saw the abolition of the area tier of
management. While this was heralded as the end to an unnecessary bureaucracy, it
also increased the degree of centralisation of the service. The abolition of the AHA
brought the District Health Teams (now relabelled District Health Authorities) under 
the direct control of the Regional Health Authorities and therefore capable of direct 
performance management and review. This created a situation where the NHS was
more accountable than at any time in its previous hi story (Jenkins S 1995).
The accountability was re-enforced by a system of annual performance review, under 
which the District Health Authorities were to report progress in terms of meeting 
nationally set targets. These targets were a statistically driven set of input and output 
indicators that related resources to the numbers of patients treated, but ignored the
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effects the treatments had on survival and other outcomes (Klein R 1995). These 
measures were seen as central to the NHS’s contribution to the FM1 (Prime Minister 
and Chancellor of the Exchequer 1988).
The performance targets that were set by and large reflected the perceived political 
pressures on the system - through waiting lists and other demands. For example 
District Health Authorities were required to reduce the waiting times for eye surgery. 
Therefore, the aims of the new service in 1982 were overtly political. The increased 
levels of contact between the ministerial staff and the regional units emphasised this.
This politicisation of the service was worrisome to many as it increased the short-term
objectives of the service - a trend that many saw re-enforced in the development of
sendee managerialism (Webster C 1998).
2. Increasing management
The managerial changes in the NHS did not occur at the same time as the
reorganisation. These changes were introduced a year later as a result of the Griffiths
report (Webster C 1998). The managerialism introduced by the Griffiths report was
aimed at the managerial stalemate that had occurred within the NHS. The report
hypothesised that the problem was due to the large number of central directives being
issued without a mechanism for accountability (Griffiths R 1983). The solution was to
make people responsible for their actions, and to provide a management structure to
carry out policy objective. This management structure was to consist of two boards - a
central executive and a supervisory board.
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The recommendations of the Griffiths report were carried out to the letter, and were 
problematic from the start (Webster C 1998). The supervisory board and the central 
executive were in conflict - leading to the resignation of the first Chief Executive of 
the NHS. The appointment of the Minister of Health as the Chief Executive of the
NHS in 1984 in effect ended the role of the supervisory board. However this gave rise
to governance concerns, and the hope of an independent board still lingered on - to be
revamped in the 1989 changes (The Minister of State and others 1989).
Despite the problems in implementing the recommendations of the Griffiths report in
the upper tier of management, the local changes proceeded apace. The management
teams were disbanded, and were replaced by business style executive teams. The
effect of this change was not as revolutionary as expected. The new managers found
the NHS environment different to the commercial one. The NHS suffered with an
inability to cost its activities, and this undermined many commercial practices. There
were however, two areas in which the new managerialism had a considerable effect
(Klein R 1995).
First the managerial structure weakened the power of the Trades Unions as now
negotiations were being held at local level. In this the new managers of the NHS
reflected the events at national level where Union power declined rapidly under
government pressure. The effects of the change have been that to date the Unions
have been unable to re-establish a power base within the NHS (Webster C 1998;
Poliitt C Harrison S Hunter DJ Mamoch G 1991).
The second impact of the Griffiths report was less tangible. The new managers of the
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service looked at the goods and services provided by the NHS in the light of the needs 
of the patients. This led to the introduction of consumer values into what previously 
had been a professionally driven market. However, the introduction of consumer 
values exposed a policy hole. If consumers do not like a shop they stop going and
eventually the shop closes. Could this be done with a hospital? In the majority of 
cases closing a hospital was not an option, therefore, the Griffiths report
recommendations were muted until the public could have a say in how the hospitals
were managed (Pollitt C Harrison S Hunter DJ Marnoch G 1991).
3. Increasing involvement of the private sector
The increasing involvement of the private sector took place in two areas, the
provision of private care and the provision of services.
A. The provision of private care
Private sector health care provision became a growth industiy in the 1980’s. This was 
due to the greater number of employers offering health care insurance as a perk, and 
public dissatisfaction with the NHS. Contrary to academic opinion, the Thatcher
government did not encourage private health-care directly (Thatcher M 1993). Instead
by relaxing the consultant contract in 1979 it enabled consultants to devote more time 
to private practice and increased supply (Higgins J 1988). This increasing supply in 
turn increased demand. This effect in some way demonstrates the public
dissatisfaction with the NHS in the 1980’s (Calnan M Cant S Gabe J 1993).
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Changes in the provision of long-term care also acted to increase the role of the 
private sector, particularly in the provision of private nursing home care. The changes
in the social security system encouraged the local authorities to outsource the care of
the elderly (Day P and Klein R 1987). This created a demand-led service until
spending was capped in 1992. The period 1982 - 1992, therefore, was a period of 
unlimited growth for private nursing home care, ended only by the implementation of 
the community care recommendations of the white paper Working for Patients 
(Webster C 1998). This document recommended the adoption of the results of the
second Griffiths report on care in the community (Griffiths R 1988)covered in the
next chapter.
The case of the almost accidental change in private care involvement in the provision 
of UK health services emphasises two factors. The first is that changes in health care
cannot be seen in isolation, that the environment of decision making, and policy 
effects on NHS services by changes in the welfare state, have to be considered before
deciding on final policies. Second is the strength of the link between the state and 
economy, such that a change in private provision can force the policy tempo. For 
example in the case of the provision of private care for the elderly the Government 
was forced to react with market regulation, rather than developing market regulation
in parallel with change.
B. The provision of private services
The provision of private service in the NHS by competitive tendering represents the 
other aspect of privatisation brought to bear by the 1982 refonns. In September 1983
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I-Iealth Authorities were required to tender for laundry, catering and cleaning services 
- in total about 12% of NHS expenditure (Klein R 1995). This was a detailed 
centrally driven directive and met with much resistance. However, the decline in the 
power of the Unions and the determination of central power pushed the changes 
through. However in the final analysis of this exercise the returns have been modest. 
A total of £86 million was saved and the majority of the contracts were awarded to 
the in-house teams. Therefore the changes in private institutional involvement in NHS 
service provision did little to change the status quo; it still supported, or perhaps 
increased, the state economy interaction (National Audit Office 1987). This 
unexpected result was caused by two factors. First the public had no say in the 
sendees offered. Second the effect of the tendering exercise was only felt in the lower 
paid and lower skilled workers (Klein R 1995). This has the effect of isolating a sub­
population of the civil society interaction. This isolation is further enhanced by the 
fact that changes in the role of the private sector appeared to target the most 
vulnerable - the elderly and the lower paid. During this period areas that would have 
more effect on the well off, for example prescription charges exemptions were left 
untouched (Webster C 1998). This was in contrast to prescription charges that 
increased throughout the 80’s. These charges are a disproportionate burden on the 
lower paid and act to further decrease the role of the civil society in creating a 
balanced health care system (Klein R 1995).
Despite the limited achievements of the privatisation measures in terms of financial
savings the success of these measures cannot be counted in these terms alone. The
real success of the managerial changes was an increased public awareness of the cost 
of the NHS and the creation of an atmosphere where change was possible, and the
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power of the manager demonstrated (Griffiths R 1991; National Audit Office 1987)
4. Changes in Primary Care
One of the perceived major assets of the NHS is the network of GP’s acting as 
gatekeepers of care. The GPs in the UK deliver the majority of services and act as a 
filter to patients accessing secondary care. It is believed that this system is responsible 
for the spending on UK health care to be lower than many of our European 
counterparts, while maintaining a high standard of service (Secretaries of State for 
Social Services 1987). The system operates by making GPs small businesses
contracting their experience to the NHS (Webster C 1998). This system, which dates
back to 1948, is closely defended by the GPs and previous reforms in the NHS had 
shied away from dealing directly with the GP system (Klein R 1995). However, the 
changing environment in the 1980’s made it apparent that the economic cost of 
allowing the situation of primary care to continue as an independent service 
outweighed the risks of a political confrontation with the GPs. The demand for health 
services was increasing at such a rate that unless the referral rate was controlled the 
savings in efficiency would not materialise. Any reduction in demand would require
the preventative role of the GP to come to the fore. Yet the situation with GPs, as
independents, gave no incentive to practice preventative medicine (Secretaries of
State for Social Services 1987).
The first step in this direction was to make GP services more accountable. This was
achieved by bringing the Family Practitioner Committees under the Ministry of
Health umbrella. This was followed by a review of family practitioner services
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(Kavanagh D 1990).
The first area to feel the impact of change was prescribing. In November 1984 a 
limited list was announced. This was a surprise move resisted by both the BMA and 
the pharmaceutical industry. However the government capitalised on the split 
between the Royal Colleges to push the measure through and in the end, a limited list 
of 30 excluded items was produced. While this was only a modest success it did lay 
the foundation of the parliamentary challenge to medical freedom (Klein R 1995).
Second during the battle over the prescribing of drugs the government proceeded with 
the review of the Family Practice Services. In 1987 it produced a green paper on 
Primary Health care in which proposals for a Griffiths style management for the FPC 
was proposed (Secretaries of State for Social Services 1987). This paper was widely 
debated by the BMA and the colleges, however by 1989 no conclusion had been 
reached when the NHS was engulfed by another financial crisis. Reform of the 
primary care service was therefore left uncompleted (Klein R 1995;Webster C 1998).
4.6. The Forces for Change at the Heart of the 1982 Reforms ~ a Pace for 
the Future
The 1982 refonns of the NHS were short-lived and uncompleted. As the crisis in the
NHS continued and the atmosphere of reform changed more radical reviews became
possible and were instituted in 1989. However, the 1982 reforms are important. As
can be seen from the discussion above the primary motivator for change was an 
increase in efficiency within the NHS. Underlying this desire was an ideology of a
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state that we can afford. The change was marginal, but the precedence was set to
allow for much larger change.
4.7 The Impact of the 1982 Reforms on the Tripartite Relationship of 
State Economy and Civil Society
Although the major emphasis on this section has been setting a background to more 
radical reform, it is worthwhile to review the effects reform had on the tripartite 
institutionalisation, to check if Torfing’s presumptions still hold.
First it is important to highlight that the reforms were conducted in an atmosphere of 
policy making in isolation, neither the doctors nor the public were consulted on the 
change. There is also some evidence of post policy modifications being applied -in 
particular to the areas of long-term care where the implementation of policy had 
unexpected effects These features would argue that the tripartite relationship is still in 
effect. The reforms did have the effect, however of changing the players in the 
relationship. As we have stated already, the Trades Unions ceased to be a major 
power in the relationship, while the doctors’ power - largely through general practice 
- increased. In addition the private providers of care, such as those private nursing 
homes providing for the care of the elderly, now became a significant force in policy 
decisions. This change was to have a greater impact in the 1989 reform programme
Despite these changes the reforms did not affect the tripartite institutionalisation. First
the reforms did not influence the basic problems of the NHS organisational stagnation
caused by a strong state economy relationship. In fact, giving greater power to the 
private providers, GPs and further estranging the civil society by declining Union
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power increased the strength of the state economy relationship further and reduced 
the power of civil society. Therefore if anything the NHS was more unbalanced after
the refonns than before! The effect of this imbalance can be seen in the financial
crisis that hit the organisation in 1989, covered in the next chapter. The operation of 
the tripartite interaction was also not changed. The system was still marked by 
ambiguity, with the new District Health Authorities now more responsible to the state 
as managers while trying to build local service relationships, however the role of the 
NHS as a regulator of capital development through influencing service levels
remained intact (Klein R 1995).
4.8 Conclusion
The 1982 reforms were not as radical as was first mooted, by and large because of 
financial constraints. This does not, however, diminish their importance as the 
changes provided the essence for the changes seen in the 1990’s and demonstrated
that radical change, given the right environment, was possible. It is difficult to
speculate on the impact of the changes seen in 1982 reform was short lived. However, 
the changes are based on policy making in isolation and political strategy and do little 
to affect the imbalance of the state economy relationship and the tripartite 
relationship remained intact. These features would argue
1. The period 1982 - 1989 marks the end of the Consensus, it is therefore the ideal
starting point to study the reform process in the NHS
2. The fact that at the start of the 1990 reforms the tripartite institutionalisation was
intact would argue that the framework proposed in the Introduction and validated
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in the previous chapter is suitable to start the analytical process.
The features of the unbalanced tripartite relationship are emphasised by the
continuing crisis seen in the NHS - leading to the changes seen in the 1990’s - the
subject of the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 5 NHS REFORM IN THE 1990’S
5.1 Key Points from the Previous Chapter
The consensus about the provision of health care came under strain in the late 1970’s 
due to the increasing demands for high technology care and a shift in the society that 
was supported by the NHS. The forces provoking the change suggested that a shift to
a more selective distribution of health care benefit was desirable in order to achieve
greater efficiency within the NHS. This change implied a move away from the 
Consensus and an end to the emphasis on universal care. However, it was realised that
any change to the NHS would not be easy and the economic and social conditions for
change had to be right before any change was attempted. In the middle of the 1980’s 
such conditions did not prevail and instead further change in the demand management
structures was mooted. This reform involved the introduction of executive
management styles into the NITS, together with limited competitive practices - such 
as the ‘tendering out’ of hotel services and changes in primary care. The impact the 
changes would have had is difficult to assess, as further problems in the NHS - and a
change in the economy - forced further reform. However in the short term the reforms
were successful in demonstrating that change was possible. The continued pressure on
the NHS, together with a change in the economic circumstances implied that towards
the end of the 1980’s radical reform was once again on the agenda
Despite the changes seen in the NHS during the mid-l980’s evidence suggests that the
institutional framework proposed as the analytical method remained intact and so the
process of study remained unchanged.
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5.2 Objectives of this Chapter
This chapter is focused on explaining the basis of refonn ideology and practicality in
the 1990’s. It will therefore review the pressures that generated the reform, the ‘new’
models of health care available for radical reform and how the Conservative Party
selected the new model for the NHS.
5.3 Why Was Radical Reform Needed?
The interaction between the state and the economy, as we have discussed in the
previous chapters, was the major influence on health care policy in the UK. As the 
years 1948 - 1974 were marked by a buoyant economy this provided a stable, if tense,
background to the NHS as the service continued to grow as the economy grew (Le
Grand J and Vizard P 1998; Klein R 1995). This is not to say that improvements
could not have been made during this period for the NHS was marked by difficult and 
confusing peripheral-central tensions that complicated the further development of the 
NHS. However, the levels of service gave rise to happy patients and NHS expansion 
continued (Klein R 1995). During this period it was recognised that the major 
constraint on welfare expansion was the rate of inflation (Glennerster H 1998). 
Changes in welfare expenditure places Unions in a stronger position and increases 
their bargaining power for higher wages - particularly when the expansion increases 
social security payments. These higher wages drive up the cost of manufacture and 
increase inflation. In addition the government also borrows money to pay for welfare 
expansion, which also has an effect on the money supply (Curwen P 1997). Therefore 
it is in the interest of the government to limit welfare expansion in times of increasing
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inflation. The NHS was no exception to this and in the period 1948-1974 the welfare 
state did not grow in parallel to economic growth (Glennerster H 1998).
The stability of the UK welfare system was thrown into crisis in the early 1970’s, 
when the sudden doubling of the price of oil precipitated a major inflationary crisis 
(Curwen P 1997). The response of the government was to implement a series of 
economic cuts. As welfare services were seen as a prime generator of inflation, the 
brunt of these cuts fell in the welfare budget - including the NHS. However, this did 
not solve the problem and in 1976 the Labour Government negotiated a loan with the 
International Monetary Fund. As part of this funding, further cuts in welfare 
expenditure were demanded and implemented on the welfare state - including the 
NHS (Timmins N 1995). However as the government had no control over the levels
of demand for care - this was in the hands of the doctors the effect was to further
increase the size of the deficit in the NHS (Klein R 1995). Given these circumstances
radical change seemed inevitable (Glennerster H 1998).
5.4 The End of the Consensus - a Slow Demise
The prime target for the reduction in expenditure on the welfare state was to put an 
end to the Consensus agreement on universal care reached in 1948 (Kavanagh D
1990). The end of the Consensus would allow the resources available to the NHS to
be targeted, and therefore used with greater efficiency and give the opportunity for a 
decline in growth, or perhaps in the long-term a decline in overall expenditure. The 
end of the Consensus, however, was a radical step and as was mentioned in chapter 4 
the conditions for a formal end of the Consensus did not prevail until the end of the
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1980’s (Barnet J 1982).
Plans to draw an official end to the Consensus started in the early 1970’s. The
Labour Government drew up plans to achieve a change to the Consensus in Labour's
Programme for Britain (Wickham Jones M 1997) and Prevention and Health -
Everybody’s Business (Department of Health and Social Security 1976). These
documents called for a fundamental shift in the welfare state. Individuals were
encouraged to be less reliant on the state, take more responsibility and charges were 
introduced for many services. These changes were accompanied by the introduction 
of an incomes policy and cash limit on public expenditure (Harmon MD 1997). These 
measures imposed a degree of selectivity on the services and led to strengthening of
the state-economy interaction. Whether these measures would have been successful it 
is difficult to tell as, in 1979, a Conservative Government was elected on the platform 
of monetarism and a reduction in the role of government in state affairs (Jenkins S
1995).
As was discussed in the previous chapter the incoming Conservative Government
shied initially avoided formally ending the Consensus, but the introduction of
managerialism effect ended it in all but name (Loney M. 1994). In place of the
Consensus a new set of ideals was created which have been termed Thatcherite (Lowe
R 1993)
no
5.5 Thatcherite Policy - the Replacement to the Consensus
Margaret Thatcher, the Prime Minister who gave name to the term Thatcherite policy,
is credited with moving away from the response of seeking short-term fixes for the
Consensus (Thatcher M 1993; Kavanagh D 1990). Previous governments, when faced
with a crisis had ‘sought efficiencies’ or borrowed money to fund demanded services
(Klein R 1995; Harmon MD 1997). The use of demand management tools was now
seen to be part of the problem. In addition there was a growing criticism of the failure
of welfare services to resolve underlying economic and social weaknesses in the UK.
Authors such as Hayek had been critical of the dependency culture engendered by the
welfare state since 1948 (Deakin N 1994; Owen D. 1989; Glennerster H 1998).
Questioning the Consensus coincided with an intellectual challenge to the legitimacy
of the welfare state. The background to this was the rising tide of militancy among the
UK population. Initially students became concerned at the direction successive 
Labour Governments were taking, leading to a range of vocal protests. This militancy
among the students spread to workers, culminating in the 1974 strike by miners and
the ‘Winter of Discontent’ (Wickham Jones M 1997). At this point many intellectuals
became concerned that revolution was coming. Further concerns that Britain was on 
the path to revolution came from the mounting crime and terrorist activity figures
(Thatcher M 1993). Under such circumstances the welfare state was considered to be 
a contributor to the revolution - as it encouraged dependency and that the welfare
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state had helped to ‘morally bankrupt’ the country (Lowe R 1993) (Webster C 1998) 
(Reitan EA 1997).
Margaret Thatcher based her platform for the need for radical change on a
combination of these themes. The welfare state under the Conservatives would be
economically affordable, socially independent, in that it did not restrict personal 
freedom, and morally committed to a return to the values of the role of the society in
the affairs of state (Thatcher M 1993), (Jackson P 1985). These aims were to be
applied to all branches of the welfare state. However, health care and social care were
particular targets as they were seen to be the major offenders of the decline of the
values of society and a lack of commitment to the creation of personal wealth (Reitan
EA 1997).
5.6 The Solution to the End of the Consensus
The Thatcher government rejected Keynesian economics as a tool and believed that a
programme of aggressive monetarism could achieve the aims of improving the 
efficiency of the welfare services and effecting a wealth distribution as a part of the
trickle down effect (Reitan EA 1997). This monetarism took the form of a belief in
privatisation, curbing local government power and the use of inequality to promote
change (Le Grand J and Robinson R 1984).
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1. Privatisation
Privatisation, in this context, implies a reduction in the role of State and the transfers
of its functions to a private institution. These private institutions may be commercial
firms, however it also includes voluntary associations or formal and informal
networks. Le Grand and Robinson have identified three areas of state intervention in
relation to privatisation - provision, subsidy and regulation. A reduction in any of
these three areas can be considered as an act of privatisation (Le Grand J and
Robinson R 1984).
Thatcherite provision is dominated by the notion of contracting out, where public 
authorities offer contracts to commercial or non-profit organisations that agree to
provide a service. This change is closely linked to the provision of subsidies. Under
the Thatcherite governments subsidies were to be used to facilitate a change from
direct funding into the signing of contracts which specified the levels of service to be
delivered (Deakin N 1994). Finally regulation is used to protect the vulnerable from
the effects of privatisation. Also, in many cases, regulation was reduced in order to
encourage free markets (Deakin N 1994).
2. Curbing Local Government
The other main plank of Conservative policy has been to exercise greater control of
local government expenditure (Thatcher M 1993). Local authorities were given strict
spending targets and excessive expenditure could be penalised by the loss of
government grants.
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3. The use of inequality to promote change
The final, and perhaps most controversial, aspect of Conservative policy has been the
deliberate use of inequality. Inequality has been used as a deliberate strategy to
provide incentives and encourage income redistribution (Jackson P 1985). The 
Conservatives placed an emphasis on the enterprise culture by encouraging free 
markets and competition in all aspects of national life. In addition tax policies which 
favour the rich were put in place. The effect of these policy changes relied on the 
incentive of inequality to have an effect (Walker A 1979; Reitan EA 1997)
Although the policy aims were clear the mechanisms to achieve change were not. 
Instead Conservative policy evolved over a period of time. Health care reform was
included in this process (Thatcher M 1993).
5.7 The Pattern of Radical Reform
The Conservative government considered a refonn of the social security system the 
primary target in its first term of office (Thatcher M 1993). This reform process took 
the majority of the 1980s to be accomplished. Therefore it was not until the middle of 
this decade attention was turned to health care reform, when as the economy picked 
up in the late 1980’s funds were released for reform (Webster C 1998).
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5.8 The Basis of Reform
The government was convinced that the solution to the problems in the NHS - and 
the replacement of the Consensus - lay in creating a competitive environment in 
health care (Webster C 1998). Several models to achieve this were available. 
Therefore, the question was, therefore, not whether competition should be introduced 
but what type of competition should be used (No turning Back Group of Conservative 
MPs 1988). Before discussing the Conservative strategy in selecting the model it is 
important to review the options available.
5.9 Models of Competition and Internal Markets in Health care
The introduction of markets in health care are seen by many health care policy 
specialists as the key to improving efficiency in health care provision. Markets 
introduce competition into the provision of health care and so in theory should 
improve efficiency. However, it is acknowledged that conventional markets have
unsuitable characteristics that limit their application to health care. Therefore the key 
concept of interest is the ‘Internal Market’. Internal markets have three defining
characteristics (Anell A 1995)
1. Internal markets in health care are modified conventional market structures, that
permit the limited development of market forces in situations where markets 
cannot exist, or where they would be socially damaging. The types of 
modification seen are regulations to control the entry of both purchasers and 
providers into the market; to control the profits of an organisation in the market
and maintain the access of the consumers to the market (Sheaff R 1994).
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2. Internal markets contain structures to enable the management of the market to 
occur. These structures enable the market to be managed so that the wider social
implications of a health care system can be maintained, for example, the French 
Ministry of Health is there to ensure that the principles of universal access to 
health-care is maintained. In order to achieve this role the Ministry has certain 
powers (Saltman RB Vanotter C 1995)
(i) To control entry and exits to the market
(ii) The maintenance of services in equity, availability, access and quality
(iii) To review prices
(iv) To manage incentives to providers
(v) To review the determinants of population health
(vi) To define efficiency and efficiency gains.
All competitive health care systems have agencies that perform these functions.
In some countries the government performs this role e.g. the Ministry of Health in
France. In others semi-independent bodies perform the role e.g. the Netherlands 
(Committee on the structuring and financing of health care and the Dekker report.
1986).
3. Internal markets are limited to trading within that market. Therefore, health-care
markets only trade in health-care (Anell A 1995).
The points above are fundamental to an internal market. However, in practice there 
are other features included: all internal markets offer choice of providers; separate
purchasers and providers; permit the cash limitation of public expenditure and can
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accommodate both public and private ownership of health-care providers (Sheaff R 
1994).
The creation of internal markets, in addition to adding the possibility of competition, 
also offers the availability to offer a wide range of policy options within a single 
structure. An example of this is the Dutch reforms where social insurance, private 
insurance and internal markets are being employed (Sheaff R 1994).
In practice there are five variations of internal markets
(i) Compulsory private insurance
(ii) Social insurance
(iii) Primary care doctor purchasing
(iv) Competitive bidding
(v) Managed competition.































































































































1 = Fee for service; 2 - Cost and volume; 3 = Block contract
TABLE 5.1 MODELS OF INTERNAL MARKETS MODIFIED FROM (SHEAFF R 1994)
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5.10 The Key Features of the Market Models
5.10.1 Compulsory Private Insurance
Compulsory private insurance-based internal markets have been proposed in 
Guernsey. It is proposed that all citizens would have to purchase private health
insurance, the government contracting with the insurers to purchase cover for those
who cannot afford to do so. The insurer guarantees a universal minimum level of
cover at a price reflecting the subscribers income. The government pays all 
administration fees and has a profit sharing relationship with the insurers. The 
insurers themselves are limited to six, selected by a tendering process. Under the 
Guernsey proposals the entry and exit to the market would be state controlled as 
would prices and quality. However, insurers and providers are left free to compete 
for patients (States of Guernsey 1992).
5.10.2 Social Insurance
In northern Europe (Belgium, The Netherlands and Germany for example), social 
insurance models are the basis for a long-standing internal markets (Hoffmayer UK 
arid McCarthy TR 1994). Health insurance in these counties is compulsory, with
public bodies purchasing insurance for those who cannot afford it. However, the
premiums paid are regulated by the state, not by the individual companies. Patient,
state and employer all contribute to the payment of premiums. Therefore, virtual
global coverage of a minimum range of services is guaranteed. The purchasers of
health-care are non-specialised, commercial sickness funds, organised either
geographically or along trade Union or religious lines. The cost of the services
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offered is fixed by negotiation. Private insurers and sick funds also offer “top up” 
insurance to purchase a wider range of services for the individual (Hoffinayer UK and
McCarthy TR 1994). Market entry is regulated by accreditation. In this way the
quantity of services is maintained. Management structures therefore control quality
and price.
5.10.3 Primary Care Doctor Purchasing
Primary care-led purchasing has been introduced as part of the NHS reforms as GP
Fundholding. Similar experiments have been tried in Sweden and Russia
(Honigsbaum F Calltrop J Ham C Holmstrom 1995). It is based on the role of the
primary care team as the gatekeepers to secondary or hospital care. In this system 
medical care is purchased by clinicians from cash limited budgets allocated to them
by the management structure. Primary medical care may be purchased from the same
budget (Russia) or a separate budget (UK). In theoiy every patient has the right to
register with a primary care physician, and so the right to universal care is maintained.
The primary care physicians, in addition to acting as gatekeepers to care, also act as
market regulators. In effect care providers are regulated by the willingness of the
physician to refer patients. This allows a variety of care providers to enter the market.
Although public funded hospitals predominate in many primary care markets the
range of providers can include charities and voluntary sectors.
Price and quality are regulated by negotiations between the purchaser and provider.




The reforms introduced into the Swedish health-care system and the competitive 
tendering process in the NHS are both examples of the competitive bidding type of 
internal markets. Providers bid competitively to provide services to a management 
structure. The purchaser of the service decides the specification and the quality 
standards. In this way competition between providers can be planned and market 
entiy is controlled by the management structure (Honigsbaum F Calltrop J Ham C 
Holmstrom 1995).
5.10.5 Managed Competition
Managed competition is typified by the Dutch reforms and is a focus for the US 
reforms (Committee on the structuring and financing of health care and the Dekker 
report. 1986). In managed competition a layer of regulatory bodies manages relations 
between purchasers and providers. This is done so that the equity of health-care can 
be maintained and the purchasers of health-care can offer a guaranteed basic range of 
health-care available to all, irrespective of current health status of a population or an 
individual. To spread the financial risk it is necessary to create either large pools of 
purchasers or to ensure that there is adequate access to a large risk pool. This system 
does not exclude individuals from being compulsory insured, with the state providing
coverage for those who cannot afford it.
Managed competition leaves open the policy question about contributions paid by 
individuals against the cost of cover and the levels of private insurance. The 
intermediate bodies can levy a surcharge purchase to compensate for bias in
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insurance.
The entry of providers into the market is closely regulated by accreditation. The
management of incentives is left to an intermediate body. Contracting with the
provider to offering certain safeguards may also regulate purchasing, e.g. DRG base
contracts.
5.11 Management and Competition in the Internal Market
The choice of models in the internal market makes the management of a health 
system achievable, by focusing on the pattern of incentives, market failure and 
competition (Sheaff R 1994). The key to all of these models is the type of payments
used within the market.
All types of internal markets have payment to providers for incurred expenses. There 
are several types of payments (Anell A l995;Sheaff R 1994)
• Standard tariffs (payment on a fee for service on cost per case)
• Capitation - a combined payment for an entire population
• Block payments - payment on activity levels
• Cost and volume payments based on thresholds of activity levels.
All internal markets make use of these payment mechanisms to a greater or lesser 
degree the choice depends on the type of market being employed (Sheaff R 1994).
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In the competitive bidding markets block contracts and cost per case is the norm 
(Sheaff R 1994). This contrasts with primary care purchasing where cost per case is 
most frequent (Wall A). Project payments, payments for health promotion and 
research and development are also a feature of competitive markets not seen in other 
systems (Anell A 1995). In private managed markets, such as the Guernsey proposals, 
cost per case is the proposed system of payment, while in social insurance markets 
tariffs based on the resources consumed, are proposed (States of Guernsey 1992). In 
managed competition all forms of payments are possible (Committee on the 
structuring and financing of health care and the Dekker report. 1986).
5.11.1 Incentives With Each Model.
The incentive systems that are offered by payments within regulated markets are well 
described (Sheaff R 1994). Cost per case payment acts as an incentive to maximise 
the number of patients and the cost per patient. Capitation payment acts to increase 
patient numbers and minimise cost. Cost and volume contracts act in much the same 
manner but incentives vary with the wording of the contract. Block contracts have a 
complex incentive system, with most authorities stating that they minimise numbers 
and service quality,(Holiday I 1992).
If the theory of internal market incentives is correct then players in the market have 
the pseudo-commercial reasons to maximise charges and minimise costs. The effect 
of incentives in the internal market is not as acute when markets are growing, when 
the evidence is that quality becomes a major feature (Saltman RB Vanotter C 1995).
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In primary care-led purchasing there are two additional sets of incentives to consider. 
The first of these is for the provider of care who responds to the physicians, who 
demand service quality, although the demands are not always the same as the patients. 
The other set of incentives is that of primary care doctors. GPs want attractive 
services with quick access to patients offering the type of service they require, but 
again this might not suit the patient needs (Sheaff R 1994).
5.11.2 Management and Market Failure.
Despite the precautions taken and the incentives used, it is apparent that internal
markets may fail to deliver the desired effects. This is by and large due to a failure of 
market forces to stimulate competition, but instead generate monopoly (Anell A
1995). This effect is due to
1. The behaviour of customers and consumers
Health care is emotive, and therefore its consumers may not act rationally in
selecting a basket of goods to maximise utility.
2. Structural condition, such as the doctor- patient relationship
In many cases the consumer of care is not the purchaser, instead a doctor or other
health professional acts as the agent. This structural relationship makes the market
difficult to stabilise.
3. The rules of transaction
In the functioning of markets free exchange is assumed. However the relationship
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between services and ability to pay, implies that the free market would distort 
equity. Therefore there are rules of transaction - in the form of medical ethics -
that distorts market function.
4. Lack of information
The complexity of medical treatment implies that information can be incomplete
in terms of decision making.
The presence of these four factors implies that free markets would never work in 
health care, as a free market would always result in poor competition and market
failure. This would have the result that the health care provided under a free market
would not reach those most in need, and therefore not be efficient (Anell A 1995).
Therefore, the drive towards markets in health-care should be interpreted in terms of 
achieving better resource allocation and efficiency through the use of competition and 
management. This statement implies the need for markets to be managed. Therefore, 
health-care markets are of the regulated or internal form, which affects the tangible
aim of these markets, i.e., a reduction of the direct costs of production of services and 
also to manage the indirect costs of lost efficiency to society.
The nature of the management needed to achieve competition and reduce market 
failure is closely linked to the incentive structure, and is there to prevent abuse of the 
incentives. The major regulatory mechanisms are the containment of costs and the
prevention of moral hazard (Arvidsson G 1995).
1. Cost management
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Internal markets are very sensitive to two forms of cost pressure, internal costs
and transaction costs. The issues of costs in socialised medicine in a sensitive
issue as previously many of these systems are unused to dealing with monetary
values attached to services. Furthermore some services are more cost sensitive
than others are. For example respite and chronic disease management tends to 
have high internal costs, making it sensitive to commercial pressures. Another
area of concern is Transaction costs. Transaction costs- reflected as the costs of
contracting - acts as dead weight to the competition of the market and reduces
efficiency. These costs therefore need careful management.
2. Moral Hazard
Moral hazard arises as the consumer of health care uses an agent to purchase care. 
It is in the best interest of the agent to purchase the maximum care, and therefore 
the consumers are over-treated. The risk of moral hazard is greatest in the 
competitive bidding and primary care types of market. The existence of moral 
hazard implies a need to carefully manage the distribution of services by agents - 
such as general practitioners.
3. Management Mechanisms
There is a range of suggested solutions to the problem caused by internal market 
failure due to moral hazard, cost pressures and incentive abuse. These vary with 
not only the type of market but also the degree to which they interfere with the
functioning of the market (Arvidsson G 1995).
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1. Tactical Variation
Purchasing by the management structure of services not normally purchased. An
example is the long stay care of the mentally ill.
2. Market Development
By bringing in external market players, market failure can be prevented. An 
example is the use of the use of capital grants and preferential loans to private 
providers to stimulate new services.
3. The Regulation of Costs and Efficiency
The use of efficiency targets, usually reflected as cost improvements are used in 
many markets to ensure competition and avert cost pressures. An example is the 
regulation of the British Gas Industry where efficiency gains and cost pressures are 
linked to the retail price index.
5.12 The Selection of the Appropriate Market and Regulatory Model - the 
Institutional Analysis of the Internal Market
From the above discussion, it is apparent that the development of a successful internal 
market is dependent upon the selection of an appropriate market and regulatory
structure. The appropriateness of one market model over another can be viewed from
a number of angles and while the accuracy of the method selected to judge the 
appropriateness of a model is not important, as all methods are abstractions, it is
important that the analytical methods is sensitive to the political and institutional 
environment. For this reason many investigators have viewed market developments in
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the terms of the institutions involved in the development of policy from Fordist to
Post-Fordist labour practices (Williams Fiona 1994).
5.12.1 Fordist and Post-Fordist structures
The terms Fordism and Post-Fordism are terms borrowed from the regulationist 
schools of public policy. They characterise a state by the economic framework in 
terms of (Jessop B 1996)
1. A characterisation of the labour processes
2. The role of the state in controlling capital
3. The role of the state in economic policy
4. The role of the state in promoting institutional integration
Although often discussed individually, the terms Fordist and Post-Fordist are at the
opposite ends of a spectrum characterised by these four elements.
Fordism
Fordism creates up images of the Ford production plants in Detroit and of mass
production methods. This is only part of the Fordist structure however, as Fordism is 
also representative of the capital and social structures that support the development of 
mass production. Drawing on the regulationist approach to describing capital 
structures, Fordism is characterised as (Jessop B 1996; Aglietta M 1979)
1. The configuration of labour such that technical and social labour is divided.
Labour skills under Fordism are fragmented and geared to the use of special
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purpose machinery - the assembly line. Implicit in this scenario is a 
hierarchical bureaucratic management structure.
2. A capital accumulation regime characterised by the mass consumption of 
goods and services. Their standardisation and economies of scale in 
production characterise these goods.
3. The use of a social mode of economic regulation, that is, the use of social 
structures, clubs, institutions and networks to guide economic policy and 
support mass consumption
4. An emphasis on social cohesion to support the economic regime.
It is possible to break Fordism down into two elements. Firstly a mode of 
accumulation characterised by the promulgation of mass standards, in which both the 
wage relationships and the labour processes are geared to mass consumption and 
production. Secondly Fordism can be characterised by a mode of regulation of 
increasing consumption levels held together by a social cement of welfare and other
social benefits. By focussing on mass production any state following the Fordist 
model, in theory, will produce a stable cycle of consumption based economic cycles 
stabilised by the involvement of society in the mode of accumulation (Aglietta M 
1979).
The prototypic Fordist State has been tenned the Keynesian Welfare State (KWS).
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This state with its commitment to full employment seeks economic stability by 
demand side management (Einhom ES and Logue J 1989). It achieves demand side 
management by adjusting demand to meet the technical capabilities of the mass 
production methods used to manufacture consumer goods - which, by its nature, is 
inflexible. This is coupled with a restriction on the collective bargaining power of 
individuals so that maximum consumption and full employment are guaranteed 
(Jessop B 1996).
Post-Fordism
The implication of the term Post-Fordism is that it represents a significant break with 
the traditions and ideals of Fordism, but retains an evolutionary link with it (Williams 
Fiona 1994). Therefore Post-Fordism can be analysed using the regulationist 
approaches we explained above - but with significant differences in the results (Boyer 
R 1991).
Post-Fordism can be defined in terms of
• A flexible labour force - able to take on many tasks and not just related to the 
tasks associated with mass production. This flexibility may be manifest for 
example by the ability to accommodate small batch production involving skilled
tasks along side mass production methods.
• An innovative pattern of capital accumulation using flexible production processes
to produce a wide range of consumer and non-consumer durables. The innovative 
patterns of accumulation develop both from the production of a flexible workforce, 
but also as a result of technological innovation allowing the generation of new 
process and organisational forms. This innovation is not limited to domestic
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consumption but towards a more global marketplace. Therefore, consumer 
preferences - and an emphasis on niche innovative products - determine the
innovative tendencies seen in the global marketplace
• Supply side management of social and economic policy as a result of change in the
capital and labour production methods. In this the role of the state is decentralised 
and local regulation more evident. Organisations will flatten and new governance 
practices will emerge.
• A varied pattern of organisational integration resulting from the flexibility.
(All points adapted from (Boyer R 1991)).
The ideal post Fordist state has been characterised as the Schumpeterian Workfare 
State or SWS (Einhom ES and Logue J 1989). The objectives of this State are to 
produce a State that supports an open economy based on innovative products, 
organisations and markets. It is based on supply side strategies and relies on
competition to promote social policy. It differs from the KWS as it has no 
commitment to full employment and welfare policy is secondary to economic success.
The SWS has the effect of ‘Hollowing Out’ the role of government associated with a
decline in state provided services such as welfare, (Gould A 1993). As the success of
the state is based on competitiveness - which is often global - burden of the state is
reduced to fuel economic development and so the power of the nation state declines.
This decline is in favour of both localised and supra-regional powers. Therefore the 
SWS places a greater emphasis on local power.
The tendency to the SWS as part of Post-Fordist development is underscored by four 
changes in the global economic environment. These changes are (Jessop B 1994)
• the rise of new technologies
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• internationalisation
• regionalisation of economies
• the shift away from Fordist and KWS models of the state
The rise of new technology permits the development of newer innovative production 
methods - such as those seen in the newly industrialised countries of the Pacific Rim. 
This shift enforces a role of the state in terms of supporting and not fostering 
technological change in order that competition may be maintained. This effect spills 
over into the challenges brought by internationalisation. States can no longer act as if 
their economies were closed either financially or technologically. This has an 
important detrimental effect on the philosophy of the KWS in that it is not possible to 
maintain full employment and stable prices on a pan national basis. 
Internationalisation causes states to lose control of their national economies. Finally 
in this context internationalisation causes economies to regionalise to core areas 
without respect for national boundaries.
5.12.2 Health-care Market Models in Terms of the Fordist Post-Fordist Spectrum 
and the Objectives of Reform.
Earlier in the chapter we introduced five market models. These were Managed 
Competition, Private Insurance, Social Insurance, Competitive Bidding and Primary
Doctor Purchasing (Sheaff R 1994). The selection of the appropriate market model, 
therefore, depends on the fit between the market model and the mode of












Yes No No . Supply
Private
insurance (PI)
Yes Yes Yes Supply
Social
insurance (SI)
No No No Supply
Competitive 
bidding (CB)
No No Yes/No Supply
Primary care 
Doctor P (PC)
Yes Yes No Supply
TABLE 5.2 THE MODELS OF MARKETS AGAINST THE CHARACTERISTICS OF FORDIST 
AND POST - FORDIST POLICY
Adapted from (Gould A 1993)
All five models represent a move from the KWS as all the models use supply-side 
management as opposed to the demand-side management. However, the degree that
the models resemble the SWS varies. Based on these characteristics, it is possible to 
put them on a spectrum of policy depending on how closely the markets resemble the
Keynesian and Schumpeterian visions.
KWS SI CB MC PC Pi SWS
FIGURE 5.1 THE SPECTRUM OF THE MARKET MODELS BETWEEN KWS AND SWS
From Figure 5.1 the social insurance and competitive bidding models lies closest to
KWS. This is in contrast to private insurance which lies would be closest to the SWS. 
Managed competition and primary care doctor purchasing are in the middle of the
spectrum.
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5.12.3 The most appropriate model for the Conservative Government
Based on regulation theory it is possible to select an appropriate model for a given 
economic and social circumstance. Using this approach it is possible to align political 
strategy with the nature of the health care market. As the Conservative strategy was to 
decentralise and increase flexibility and organisational diversity, this would argue for 
one of the models close to the SWS, either private insurance or primary care
purchasing, as the most appropriate model for the reformed NHS (Burrows R and
Loader L 1994).
5.13 The Conservative Strategy in Selecting the Model for the Internal 
Market to Reform the NHS
Conservative deliberations on the nature of the NHS market were cut short by 
circumstance (Webster C 1998). In 1987 it was apparent that the NHS was in a 
profound crisis. It was estimated that the deficit in funding had risen to £400 million.
Waiting lists hit an all time high, and many hospitals began cutting back basic and 
essential services (Ham CJ 1992). The Government responded to the 1987 crisis in two
ways. An extra £101 million was made available to fill any acute needs and an extensive 
Government review of the NHS was announced. In announcing the review the Prime
Minister - Margaret Thatcher made it clear that this review would be swift and would
report its findings within one-year (Ham CJ 1992).
Despite the intensity of the crisis and the sudden nature of the review did not start
with a blank sheet of paper (Ham CJ 1992). In 1984 Professor Alain Enthoven, a
health care specialist at Stanford University, looked critically at the NHS at the
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invitation of the Nuffield Provincial Hospital Trust. His recommendation was to 
create an internal market to increase efficiency. He advocated a managed competitive 
market that would enable Health Authorities to buy and sell services among 
themselves or from the private sector (Enthoven AC 1985).
Enthoven’s review, Reflections on the Management of the NHS, did not gain wide 
publicity. However, the Nuffield Trust ensured that it was widely read by figures 
influential to the NHS. Downing Street did notice the report and Enthoven discussed 
it with the Downing Street Policy Unit headed by David Whillets (Timmins N 1995). 
His suggestions were also adopted by several London teaching hospitals that began, 
on a small scale, charging district specialist services (Ham CJ 1992).
Margaret Thatcher became increasingly interested in the concept of Enthoven’s 
markets following the success of the pilots in London (Thatcher M 1993). 
Coincidentally at the same time as the success of charging for a service was mooted a 
review of the NHS funding was also underway. This review was based on studies of 
Health Maintenance Organisations (HMO) undertaken by the University of York and 
leading civil servants. However despite Thatcher’s enthusiasm and the positive 
findings from York nobody could arrive at concrete proposals - so the ideas were
shelved (Timmins N 1995).
With this background the review of the NHS initiated by Margaret Thatcher in 1987
began. The team that was assembled to conduct the review consisted of two health
ministers, two treasury ministers and the Prime Minister (Thatcher M 1993). The
review began by looking at the funding of the service - where a source of new funds
was needed. Three proposals were made. First to impose hypothecated taxes with the
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ability to opt out and have private insurance. This idea was rejected on the basis that 
the young would opt out leaving the NHS to care for the elderly and leave the
government to pick up the bill. The second was an increase in charges - rejected due
to unpopularity. The final option was for NHS funding mechanisms to remain
unchanged but with the addition of tax concessions on private insurance - with the
hope that funds would trickle back into the service. This proposal had the advantages 
of both popularity and practicality and so became the preferred option (Webster C
1998).
The review then shifted to the delivery of the service. From the outset Margaret
Thatcher wanted money to follow the patient as would be achieved in a free market
(Thatcher M 1993). However, this was a radical shift for the NHS, as it required that 
the service should be able to cost its activities, a feature that proved a stumbling 
point. Meetings were held with sympathetic doctors and health service managers in an 
attempt to solve this problem (Thatcher M 1993). A variety of options were 
considered of which the only one to survive was the internal market split - where 
contracts would be made sufficiently robust to be less sensitive to the costing issues. 
However it was far from clear who should be the purchaser of services. Ideas were 
suggested that hospitals be privatised leaving health authorities, GPs and patients to 
be purchasers. However nobody could see how this would be done. Professor Ian 
McColl made a suggestion that the service be returned to pre-1974 status when
teaching hospitals were independent with their own board of governors (Timmins N
1995). His ideas shaped the concept of self-governing hospitals. This idea was to be
central to all of the reforms. The review was given added impetus with the arrival of
Kenneth Clarke, who joined the review as Minister of Health in 1988. Clarke doubted
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if the NHS management should be solely responsible for purchasing. This point 
caused problems. Reviews of HMO’s had concluded that GPs could buy hospital care 
but nobody could see a suitable infrastructure to enable them to handle budgets. 
Clarke concluded this could be done if budgets to GPs were capped. In this way risks 
and difficulties could be managed. For example, costly emergency services could be 
excluded, the health authority remaining responsible for these. Clarke’s idea, known 
as a GP Fundholding, became established as part of the review (Timmins N 1995).
The bare bones of tax concessions, self governing hospitals and health authority and 
GP purchasers became embodied in a White Paper known as ‘Working for 
Patients’(The Minister of State and others 1989). The paper also included changes in 
the management structure. The DHSS was divided into the Department of Social 
Security and the Department of Health (DoH). The DoH was to consist of a policy 
board and a supervisory board. The supervisory board, called the Management 
Executive, was to be present not only centrally, but also with outposts scattered across 
the regions. Initially the newly created independent NHS providers, such as hospitals,
would report directly to these outposts, while the DHA’s would remain accountable to
the RHA. The DHA's were also to be restructured along business lines, with a board 
of control having both managerial and non-executive inputs. Parallel changes were 
planned for the Family Health Services. Family Health Service Authorities (FHSA) 
were established in place of Family Practitioner Committees. These were also to have
a more business like structure with a board consisting of managerial and non­
executive members.
Within the provider units there were other changes (Klein R 1995). NHS provider 
units were to become devolved from direct DHA management. The semi-independent
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providers, called trusts, were to be given a greater degree of flexibility over the use of 
finance, the employment of staff and management arrangements. The trusts were to 
be directly accountable to the management executive, and were to be organised as 
though they were an operating business. Trust staff, including the professional grades 
such as doctors, were to become more accountable for their performance. 
Accompanying this, a greater degree of flexibility over appointments was to be 
exercised. The first example of these changes was the introduction of new 
disciplinary procedures (The Minister of State and others 1989).
Underpinning these changes were alterations to the resource allocation mechanisms 
(Webster C 1998). DHA's were to continue to receive funding on the basis of a 
population, adjusted for gender proportions and the number of the elderly, but this 
funding was to enable the purchasing of hospital services. The transfer of funding to the 
health-care providers was to be on the basis of contracts to provide services. These 
contracts could be placed with any hospital capable of providing the services required.
These budgetary arrangements were reflected in the establishment of GP Fundholders.
Doctors whose practice was large enough, and who elected to do so, would receive a 
budget direct from the RHA to purchase directly a limited range of health care. The 
budgets included funding for a range of inpatient procedures, outpatients and diagnostic 
tests. The costs of these procedures would be subtracted from the DHA allocation (The 
Minister of State and others 1989).
The final change was the introduction of a new system of charging for capital. This 
involved hospitals being charged a rate of return for the assets they used. The
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introduction of capital charges, as they were called, was designed to instil a sense of 
realism into the NHS’s use of capital and to enforce the internal market reforms (The 
Minister of State and others 1989).
5.14 Assessing the Changes and the Impact on the Mode of 
Accumulation and Institutionalisation of the NHS
It is possible to assess the changes introduced into the NHS by comparing the changes 
seen in the NHS to the changes seen in social services and by comparing the reformed 
NHS to the pre-reform structure. Again we will do this by using the Fordist-Post-Fordist 
continuum introduced earlier and the tripartite structure included in the last chapter.
5.14.1. The Pre-Reform NHS
In the previous chapter we highlighted the tripartite structure of the NHS as being the 
Government, the TUC and the Doctors as the major players with the Pharmaceutical 
Industry and the Community health Councils in support, Figure 5.2. This analysis 
highlighted the state economy interaction as the major driver of policy, and 
commented on the imbalance with the other interactions. It was apparent that these 
features implied that the NHS did not support a Keynesian welfare state ideal. The 
NHS at this time was also partially decentralised - with the role of the medical 
profession at the regional level, although there was little organisational diversity and 
flexibility. Based on these findings, the reformed NHS was best placed closer to 




Doctors and Other --------------------------
Health Professionals, Pharma. Industry 
And Employers
TUC
FIGURE 5. 2 THE TRIPARTITE RELATION IN HEALTH CARE
The pre-reform NHS 
I
KWS SI CB MC PC
FIGURE 5.3 THE PRE-REFORM NHS
PI SWS
5.14.2. The Post-Reform NHS.
The introduction of internal markets covering the provision of all care coupled with the 
mixed economy of Primary Care led purchasing and would place the reformed NHS 
much closer to the Schumpeterian mould. Figure 5.4.
The pre-reform NHS
________ !_____________________________________________________
KWS SI CB ~ MC | PC PI SWS
The post reform NHS
FIGURE 5.4 THE POST -REFORM NHS
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The tripartite relationship however is little changed at this stage of the refonns as mention 
was not made of the Unions in Working for Patients, nor was there to be increasing 
power to patients. If anything the changes, as proposed, increased the power of the 
corporations by increasing doctor power via GP Fundholding.
5.14.3 Comparing Health Service Changes to Other Social Service 
Reorganisations.
A. Housing
Under the Conservative Government, private ownership and private landlords were
encouraged at the expense of Local Authorities (Deakin N 1994). According to the social
thermometer, the reorganisation was considerably closer to Schumpeterian Welfare State
Figure 5.5.
The pre-reform NHS Housing reform
1__________________________ T_______________________!_____________
KWS SI CB MC| PC PI SWS
The post reform NHS
FIGURE 5.5 HOUSING AND HEALTH-CARE REFORM COMPARED.
B. Education Services
Under the Conservative government schools were given the right to opt out and 
increasing parent power was encouraged. This was accompanied by an increase in
regulation of the educational curriculum (Lowe R 1993). This would place education
between the PC and PI on the social thermometer, Figure 5.6.
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The pre-reform NHS Education reform
KWS SI CB MC I PC PI SWS
The post reform service
FIGURE 5.6 EDUCATION AND HEALTH-CARE REFORM COMPARED
C. Personal Social Services
In the personal social services arenas the emphasis on care shifted from the Local 
Authorities being the providers of care into being the enablers of care. This had the effect 
of increasing the private provision of care (Evandrou M and Falkingham J 1998). 
Therefore the reform of social services can be placed between PC and PI, Figure 5.7
The pre-reform NHS Social Services Reform
------------- 1------------------------------------------------------ 1--------------------------
KWS SI CB MC | PC PI SWS
The post reform NHS
FIGURE 5.7 SOCIAL SERVICES AND HEALTH CARE REFORMS COMPARED
5.14.4 The reforms compared
Comparing the reforms in this manner it is apparent that the reforms in health care are 
not as close to the Schumpeterian Welfare State as the reforms seen in social services 
education and housing. This difference may, in part, be due to different starting points.
However all the services were part of the Keynesian Welfare State formed in 1948;
therefore the starting points were similar. Instead other reasons must be sought for the
change in the magnitude of refonn. We have already commented that the NHS was
perceived as being efficient in the standards of service being supplied relative to its
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funding when compared to the rest of Europe. This did not mean that the service could 
not be made more efficient and what was being sought was a redistribution of health care
resources into the ‘at risk’ groups of the elderly, children and mothers. Therefore the aims 
of the internal market in health care would be different. This does not explain why, 
however, the NHS reforms are now apparently not supporting the overall mode of
accumulation reflected in the other welfare reforms - i.e. that of an individualised
enabling state.
5.14.5 The Reforms in Relation to the Economic Restructuring in the UK
The UK like many other European countries has undergone a radical economic
restructuring in the 1980’s and 90’s. This change, amongst other factors such as the 
emergence of global economies, has led to the emergence of a new form of capital 
accumulation (Curwen P 1997). The change in the mode of accumulation is difficult 
to define in terms of the Fordist/Post-Fordist spectrum and is the subject of many 
debates. However the fundamental changes are established in terms of the mode of 
accumulation relying on new divisions of labour centred on a restructuring of work
processes and a change in the labour market.
The changes seen in the restructuring of work processes involve increasing reliance 
on technology and a shift from manufacturing to service industries. These changes
have been identified in the UK as a decline in the industrial base, with an increase in
the financial and other service sectors. Facilitated by the change in the working 
processes the labour market has also changed. Increasingly the UK labour market is 
dominated by flexible working practices marked by declining unionisation of work, 
and increasing part-time employment. The shift in the labour market is also apparent
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by the numbers of women of childbearing age entering and remaining in employment
(Burrows R, Gilbert N and Pollert A 1994).
Under these circumstances some change in welfare provision is inevitable for, as was
remarked above, the welfare state was formulated on the basis of a male dominated
manufacturing-working base. Esping-Andersen argues that under the current regime 
the welfare services should act as a safety net for those in need and provide social 
rights to protect the individuals who are now much more subject to the fluctuations of 
a global economy (Esping-Andersen G 1990). This would argue that the changes in 
the NHS, along with the other components of the welfare state, should guarantee 
protection to those in need. This calls for a service closer to the Schumpeterian ideal, 
i.e. closer to the private insurance models that have been introduced into the other
welfare services, as the role of the welfare state in this circumstance is to act as a
safety net, while facilitating the achievements of the individual. This calls for a focus
on the community care of the elderly - to allow families to work - and an extensive
screening and prevention programme (Burrows R and Loader L 1994). However it is 
apparent that the NHS reforms were not developed along those lines.
5.15 Conservative Strategy and Reform Policy
Faced with the plethora of market alternatives and the overwhelming evidence of 
economic change the Conservative Government under Margaret Thatcher chose a
model of health care reform that was not in line with either economic system or
society needs. There is no single reason for this (Timmins N 1995). However, there is
some evidence that the desire to reform the services was tempered by the need to
144
administer it. In addition the formulation of Conservative policy to refonn the NHS 
involved few of the interest groups and instead looked internally for ideas (Lee-Potter
J 1998). Therefore it would appear that the Conservative method for selecting the way
to refonn the NHS differed very little from previous governments in having an
ideology modified by what is best administered (Timmins N 1995) (Deakin N 1994).
This effect would argue that the selection of policy across the institutionalisation was
not consistent and influenced by the strength of the state - economy interaction.
5.16 Conclusion
The change in society since 1948 led many to doubt the value of the Consensus on health
care provision. The pace of medical technology coupled with the increase in life
expectancy also implied that financially the Consensus was too expensive to support. The 
solution of the incoming Conservative Government in 1979 was to replace the consensus
with internal markets.
As internal markets are modified markets structures and a number of configurations are 
possible. The government selected a model which, at face value, appears not to fulfil the 
needs of society and economy in the supply and distribution of health care. The reasons
for this are unclear. In part the lack of change may be due to the efficient nature in which
the NHS was perceived to deliver services, but it is likely that political or social ideals of
the NHS, together with administrative needs have prevented its further movement. This
impression is confirmed by examining the model with respect to the institutionalisation.
The selection of the model does not appear to be consistent with the institutionalisation of
an internal market. A market institutionalisation would give equal emphasis to the
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partners in the tripartite relationship, but as we have discussed the model still supports the 
state- economy interaction that dominated the NHS prior to the reform. This leaves room 
for considerable modification of the effects of policy by the local actors. The impact of 
the lack of consistency, in institutional terms, institutionalisation is the subject of the
following chapter.
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Chapter 6 Implementing the reforms
6.1 Key points from the Previous Chapter
The reforms proposed as a result of the Conservative policy debates regarding the end of 
the 1948 Consensus on universal health care were not as radical as first suggested. In 
particular the reforms retained the state-economy domination of the NHS, even though 
the aim of the reforms was to introduce competition and money following the patient.
This effect results from the market model that was chosen on which to base reform. The
market model that was selected by the reform process was closer to the Keynesian model 
than would be predicted by the ideology underlying reform. The inconsistency in the 
selection of the model is evidenced by the exclusion of the medical profession and civil 
society elements from the policy making process and the fact that the final product of the 
reform process was out of alignment with economic and social developments. The
reasons behind the selection of a less radical model are not clear-cut; however, they 
appear to result from the pragmatism that was needed to establish the reform process. 
This refonn process however allowed for considerable implementation ad hoc changes to
occur.
6.2 Objectives for this Chapter
This chapter will review the implementation process of the NHS reforms, focusing on 
where the process may have had impact on the final shape of the reforms. At the end of 
the chapter the total effect of the refonns will be discussed from the institutional
methodology introduced in the introduction.
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6.3 Implementing Working for Patients
6.3.1 Background
When published ‘Working for Patients’ was not a complete document. A series of
working papers were published in the months following the release of the document 
containing the detail of the proposals. These covered the basis of the functioning of the 
market, the nature of contracting and the flexibility to be allowed. Whilst they provided 
guidance no details were included. It was assumed that the details would be added during 
the implementation process (The Minister of State and others 1989; Ham CJ 1992; Ham
CJ 1992).
The key theme of these papers was the implementation of the refonns based on an
understanding that the government was seeking the introduction of market incentives
rather than the introduction of a full-blown market economy (The Minister of State 
and others 1989). The NHS, it was argued, had too many multiple objectives to be 
incorporated into a full-blown market economy, (Appleby J 1994). Therefore the 
government wanted to introduce a ‘managed competition’ style market as part of the 
implementation process. As such, this market was to cover the hybrid of market 
incentives and social objectives. These changes were to be accompanied by an 
increase in expenditure to cover the transition period (Ham CJ 1992).
In order to assure a smooth transition a gradual reform process was instituted and it
was expected that the completion of the reform would take many years. This gave
room for considerable change in the ethos of the implementation, and this is indeed
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what happened. In a way this was not unexpected. It has been argued that the 
‘Working for Patients’ refonns were the product of a unique set of political and social 
circumstances - the combination of rising inflation and rising unemployment 
(Kavanagh D 1990). This picture was not sustained for long and a stable economy
emerged in the early 1990’s. This, some would argue, pennitted the return of the 
Consensus style of welfare state and, therefore, some pragmatism should be allowed
in the reform process, (Ellison N). However should also be noted that Margaret
Thatcher was ideologically committed to the end of the Consensus and so the reversal 
of the reforms was unlikely (Thatcher M 1993). Furthermore, despite the declining 
inflation and improved economic conditions seen in the 1980’s the NHS continued to
come under criticism during the period following the reform and appeared to lurch 
from crisis to crisis. It has, therefore, been argued that the changes have more to do
with a response to the problems seen in the NHS rather than a social change,(Webster 
C 1998), and as such it not surprising that the reforms represent a continually
changing process.
Whatever the cause of the changes in the implementation process, several distinct 
phases can be made out. Each of these phases is associated with a particular style and 
political priority and series of events Table 6.1 Table 6.2.
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TABLE 6. 1 LAND MARKS IN THE 1990 NHS REFORMS
1990
June The NHS and Community Care Bill receives assent.
1991
April The refonns come into effect - first wave trusts and Fundholders are
devolved.
June Guidelines on GP Fundholders referrals are established.
Draft of the 'Health of the Nation' produced
1992
April Second wave GP Fundholders and trusts established.
July Health of the Nation white paper published.
October Tomlinson report published.
1993
February Making London Better Published.
Manpower review established.
April Third wave trusts and Fundholders.
October Managing the new NHS published.
1994
April Final wave of trusts established.
1995
April The abolition of regions.
June Total-purchasing pilots established.
1996
July Shaping primary care documents published
Modified from (Ham CJ 1992)
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TABLE 6. 2 CHANGING POLITICAL PRIORITIES DURING THE NHS REFORM
Political lead on the NHS Priority
Margaret Thatcher Competition and Markets
Kenneth Clarke Reforming Primary Care
William Waldegrave The Health of the Nation/Performance
Targets
John Major The Patients Charter
Virginia Bottomley Community Care
Gerald Malone Primary Care
Stephen Dorrell Reducing Management
Modified from (Ham CJ 1992)
The phases of NHS reform, while appearing complex, can be broken down into
several themes. These themes are
• Early phase
• Implementing reforms and market protection
• Performance targets and one nation conservatism
• Primary/community care
• Reducing management.
6.3.2 The Early Phase
A. The Finalisation of the Bill
The early phase is where the bulk of the reform process was accomplished. This period 
lasted from early 1990 to June of 1991. It represents a period of structural change with a 
focus on competition and primary care (Ham CJ 1992).
The period begins with the introduction of the legislation into parliament. Working for 
Patients was incorporated into the National Health and Community Care Acts 1990 
(Webster C 1998). This Bill not only contained the elements of Working for Patients but
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also included ideas from an earlier White Paper published in 1987 (Secretaries of State 
for Social Services 1987). Promoting Better Health aimed to raise the standards of 
primary and community care, and to place a greater emphasis on prevention and health 
promotion. The key element to these changes was the introduction of new contracts for 
GPs and dentists. The new contract for GPs was published at the same time as Working 
for Patients. It included provision for health checks for patients over the age of 75, targets 
for vaccination and cervical cancer screening and encouragement to develop more health 
promotion activities. Other features of the new contract involved incentive payments for 
deprived areas, additional money to employ practice staff and improvement to practice 
premises. In return GPs were expected to produce annual practice reports and information 
leaflets for their practice and ensure standards of service. Overall the effect of the new
contract was to increase the proportion of capitation payments by GPs from 46% to 60%.
This was designed to provide an incentive for GPs to target services for patients (Ham CJ
1992; Lee-Potter J 1998).
The new dental contract, like the GP contract emphasised the need for preventative as 
well as restorative procedures. Children’s dentistry was to move to a capitated system 
instead of a fee for service. The cost of this change was to be met partially by the 
introduction of adult dental charges (Klein R 1995)
Parallel to the changes in the way in which clinical care was delivered the Bill enacted 
changes in the way in which community care was provided. It was now the local 
authorities that were responsible for community care services. This change followed 
on from a report produced by Griffiths in 1988 - Caring for People (Griffiths R 1988) 
These changes would be developed hand in hand with new funding arrangements. Under
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these arrangements there was to be no financial incentive to admit people to private and 
voluntary care with the bill falling on Social Services. Instead individuals would be
entitled to income support, regardless of where they lived. However, Local Authorities 
were given greater powers to charge for services and apply tests of need (The Minister of
State and others 1989).
The NHS and Community Care Act was presented to parliament on a take it or leave 
it basis and to the surprise of many the Bill was passed in June of 1990 with minimal 
changes. This was largely due to the clever publicity campaign launched by Kenneth 
Clarke and the decision by the British Medical Association (BMA) to tackle the 
changes in the implementation phase (Webster C 1998). However the passage of the 
Bill only started the implementation process and it was not clear at this stage what the 
final workings of the reforms would actually look like (Webster C 1998). Instead the 
Bill laid out the new structure, Figure 6.1, together with the ground rules for 
operation.
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FIGURE 6.1. THE STRUCTURE OF THE NHS POST 1990
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR HEALTH
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Source (The Minister of State and others 1989)
Underlying this change was the development of an internal market, the structure of which 
is outlined in Figure 6.2.
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Source (The Minister of State and others 1989)
The foundation of the functioning of the internal market was detailed in the Act. These 
were identical to those in Working for Patients (The Minister of State and others 1989).
In brief these were
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1. The Separation of Purchaser and Provider Roles
Prior to the reforms the Health Authorities received a fixed budget with which to 
manage the hospital and community health services. The requirement was that they 
remained within budget and provided an appropriate standard of care. The direct 
management of providing services achieved these aims. Post reform the District 
Health Authorities were responsible for providing care via contracts from independent 
provider units. In effect District Health Authorities became the purchasers of care, 
using a budget that reflected the age and size of their local population.
2. Increased Financial Flexibility
The trusts in theory had a greater degree of financial flexibility. In practice, however,
this was limited. The financial regime the trusts were established under was one of 
price equals cost. This restricted the ability of the trusts to establish premium pricing 
and allow specialisation. The financial operation of the trusts was also controlled by 
the manner in which the trusts could raise funds for new developments. The reforms 
permitted trusts to borrow money - enabling the development of capital intensive 
services. However the trusts were requested to borrow money from the most 
financially sound source - which in effect limited them to the treasury. Trusts were 
also given an External Financing Limit (EFL) - a calculated figure based on the asset 
value of the trust. This restricted the level of the borrowing and hence development. 
Finally trusts were requested to make a 3% return on the use of capital assets. These 
'Capital Charges' were imposed to make hospitals aware of the cost of capital - but in 
effect they made trusts unwilling to invest in new services as their costs would rise.
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3. Labour Practices Flexibility
The trusts were no longer bound by the Whitely council rules and instead could set 
the pay rates they wanted. In addition, trusts were encouraged to look at the required
skill mixes to deliver the services. This included the use of National Vocational
Qualifications.
4. Managerial Flexibility
The managerial flexibility reflected the change to direct management. In trusts 
therefore, managers were accountable for the signing of contracts. In order to achieve 
this a new performance management system was established. The NHS management 
executive was now responsible for the performance of trusts; they set the financing
limits and monitored contracts. It was made clear that trusts did not come under the
remit of the Regional Health Authorities but that the RHA was present to resolve 
disputes and monitor performance.
5. Contracting for Care
The basis of the market mechanism was the use of contracts to procure services. The 
view of the Government was that they were not legally binding. Therefore rather than 
viewing them as contracts the arrangements can be viewed as service agreements.
The agreements between purchasers and providers were of three types (The Minister 
of State and others 1989).
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1. Block
The payment of an agreed sum to deliver a defined range of services.
2. Cost and volume contracts
These involve the payment of a sum to deliver a specified volume of work.
3. Cost-per-case contracts
Equivalent to fee for service.
Outside of these formal arrangements a fourth type of payment was made available. 
These are the Extra Contractual Referrals or ECRs. This, in many ways, is the most 
controversial aspect of purchaser payments. ECRs are referrals by GP's and hospital 
consultants to hospitals with which the parent DHA has no contract. The DHA is 
responsible for approving such payments, except in the case of Fundholder procedures. 
DHA’s are required to develop procedures to deal with these referrals and determine how
much money should be set aside to deal with such refenals (Ham CJ 1992; Webster C
1998).
The contracts were constructed on activity target - using a currency known as the 
Finished Consultant Episode (FCE). This contracting currency counted the number of 
times a consultant hospital team saw a patient within a treatment episode. Therefore a 
single inpatient visit amount to several FCE's. It was therefore difficult for purchasers 
to take the population figures and directly extrapolate the activity levels within the 
contract. In most cases therefore, contractual levels were based on historic activity - 
leaving the service with a supply-side focus. The use of the FCE also impacted the 
ability of the NHS to cost the services provided. The FCE bears no relation to the
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resources consumed by the patient and makes the running of the market difficult.
B. After the Bill - implementing the reform
Shortly after the final contents of the Bill were made public, Dr. Duncan Nichol was
appointed to oversee the implementation of the refonns. Until the time the Bill 
became law Dr Nichol made a number of suggestions to the refonns, however, at the
time of the assent of the acts as it was still unclear how the reforms would work in
practice. The implementation of the reforms was made more complex the ‘’wait and 
see” policy of the British Medical Association and the Royal Colleges. Therefore the 
passing of the Bill was only the start of the process of refonn (Timmins N 1995).
Shortly after the passage of the Bill the BMA and the Royal Colleges launched the 
opposition campaign. This centred on the fact that the NHS was being dismantled and 
that the Government was embarking on a policy that would inevitably lead to 
privatisation (Lee-Potter J 1998). While this campaign was successful with the public, 
it was apparent that the ranks of the medical profession were split. This split was at 
two levels, primary care and hospital services (Timmins N 1995). By December 1990 
the size of the primary care split was apparent as over three hundred practices 
indicated a desire to become Fundholding - a sizeable minority (Ham CJ 1992). The 
opinions of the hospital consultants were also divided, as many saw the moves as a 
return to the situation prior to the 1974 refonns - where some hospitals were self 
governing (Lee-Potter J 1998). The magnitude of the divisions were such that the 
medical profession was unable to mount a co-ordinated response to the change, and 
so despite opposition were unable to alter the refonns (Klein R 1995).
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Opposition from the Trade Unions and professional bodies was also muted. The 
Union power declined during the Thatcher years and with the onset of local pay 
bargaining and the reduction in power of the Whitely Councils the Unions were in
effect disenfranchised (Webster C 1998).
The medical advertising campaign and the frustration of the Unions coincided with 
the onset of the Labour Party opposition. The Labour Party launched into an 
expensive media campaign, but with Union strength decreased, the medical vote split 
and no election in sight, the campaign did not succeed in making an impact (Webster
C 1998).
Despite the muted victory over the opposition, considerable concern still lingered 
within the Tory Party - particularly over the effects that changes would have on 
community care and the administration of the system. Despite this Margaret Thatcher 
would not back down at this stage, arguing that the political price of change would be 
too high. So the Government pressed ahead with the reforms when many in the 
Cabinet would like to have seen the pace of reformed slowed (Thatcher M 1993). 
Some concessions were given, however. The Griffiths report of 1988, which formed 
the basis of the community care services in the 1989 Act, recommended an aggressive 
change schedule (Griffiths R 1988). In practice this involved a difficult untangling of 
responsibilities, which would take longer than anticipated. Therefore, compromises 
were developed that involved the partial funding of care by transfers of funds from 
the health to the social services budget (Webster C 1998). This still left community 
care vulnerable to budget shifts, and the sucking in of funds by an expansion in the 
acute services. The need to re-negotiate the community care provisions pushed back
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the implementation dates for the community care programme to 1993.(Timmins N 
1995)
The delay in the implementation of community care marked the end of the first phase 
of health care reform. The financial crisis of 1990, the social unrest over the poll tax 
and the decline in Margaret Thatcher’s popularity forced her out of office later that 
year (Thatcher M 1993). Her replacement - John Major - had different views on the
NHS reforms and his appointment marked a new phase in NHS reform (Ham CJ 
1992). However it should be noted that at the time of the change in Downing Street 
the reforms were unchanged from the Working for Patients ideal (Thatcher M 1993) 
as the market remained un-segregated and the role of the DHA. as market manager 
was defined. This was a situation that was set to change as the implementation 
proceeded
6.3.3. Phase 2 Implementing Reforms and Market Protection
The first trusts were established on the 1 April 1991 (Webster C 1998). On that day 
57 trusts were established. The first trusts included acute and community services, 
ambulance authorities and services for those with learning disabilities. The first trusts 
were, quite frequently, of a combined nature in line with Working for Patients (The 
Minister of State and others 1989). However, the establishment of these trusts
displayed a weakness in the system. At the outset it was apparent that the 
vulnerability of the community services in combined trusts had been underestimated 
(Klein R. 1995). This was shown by some funding failures, in which community 
services were sacrificed to the benefit of acute services. This situation was changed
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for the second-wave trust selection when no combined trusts were allowed (Ham CJ 
1992). This however, created some small trusts and required greater involvement of 
the DHA and more intense regulatory and market intervention. In effect this action 
created a segregated centrally controlled community care market (Klein R 1995).
In response to the problems seen in the establishment of the trusts, it became apparent 
that the development of District Health Authority purchasing should be delayed while 
the trusts developed (Ham CJ 1992). A gradual process of purchaser change was 
initiated in which the main aim was to clarify managerial responsibility, while not 
encouraging market behaviour (Klein R 1995). The initial phase of the new 
implementation programme involved the devolution of responsibility to provider units 
supplying care by a redistribution of staff between district headquarters and provider 
units. Therefore, initially the management of the NHS separated - with only a small 
core remaining in the District Health Authority. The resulting purchaser and provider 
management then formed a hybrid intennediate tier until the trusts could be formed. 
Hospitals in this hybrid role were termed Directly Managed Units (DMU). While 
potential trusts existed as DMU, the DHA remained responsible for the financial 
integrity of the unit (Ham CJ 1991). What little development in DHA occurred before 
1992 was focused around Project 26, (East Anglia Regional Health Authority 1990). This 
project brought together DHA’s to share thoughts and feelings about purchasing, however 
it did not make concrete recommendations and focused on coping within the existing 
structures (Ham CJ 1992).
In contrast to the problems seen in the DHA and trust development programmes, the 
GP Fundholding developments proceeded at a pace. In Working for Patients it was
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envisaged that only practices of 11,000 patients would be eligible (The Minister of 
State and others 1989). This was rapidly reduced to 7,000 patients and practices were 
permitted to join together to reach the target number. The range of services on offer 
was also widened (Glennerster H Matsaganis M Owens P Hancock S 1994). Initially 
only practice expenditure, drugs and a limited range of elective therapeutic and 
diagnostic procedures were included. This was widened in 1991 so that most non­
acute surgery and some medical services were included. However, in the face of 
concerns about financial accountability the scheme was changed. Practices were 
forbidden from becoming private companies and were made more financially 
accountable to the DHA. (Glennerster H Matsaganis M Owens P Hancock S 1994). 
These changes placed DHA’s in the ambiguous position of being both funder and 
regulator of service provision. The relative lack of experience of DHA’s in both roles 
- coupled with the pressure from GP Fundholding, led many health authorities to 
merge and establish purchasing schemes in conjunction with the Family Health 
Services Authorities (Ham CJ 1992). In a number of places this led to the creation of 
joint management bodies for the purchasing of health services. These 
‘commissioning’ bodies took on the majority of non-statutory purchasing roles and 
sought to simplify the management structure. However they did create ambiguity and 
conflict within the system as both primary and secondary care were funding- 
dependent upon a single authority (Glennerster H Matsaganis M Owens P Hancock S 
1994).
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6.3.4 Phase 3 Performance Targets and One Nation Conservatism
In response to the problems faced by DHAs major changes were made in the structures 
surrounding purchasing (Klein R 1995). These mark a new phase in refonn development 
and represent changes in purchasing and access. These changes were brought about not 
only by concerns over the management of the service but in an attempt to quell public 
concern over the care of patients (Ham CJ 1992).
A. Changes in Purchasing
The first change was the publication of The Health of the Nation (Department of Health
1992). The Health of the Nation was put forward as a health strategy for England. Its role 
was to clarify aims and responsibilities as well as providing a framework to focus action 
upon and measure performance. It centred on the
• Identification of health problems
• A focus on good health and health promotion
• A need for greater co-operation between responsible parties
• Securing the best use for available resources.
Implicit in these tenets was the need to focus on health gain, the involvement of local 
people and the dissemination of adequate information to ensure choice. The 
achievement of these goals was to be brought about by the setting of specific targets 
for reductions in the mortality and morbidity of diseases, that the government’s 
medical advisors considered were significant. Hence targets were set for:
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• Sexually transmitted diseases
• Mental health
• Reduction in factors known to influence ill health such as smoking, dietary
problems and lack of exercise
• Improvement in the health of pregnant women
The effect of the publication of this health strategy was to give purchasers a clear set 
of objectives, against which their performance could be measured.
The second change came about as a result of the publication of The Tomlinson Report on
hospital services in London (Tomlinson B et al 1992). This report sent a clear signal that
the over-provision of services was no longer to be tolerated, and rationalisation of
services must occur. This signalled the end of the gradual process of DHA development 
and encouraged purchasers to be more aggressive to reach the targets set in the Health of
the Nation.
The use of health-related performance targets was matched by the use of financial targets 
concerning the use of funds. In the years up until 1990 the DHA were obliged to stay in
financial balance. In the years after 1991 DHA were obliged to increase efficiency by 3%
each year by purchasing more activity for the same financial outlay (Appleby J and Little
V1993).
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The last change in purchaser development came in 1993 with the Costing for Contracting 
Exercise (NHS Executive 1993). The development of the market had permitted a range of 
costing arrangements to evolve. Costing for Contracting aimed to place these
arrangements on a uniform basis.
The overall effect of the changes was to increase the centralisation and uniformity of 
purchasing services (Klein R 1995) (Appleby J 1994). This centralisation was achieved 
by the use of standardised costing and performance management in both finance and 
clinical areas. The DHA were no longer running a local market, but contributing to a 
national market under the control of the seven outposts of the management executive. If 
performance management targets were not met the DHA. faced the prospect of either 
reductions in funding or enforced changes in management (Bartlett W and Le Grand J
1994).
B. Changes in Access - One nation Conservatism
Increasing criticism over the lack of patient rights in the NHS led to demands for rights of 
access to services. John Major developed the idea of the Patients Charter - guaranteeing 
the rights of patients to standards of service (The Secretary of State for Health 1991). 
These standards were national and reflected the idea of Britain as a community of equal 
rights. The Patients Charter was also seen as a way of addressing any imbalance in the 
state-economy relationship, thereby increasing market ethos (Glennerster H 1998). 
However it reduced the flexibility of purchasers and providers. Therefore, paradoxically - 
the Patients Charter increased the central management of services (Klein R 1995).
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Taking these changes into account, by the end of the third phase of refonn a fundamental 
shift had occurred in the NHS reforms. The original reforms were aimed at generating a 
locally flexible market. However, the unexpected results of the refonns in terms of 
the vulnerability of community services, difficulty in administering the services and 
patient concerns over the equity and standards of service (Powell MA 1997), forced a 
change leading to the development of a centrally regulated market (Klein R 1995). 
This required a change in the emphasis of the market - the development of primary 
and community care - if the objectives of market development were to be sustained.
6.3.5 Phase 4 Piimary and Community Care
It was originally intended that the reforms to community care would be implemented at 
the same time as the introduction of changes to hospital care. However, the public outcry 
caused by the introduction of the poll tax led to the delay in the implementation of the 
reforms until 1993 (Thatcher M 1993). In 1993/94 £399 million in funding was 
transferred from the Health to the Social Security budget to facilitate the change (Ham C 
1994). An additional £140 million was also made available to fund the changes. However 
the funding transfers did not work well and the situation led many local authorities to 
rationing care (Powell MA 1997). This situation has been made more complex by the 
ending of income support to those in long term care. Local authorities now had a fixed 
budget in which to plan care, and like the problems associated with the use of the FCE, 
the lack of ability to cost services left major problems in balancing the budget (Powell
MA 1997).
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The response to these problems did not involve a change in the overall market 
ideology, but forced a change in the market itself (Timmins N 1995). In 1993 
increased emphasis was placed on protecting community care. Health Authorities 
were required to demonstrate a commitment to developing community programmes in 
their purchasing and business plans for 1994/5 (Wessex Regional Health Authority
1993). The response to this has been the establishment of ‘Joint Commissioning’ to 
ensure a consistent approach to allocation by both Local Authorities and Health 
Authorities (Southampton Health Commission 1993). This has further increased the 
ambiguity of the health authority position as it is now in the position of both 
contracting and distributing funds. It has also changed the dynamics of the 
interactions by further increasing the central control of the market, as the authorities 
are required to make regular reports on the progress of community care.
6.3.6 Phase 5. Reducing Management
By late 1995 it was apparent that the cost of refonn was higher than had been 
anticipated (Webster C 1998). Faced with mounting criticism over the apparent waste 
of resources and the overburdening effects of management the focus was turned on 
the market administration. The RHA tier of management was removed - increasing 
the centralisation of the market - and purchasers were encouraged to make their 
management costs less than 2% of the overall revenues.
The changes at DHA level increased the emphasis on the GP Fundholders. The 
Fundholding system was seen as efficient, and not overtly managerial in nature
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(Glennerster H Matsaganis M Owens P Hancock S 1994). The success of the limited GP
Fundholder system led many to question whether DHA were needed at all (Timmins N
1995). In an attempt to resolve this controversy Total Purchasing pilots led by GPs were 
established, the results of which have suggested that total purchasing is an efficient way 
to manage resources. In other moves GPs were encouraged to provide a wider range of 
services and all practices were given the option of having a drugs budget. Therefore 
primary care was made centre stage on the political agenda (Timmins N 1995; Rivett G 
1998). The effect of the emphasis placed on primary care was to further complicate the 
market - making regulation more difficult. Paradoxically the DHAs were encouraged to 
be the enablers of care - increasing the centralisation of the market, while at the same 
time encouraging the development of Fundholding (Klein R 1995). Given these 
developments it was hardly surprising that the government was accused of ‘making it up 
as they went along’. This situation prevailed until the general election of 1997 (Ham C
1994).
6.4 The Result of the Implementation Process
The final product of the reforms - reached in 1997 - differed substantially from what 
was imagined in ‘Working for Patients’. The NHS and Community Care Act 
established a system of purchasers and providers, but the market incentives were not 
what were envisioned and the market was more centralised than initially conceived 
(Bartlett W and Le Grand J 1993;Glennerster H 1998). The reasons for this include
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1. The Patterns of Contracting
The protection of the trusts in the early phase reduced flexibility in terms of 
contracting. This resulted due to the DHA being left responsible for the Directly 
Managed Units, DMU, for a considerable period of time, during which patterns of 
purchasing were established that, given the regulation of the market, would prove 
difficult to change (Ham C 1994).
2. The Market Complexity
Establishment of community trusts, to protect politically sensitive community funds, 
and GP Fundholding caused the market to be very complex and increased the role of
central management by the RHA and NHS Management Executive (NHSME).
3. Market Incentives.
The incentives to use block contracts, compounded by the contracting currency that 
was used, led to the market incentives of price and cost not developing (West P
1998).
4. Information Imbalance.
The lack of information and emphasis on quality further enhanced the supply side
features of the market.
5. Reduced Flexibility and Increased Management
The separation by the reforms of community and hospital services reduced the 
flexibility in the service and created a number of small trusts that require intensive
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market management if they were to survive (West P 1998).
The majority of these deviations resulted from the actions of the organisations that 
surrounded the implementation process and represent ad hoc attempts to make the
market work. (Jenkins S 1995) (Douglas HR Humphery C Lloyd M Prescott K
Haines A Rosethal J Watt I 1997). This provides evidence for post - policy 
modifications and supports the argument that the changes seen in the NHS reforms in
the 1990’s result from the failure of a coherent policy (Black D 1992). However, 
deviations from a market model were acceptable to the administration as they were
within the broad ideology of markets and made the system manageable. Indeed it was
commented that Margaret Thatcher was so ideologically committed to markets she
was prepared to accept them at any price (Timmins N 1995;Lee-Potter J 1998).
6.5 Where Did the Reforms End-up on the Social Scale in Institutional 
Terms
Referring to the spectrum of the KWS and SWS it is apparent that the reforms were
closer to the KWS than envisioned during the development of the reforms - as
discussed in chapter 5. The differences seen were mainly due to the reduced 
flexibility, the degree of centralisation and the features of supply side management 
required to make the reforms work. In other words the purchasers were being 
requested to deliver a centrally mandated and planned service, with Keynesian
elements - a focus on access - and dominance by the supplier (Glennerster H 1998).
This was enhanced by the failure, as part of the reforms, to establish clear legal rights
within the system and the reduction in purchasing powers of the DHA as a result of
the way in which Fundholding was established (Bartlett W and Le Grand J 1993).
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In terms of the social thermometer introduced earlier the reforms seem now to be far
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FIGURE 6.3 THE NHS 1997, PRE REFORMS AND POST WORKING FOR PATIENTS
6.6 Conclusion
The conclusions of this chapter are
1. There is evidence of post-policy modifications in the NHS refonn process. These 
modifications are in response to either unexpected effects of policy or changes 
needed to make the system more manageable.
2. These modifications appear to result from the lack of consistency of policy across 
the players in the NHS policy process. Using the analytical framework proposed, 
this lack of consistency is manifest as an emphasis on the state-economy relations
3. The way in which the reforms of the NHS were implemented permitted 
considerable post - policy change. The lack of consistency that was evidenced by 
problems in the institutionalisation allowed this post policy change to divert the
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reforms from their original purpose and into actions that favoured the
administration of the service.
The final analysis of the outcome of the reform process emphasises the fact that the
NHS was now out of kilter with the rest of the welfare state, and was no longer
associated with the support of a mode of accumulation based on individual
empowerment. In reviewing the development of the modem welfare state many
analysts have indicated that this situation is the ideal developing ground for exclusion 
and marginalisation within the welfare services, and that the development of this
marginalisation is a critical feature of why reforms fail (Esping-Andersen G 1990).
Therefore, before proceeding further into a discussion on the success or failure of
reform it is important to review the effects that the changes have had on the delivery 
of services. This is the subject of the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 7 The impact of the reforms
7.1 Key points from the Previous Chapter
The NHS reforms were established to bring a sense of market forces into the 
functioning of the NHS. These refonns were, however, changed by the political,
administrative and social environment that surrounded the service. The final structure
can be characterised - in accordance with the institutional methodology - as lacking
consistency in policy across the organisations involved, and of a service not in
alignment with the remainder of the welfare state. These findings would argue that
the NHS reforms lacked some of the features of a market based reform structure.
However, the outcomes of the reform process does not mean that the NHS did not 
functionally support the new role of the state, as for the most part the function ot the 
sendee is independent of its structure, as evidenced by the post-policy modification of 
the NHS reforms. Therefore, before concluding anything about the 1990 reforms the
function of the service should be reviewed.
7.2 Objectives for this Chapter
The purposes of this chapter are to review the performance of the reformed NHS 
against the requirements established at the beginning of the refonn process, the 
requirements of a modem welfare state, and the needs of society.
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7.3 Introduction - The Objectives of the Reform
The previous two chapters reviewed the development and the implementation of the 
refonns. As we have commented the reforms were implemented to introduce market 
incentives into the NHS. The objectives of this move were to (The Minister of State
and others 1989),
1. Introduce the concept of the money following the patient dependant upon market
values.
2. Increase efficiency using competitive pressures.
3. Decrease the power of local governments.
4. Introduce selectivity with an emphasis on the young and the elderly.
5. Introduce labour flexibility.
As we have seen the implementation of the reforms produced some further objectives
(Appleby J 1994)
1. The protection of community services.
2. The implementations of GP Fundholding as a managed care experiment.
3. The provision of specific health and funding targets.
These features were not made explicit in ‘Working for Patients’ (The Minister of 
State and others 1989).
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7.4 Reviewing the Impact of the Reforms - the Metrics
In reviewing the reforms it is important that the objectives of refonn are borne in
mind. However, many of the objectives of refonn are quite soft - for example the
protection of community services. Therefore, in order to give sufficient objectivity to
any study of the impact of the reforms the metrics used must be sensitive to these key
issues. The assessment of the impact of the reforms on the perfonnance of the NHS
has been made more difficult by the lack of objective research. Some researchers
have even gone as far as to suggest that the lack of research has been deliberate (Le
Grand J and Robinson R 1984).
In light of these problems, two sets of measures have been employed by reviewers; 
direct measures on services and indirect measures on the development of the market 
(Powell MA 1997). In summary, the measures applied are (Ham C Robinson R and
Benzeval M)
1. The strength of market forces.
2. Changes in labour flexibility.
3. The development of local providers - including community services protection.
4. The delivery of care to priority groups.
5. The development of equity
6. Measures of efficiency.
7. The impact of the changes on mortality and morbidity
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7.5 The Results of the Assessments
7.5.1 The Development of Market Forces
The central tenant of the market refonns was the introduction of contracting for
services. Appleby has shown that the majority of both DHA purchasers and providers 
conducted contracting using specialist teams (Appleby J 1994). The composition of 
the team was dependent on the experience of the facility in contracting out. The teams 
included financial and public health expertise. However the effectiveness of the 
financial controls has been brought into question. Reviews have indicated that many 
managers are ill equipped to deal with their financial tasks (Marriott N and Mellett H 
1994). Given this background, the major problems faced by the contracting teams
within the DHA were the
• Lack of information on the needs of the local population, its preference for
current services and the performance of hospital units.
• Conflict between purchasers and providers over the importance of services and
how they should be provided.
• Difficulties in the assessment of service quality, and the mechanisms to include 
quality in the contracting process.
• Difficulties in adjusting DHA contracts for GP Fundholder activity
• Conflict with central priorities in as the need to demonstrate performance runs
against local needs.
(Adapted from (Best G Knowles D Mathew D 1994))
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As a result of these problems, the impact of competition in the service has not been as 
large as expected (Le Grand J and Vizard P 1998; West P 1998). Appleby used the 
Hirchmann-Herfindal index to assess the strength of competition introduced by the
reforms (Appleby J 1994). Their study - based in the West Midlands - showed little 
change in competition and in potential competition pre- and post-reform, with a 
quarter of hospitals being in a monopoly position.
These findings were emphasised in the research of Bartlett and Harrison in 1993. In a 
health authority based study, the market resembled a bilateral monopoly. There was
little by way of competitive bidding processes and there was much evidence of non­
market interactions - with deals often being struck between purchasers and providers
(Bartlett W and Harrison L 1993). These deals were often conducted in the full
knowledge, if not encouraged by the NHSME. In this manner many of the difficult
political problems of hospital closure could be avoided (Ham CJ 1992).
In addition to highlighting the apparent monopoly position of providers of care, all of 
the studies performed on DHA purchasing have emphasised that the development of
market forces was made more difficult by the lack of information. In addition the
reviews have found that large transaction costs are associated with contracting
(Appleby J 1994; Bartlett W and Harrison L 1993). This makes the exact nature of the
contractual relationship difficult to understand, however both Appleby and Bartlett 
have indicated that the market was biased in favour of the local hospitals and
suppliers of care.
Similar findings have been made in the study of contracting by GP Fundholding
(Audit Commission 1996). The Audit Commission report on Fundholding found that
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while in general GP Fundholders were best placed to contract for the care of patients 
in their practice, the lack of information contributed to problems in defining contracts 
and left the providers of care in a strong position. The relationship of GP and DHA 
contracting was also not helped by the way in which the guidance for the funding of
practices had been inconsistently applied - leading to some practices being over 
funded, and others under. The lack of accountability of Fundholders in this aspect has
made the situation difficult to rectify and had a negative influence on contracting
(Audit Commission 1996; HFMA 1994)
Taken as a whole the studies of both Fundholding and DHA purchasing would argue 
that market forces have been slow to develop and, where present, they are weak and
decision making is dominated by supplier pressure (Appleby J 1994 West P 1998). 
The problems in DHA contracting and market development led to a failure of the 
market to direct funding flow and the absence of ‘money following the patient’. In a 
study of regional neurosurgery, Adams commented that the structure of the market
penalised efficient units. Many hospitals have demonstrated efficiency gains every 
year without merit for previous gains being granted. In addition those units capable of
attracting private income have had no incentives to do so. Indeed it has been
remarked that the accounting rules introduced, as part of the market changes, acted as
a disincentive for the generation of private income (Adams CBT 1995; Appleby J
Little V 1993). The authors of other studies have also doubted that market forces were
sufficiently developed or well managed to allow the purchasing of clinical services
(Audit Commission 1994; Clinical Standards Advisory Group 1993).
Experiences, such as that reported by Adams, have called into question the
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effectiveness of the market developments. Reviewers have commented on the fact
that far from market reforms, purchasers and providers have suffered under a stream
of central commands (Best G Knowles D and Mathew D 1994). In addition the
Government intervened at times where it looked as though market powers would
result in unpopular decisions, and failed to intervene to protect services as needed.
Ham and Maynard have argued that in this the Government have not acted as a
regulator of the internal market but that the internal market has become politicised in
a way that protected the provision of services, (Ham C and Maynard A 1994).
The key example of the politicisation of the markets has been the impact of
performance management (Propper C 1995). Appleby and Sheldon commented on the
way in which performance measures, such as the efficiency index, were applied led to
short-termism and political gain without contributing to market regulation or the
efficient distribution of resources (Appleby J, Sheldon T and Clarke A 1993;
Donaldson LJ, Kirkup W, Craig N and Parkin D 1994). It is a similar situation with
regard to measures such as the Patients Charter, where the introduction of minimum
standards has led to the weakening of market incentives (Laing AW and Shiroyama C
1995). Where performance targets have been introduced with a linkage to health care,
for example the Health of the Nation, these targets were secondary to the activity
targets and introduced without guidance or indication about importance or incentives
to achieve them (Ham C 1994). It would therefore appear that the use of performance
management has the primary political aim of influencing the state-economy
interaction. This acts to augment the position of the providers of care in the new
market and re-enforces their monopoly position (Propper C 1995).
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7.5.2. Developments in Labour Flexibility
The NHS personnel function was altered by the reforms. Prior to the reforms, the
personnel function was by and large limited to the selection of staff Post-reform, the 
roles expanded to include employee relations, skill mix reviews and pay
determinations (Lloyd C and Siefert R 1992).
A. The Control of Staff Levels and Skill Mix
The self-governing provider units were established in part to exhibit a greater freedom
in employment practice (Buchan J 1992). However these aims were thwrarted by the
conflict engendered between professional groups present in the provider units (Ham
CJ 1992).
The development of labour flexibility was easier in some areas. In radiology, the
establishment of Radiography Helpers was a key example of this (NHSME 1992a).
However, at the forefront of the debate about skill mix were professional concerns
about the quality of care being delivered. National reviews have shown unexpected
downturns in the numbers of staff in some groups, for example qualified nurses, after
skill mix reviews. In addition if national initiatives, such as the NHS management
executive value for money unit recommendations were to be applied there would be a
further decline in nursing staff (Secombe I and Buchan J 1994).
Despite the resistance, some changes have been made. In place of skilled staff, health
care assistants (HCA) are employed in some units. These generic support workers are
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not linked to any one profession but to a general National Vocational Qualification 
(NVQ). They are envisaged as providing flexibility and not bound by the terms and 
conditions of professional staff (Industrial Relation Services 1992). These attempts to 
achieve flexibility, in terms of supporting a market function, have not been well
assessed. Some researchers have pointed to a reduction in the quality of care 
administered and an increase in in-direct costs (Carr-Hill R, Dixon P, Gibbs 1, 
Griffiths R, Higgins M, McCaughan D and Wright K 1993).
The development of labour flexibility is in direct conflict with the perfonnance 
management of the market. As stated above, one of the ideals of perfonnance 
management is to increase throughput. As this reduces in-patient stays, to achieve a 
higher turnover of patients a return to highly skilled, specialist, staff may be needed, 
as these staff will facilitate rapid patient discharge. Balancing this view is the
perception of skill mix review as a way of reducing short-term costs - and therefore 
any claims about flexibility must be treated with caution. In addition it is possible that 
any claims that the NHS refonns have been responsible for increased flexibility may 
be overstated as changes in nursing, medical and allied staff education was already
beginning to have an effect on skill mix prior to the reforms (Buchan J 1992). It is 
therefore not possible to divorce the changes in labour flexibility from the impact of 
political short-termism.
B. Employee Relations and Wage Determination.
Prior to the reforms in the NHS employee relations was centrally determined. The 
Whitley system of national councils set wages for non-professional staff and settled
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disputes. For those staff not covered by Whitley Councils, pay review bodies were 
established in 1973 (Webster C 1998). The Whitley Councils and pay review bodies 
were comprised of senior NHS management, Unions and professional bodies such as 
the BMA. All negotiations took place at a national level. The pay review bodies were 
seen as the ultimate NHS inflexibility - and so were prime targets in the reform 
process (Thatcher M 1993). The 1990 reforms gave local flexibility for bargaining 
and shifted the focus of employee relations to the local level (The Minister of State
and others 1989). However, reviews have indicated that there has been no rush to
move from the Whitley Council system. This was in part due to the rights of
employees to remain on previous terms and conditions when the trusts were
established (The Minister of State and others 1989). But it also reflects pragmatism
on behalf of managers for whom the changes meant an increased workload (Lloyd C
and Siefert R 1992). Some units, however, have moved towards ‘single table
agreements’ under which all employee relationships are dealt with in a single
negotiation process, in line with NHSME expectations (Secombe 1 and Buchan J 
1994). Despite this most trusts retained pay body recommendations. What change has
occurred may be more due to the relaxation of rules on payment of the rises - which
now are often staggered. This ability was introduced prior to the reforms and so
cannot be claimed to be a result of the reforms themselves (Secombe I and Buchan J
1994).
In summary it would appear that the NHS reforms have not increased labour 
flexibility. This is partly due to the centralised state demands and the political aims of 
change, but a proportion is due to the lack of skill at local level. What changes have 
occurred appear to be stimulated by pre-reform changes. These pre-reform elements
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have helped to increase the strength of the provider relationship.
7.5.3. Developing Priority Services and Protecting Community Services
One of the principal objectives of the refonn was to target resources into priority 
areas. These priority areas are well defined and include the care of the elderly,
maternity services and the care of the mentally ill. Reviews of the achievements in
this area take a variety of fonns, however most have concentrated on the direct
provision of services. These reviews indicate, in general, that while the acute services
have been well protected, there are some concerns about the availability of
community services for the elderly and mentally ill (Williams G, Flynn R and Packard
S 1997). These problems appear to have arisen due to barriers between the acute and
community services that have arisen as a result of the refonns (Best G, Knowles D
and Mathew D 1994).
1. Services for the Elderly •
Jones, Lester and West reviewed services for older people (Jones D 1994). The 
review took the view of a close examination of community services. The community 
service review questioned users on the availability of services. There was a great deal 
of satisfaction with the primary care services, including GPs and district nurses. 
However many reported increasing difficulty with other paramedical services since 
the reforms started - for example, chiropodists. The problems faced by the elderly
have also been highlighted by surveys conducted by Age Concern. These studies
would indicate that the NHS is no longer supporting the elderly in terms of the 
provision of hospital and community services. The survey highlighted the decline in
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the number and range of community places - particularly day care places for the 
elderly with mental illness, and the decline in dedicated care of the elderly beds (Age
Concern 1991). In both of the studies quoted, no difference was detected between the
GP and DHA modes of purchasing.
The decline in the numbers and standards of facilities for the care of the elderly have 
been highlighted by the appearance of several prominent court cases, in which the 
principle of the NHS’s responsibility to pay for seriously ill elderly patients was 
challenged (Tudor-Hart J 1994). These cases centred on moving the elderly in 
hospital care service institutions into other facilities where adequate care was not 
available. These cases have led to several health care managers being disciplined and 
the courts emphasising the role of cradle to grave care (Tudor-Hart J 1994; Powell 
MA 1997). The underlying theme of these cases has been a change in the definition of 
illness. The elderly are no longer counted as ill - they are suffering from the nonnal 
body ageing process and so can be discharged from the health care system. Therefore 
the question is of the eligibility of the elderly for care. Eligibility is very much a local 
issue - there is no national eligibility standard. Therefore there are wide local 
variations in care. Vickridge has commented that many elderly are discharged from 
hospitals to die soon after. This, in part, supports this contention of a change in
definition. However this redefinition has been introduced without social debate and
the existence of such a change influences the fundamental aim of care and the 
tripartite relationship - this will be explored later (Vickridge R 1995; Wistow G 
1995).
The decline in services and the eligibility problems have led to the conclusion that the
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reforms have failed to protect the elderly - which was one of the key aims for the 
reforms of the NHS (Lee-Potter J 1998).
2. Mental Health Services
A different picture emerges for the reform of mental health services since 1990. In 
general mental health services have not failed to protect the patients, however some
patterns of care have emerged. Henwood in 1995 commented that mental health 
services often are not needs led and are poorly co-ordinated (Henwood M 1995). In 
other reviews the decline of community services has been highlighted (Hadley TR and 
Goldman H 1995). These authors also comment on the apparent geographical 
differences in service availability. Overall therefore the picture is dissimilar to the 
situation seen in the care of the elderly. However, it difficult to draw a direct 
comparison between the groups. The care of the mentally ill has undergone a 
revolution in recent years, and while mentally ill patients have not suffered under the 
reforms it is difficult to claim that they have reaped benefit from the better targeting 
of resources (Evandrou M and Falkingham J 1998). It therefore seems possible that 
the refonns have failed in their aim to target the mentally ill.
3. Other at need groups
Studies of other at need groups - such as ethnic minorities and the poor have yielded 
mixed results. While no evidence has been found for the biasing of services in the 
general practice, the work of Evandrou found a bias against the poor in terms of 
hospital services use and screening services (Le Grand J and Vizard P 1998; Benzeval
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M and Judge K 1995).
4. Priority Services
Other areas where reforms were expected to have had an impact were on the priority 
services. Overall the standards of care in priority care groups have not been found to 
change. A good example of this is cardiac surgery. This speciality has highlighted pre­
reform as in need for investment. However, recent studies have indicated that there
was little, if any, impact on the services provided (Black N 1996). In part, the lack of 
change has been blamed on the poor sensitivity of the contracting mechanisms 
(Clinical Standards Advisory Group 1993).
In conclusion, it would appear that the NHS reforms have failed to produce a 
targeting of resources into at need groups. This in part can be explained by the failure 
of competition, but what is also apparent is that the reforms have not succeeded in the 
aims of protecting community services (Williams G, Flynn R and Packard S 1997).
7.5.4. The Performance of the Service
One of principal reasons for the reform was to increase efficiency in the service. 
Therefore this is one of the key measures to be made. However, this is not as simple 
as it sounds. There is considerable controversy surrounding the measurement of 
efficiency (Appleby J Little V 1993). One approach is to select a performance 
indicator such as the rate of return on capital, numbers of patients treated or the cost 
of in-patient days. The second approach is to look at a range of market-driven
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indicators.
A. The Efficiency of Provider Services
The performance of trusts and non-trusts has been examined by both methods. The
use of perfonnance indicators with respect to trusts has been widely employed by 
many researchers. However it has been criticised as giving a false impression of the 
NHS efficiency as the comparisons made are often not statistically valid (Radical 
Statistics Group 1995). Despite these limitations, some useful information can be
gleaned. In ‘The Trusts and Financial Performance’ Newchurch appraised the 
financial achievements of 57 trusts. Of these, only eight achieved a return on capital 
of 6% but only two trusts made a loss. On the whole the analysts were impressed by 
the performance of these trusts but commented that some of the accounting
methodology used may give a false impression (Newchurch 1993).
In addition to the financial indicators, trust performance has been measured in 
relation to patient activity. In 1992 the NHSME reported a 3.7 % increase in in­
patient activity and a reduction in overall waiting patients (NHSME 1992). The 
validity of these figures has been widely disputed. Firstly the figures do not 
discriminate if the hospital activity changes are a direct consequence of the reforms or 
changes which represent long-term trends. For example, cataract surgery grew at 
8.25% in the years prior to the reform and 9% post-reform. Secondly the development 
of the NHS reforms led to changes in the data collection systems which were not 
recorded, or accounted for, in the analysis of this report.
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The results of the reviews of performance and activity measures post-reform suggest 
that there may be a trend towards modest levels of growth in patient numbers. The
interpretation of this growth is made more difficult by the significant increase in 
funds that accompanied reform (Bartlett W and Le Grand J 1994). This complication
in assessing efficiency has been addressed by adjusting the performance changes for 
the cost structures in trust and non-trust hospitals. In reviews trust hospitals were 
found to have lower unit costs than non-trust units - suggesting that trust hospitals 
were more efficient. However these differences may reflect other factors, as the trusts
examined were self-selected (Bartlett W and Le Grand J 1992).
In an attempt to gain an overall opinion Le Grand and Vizard looked at expenditure 
adjusted efficiency scores. They suggested that the overall trend in efficiency by this
measure was increased by the reforms - but highlighted that some years - in
particular 1990-1991 were associated with large downturns in efficiency (Le Grand J
and Vizard P 1998). Overall the opinion of these researchers was that modest
efficiency improvements had been achieved.
In summary the NHS refonns have been modestly successful in providing an increase 
in efficiency, however the magnitude and stability of the gains appears open to 
question. In an attempt to look at the stability of the gains studies of market 
conditions have been perfonned. Studies of market condition enable a comparison of 
how the trusts actually perfonned. This was the approach taken by Le Grand in 1993
(Bartlett W and Le Grand J 1993). The criteria for assessment valuations were
productive efficiency, user choice, responsiveness to user needs and equity. In order 
to assess these changes, it was argued that a market structure must be competitive and
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have access to the relevant information and low transaction costs. In addition it was
assumed that the opportunities for equity distortions and the ‘cream skimming’ of 
profitable patients should be low (Bartlett W and Le Grand J 1993).
The results indicate that the transaction costs in the NHS market are high, particularly 
when dealing was Fundholders. In assessing equity there is evidence of cream 
skimming in that some providers are seeking to attract profitable and simple cases 
into the hospital while excluding the elderly, but no concrete information on how this 
situation arose. Finally the results demonstrate the difficulties that Trusts have with
gathering and using market information. The results indicate that while some 
improvements in efficiency have occurred, the stability of change is subject to 
question due to the lack of market information and the declining opportunities for 
cream skimming (Bartlett W and Le Grand J 1993).
B. The Performance of Purchasers
1. Fundholding
There are several difficulties associated with assessing the performance of 
Fundholding. As the Fundholding experiment was a new departure for the NHS it is 
difficult to compare it to previous performance. In addition as the scheme evolved
year on year comparisons are difficult. Finally the Fundholders were self selected and 
motivated for change. Several reviews have indicated that the changes implemented 
by Fundholding were due to the efforts of the practice (Smith RD and Wilton P 1998)
The performance of Fundholders, unlike that of the DHA, has been assessed using the 
levels of services provided and the financial management of funds by their practice.
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This is because Fundholding was considered as an experiment and the assessments to 
be used can be based on the objectives of the reforms. The targets for change as part 
of the Fundholding experiment were waiting lists, pharmaceuticals and community 
services (Glennerster H, Matsaganis M, Owens P and Hancock S 1994).
One of the difficulties in reviewing the efficiency of Fundholders is the concern that 
the GP Fundholding practices were successful because their funding was generous
(Coulter A 1992). The GP practices that went Fundholding were funded on the basis 
of costed activity - rather than a per capita formula used to fund the DHA. As we have 
discussed this may lead to problems in the inflation of budgets (Old P 1998; HFMA 
1994; Dixon J, Dinwoodie M, Hodson D and et.al. 1994). In addition ‘Working for
Patients’ had assumed that identical mechanisms for both GPs and DHA would be
used to fund expensive treatments - but this proved impossible to implement and 
Practices were insured against patients whose treatments exceeded a cost of £5000. 
(HFMA 1994; Audit Commission 1996). The effect of the different funding baselines 
for GP and DHA purchasing, coupled with the ‘safety net’ for expensive patients, 
makes any assessment of Fundholding efficiency based on need unachievable and
therefore all efficiency assessments a purely financial basis (Glennerster H
Matsaganis M Owens P Hancock S 1994).
The focus on the financial efficiency of the Fundholding experiment makes the
understanding of the financial differences between DHA and Fundholders essential.
An understanding of the size of the funding disparities between the DHA and the 
Fundholders is made more complex by the fact that budget setting for Fundholding 
practices was not constant - reflected in the size of the savings and the failure of the
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latter wave of Fundholders, who were funded less generously, to demonstrate
significant savings (Glennerster H, Matsaganis M, Owens P and Hancock S 1994) 
(Dixon J Dinwoodie M Hodson D Dodd S and et.al. 1994). Therefore it is unlikely
that the efficiency measures are comparable year on year. The measurement of
efficiency is also made more complex by the use of the savings. These savings could 
be put to any use, apart from increased personal salaries, the practice wanted.
Therefore the GP Fundholders had great financial flexibility. They also had a wide
range of managerial and labour flexibility - able to employ or organise in the way
they wanted. Therefore, in reality, the only performance that was monitored was the
financial perfonnance, and not any efficiency measures associated with it
(Glennerster H Matsaganis M Owens P Hancock S 1994). Therefore all measurements
of Fundholding have been based on the handling the prescribing budget, and the
management of patient funds.
I. Prescribing Budgets
Reviews of the early years of GP Fundholding appeared to indicate that some 
efficiency was gained in the handling of prescribing budgets - in terms of absolute
reductions and associated savings (Stewart-Brown S, Surender S, Bradlow L, Coulter
A and Doll H 1995). However, recent reviews have attributed these changes to
alterations in prescribing volumes that have not been maintained long term as the
savings were caused by the use of cheaper drugs that could not be maintained
(Stewart-Brown S Surender S Bradlow L Coulter A Doll H 1995; Bains, D Tolley, K
and Whynes D 1997). However, most authors conclude that despite these problems
the GP management of prescribing has been a success and efficiencies have been
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demonstrated (Le Grand J and Vizard P 1998; Gosden T and Torgessen DJ 1997).
II. The Use of Hospital Services
Studies have indicated that the rate of referral between Fundholding and non-
Fundholding practices is unchanged. However, Fundholders have been successful in
reducing waiting times for services (Gosden T and Torgessen DJ 1997). It is difficult 
to ascertain if this reduction is linked to an improvement of efficiency as, however, as
studies have indicated that this change may be associated with high transaction costs 
(Le Grand J and Vizard P 1998).
Based on these reviews, it would appear that while GP Fundholding has produced 
efficiencies in the use of resources, but these gains have not been dramatic and in
many cases practice led. In addition many of the true costs of Fundholding have been 
buried in the transaction costs of hospital services (HFMA 1994) (Le Grand J and
Vizard P 1998).
2. The Efficiency of DHA as Purchasers
The performance of the DHA has come under a great deal of criticism but little
objective research (Klein R 1995). In particular the DHA have been accused of being 
an unnecessary management burden and a spread of bureaucracy (Le Grand J and 
Vizard P 1998). This image of the DHA is somewhat distorted. For the first years of 
the reforms the DHA were encouraged not to make any changes (Ham CJ 1991). This 
established purchasing patterns that, given the performance management ethos, were 
difficult to break. In addition the DHA were hamstrung by the limited flexibility in
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the use of funds and the fixed costs associated with the hospital service (West P 1998; 
HFMA 1994; Ham CJ 1992).
7.5.5 The Impact of the Reforms on Equity
The NHS has a history of a long struggle with the term equity (Ham CJ 1992). 
However in the context of the NHS refonns it is generally accepted that it is equity of 
access by region that is important. Studies of regional inequity based on funding have 
suggested that the regional inequities may have been increased by the refonn process
(Whitehead M 1994)
7.5.6 The Impact of the Reforms on Mortality and Morbidity
It is apparent that the mortality burden of the lower social classes in recent years has
been increasing. This has been reflected in increasing Standard Mortality Ratios
(SMR) (Le Grand J and Vizard P 1998). The significance of these statistics is unclear,
but other studies - looking at standard ages of death have confinned the finding. 
Whether or not these findings can be related to policy making is unclear but the trends 
have been increasing post-reform (Le Grand J and Vizard P 1998).
The pattern in morbidity measures is different to mortality. The morbidity measures 
have remained constant since the reforms. This effect may be due to the changing 
demographic base.
Under the circumstances outlined above it is difficult to draw conclusions, however, it
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is apparent that the reforms have not improved mortality or morbidity statistics (Le 
Grand J and Vizard P 1998).
7.6 Conclusions on the Impact of the Reforms
7.6.1 The Impact of the Reforms on the NHS Services
Conclusions on the impact the refonns are mixed. On the financial side some 
increases in efficiency have been demonstrated, but these gains in efficiency appear 
modest and any effects that these gains may have had are shrouded by a lack of 
information (Glennerster H 1998). With regard to the other objectives, such as the 
targeting of services and improving health no benefits have been demonstrated. Yet
this cannot be the whole picture - for changes in health care have been achieved. 
Most health authorities have delivered some improvement in the Health of the Nation 
targets, and many have made demonstrable gains in efficiency as measured by the
efficiency index. In addition there is some evidence that the introduction of the
Fundholding scheme has produced some benefits - particularly in prescribing. 
However, these changes do not appear to have made a meaningful impact the metrics
of change, with regards to the objectives for the 1990 (Le Grand 1994).
The failure of the refonns has been attributed to a variety of reasons. First money 
appears not to have followed the patient as evidenced by the failure to provide 
services for at need groups such as the elderly (Le Grand 1994). Other reasons for 
failure lie in the lack of market flexibility, and failure to develop market forces. As a 
result of this efficiency savings have been hard to come by. The reason why market
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flexibility has not developed is less clear, however part of the reason may lie in the 
lack of end-user input into the system.
7.6.2 The Effect of the Reforms on the Tripartite Structure.
Any lack of end-user input must be reflected in the structure of the tripartite 
relationship that surrounds the refonned NHS. As was discussed in the introduction in
order for a welfare system to achieve its aims a balance of the state, economic and
civil society inputs are needed. This balance is essential as it allows the achievement
of the economic, humanistic and societal aims of the service. As we have commented
the pre-reform NHS was not in balance as the state economy considerations
dominated the discussions of the service. How was this changed post-reform?
The post-reform NHS - as we have discussed seems more likely to be dominated by 
the state economy interaction. As was stated in chapter six, the state economy
interaction in the new tripartite relationship is represented by the District Health 
Authority and the GP Fundholders, Doctors and Hospitals. The delays in the
development of purchasers, the effects of Fundholding and performance management 
have all had the impact of increasing the power of the economy in the tripartite 
relationship (Appleby J 1994). This is reflected as a dominance of the providers in the 
decisions that surround the market. These factors have been compounded by the lack 
of competition seen in the hospitals and the protection of community services 
(Appleby J 1994).
The increasing power of the economy has been accompanied by a decrease in the
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power of the civil society. The economy - civil society relationship has been 
decreased as the power of the Unions has declined and as health has become a
personal responsibility (Evandrou M and Falkingham J 1998). The state - civil society
interaction has also declined following the redefinition of the entitlement to services
that has occurred in the areas of mental health and the care of the elderly.
7.7 Chapter Conclusion
This chapter has illustrated two findings. First, the post-reform NHS is not delivering
the gains that were expected from it. Second, the reforms in the NHS have not
resolved the imbalance of state, economy and civil society interests in the running of 
the health service. In essence the economy and provider domination of the service has 
continued. To these results can be added the result of chapter 6 - that the NHS
structure no longer supports the mode of accumulation or the needs of workers in a
post Fordist state. This latter contention is supported by the differences seen between 
the NHS and the other elements of welfare, and the failure of the NHS to provide 
support for modem individualised labour markets. Chapter six also demonstrated that 
these failings were as a result of the political strategy needed to bring the policy to 
fruition. This implies that the policy contained in Working for Patients was not a
coherent policy (Ham C 1994).
The findings of this chapter bring together all of the elements supporting the
hypothesis - as was discussed in the introduction. However, no link has been
established between the elements - necessary if the hypothesis of the thesis is to be
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proven. In order for a causal link to be established we must first conduct a bottom-up 
analysis. This analysis must demonstrate that the failure to provide services results 
from the institutional imbalances reflected in decision making. Furthermore the study 
must also highlight that the failure of the NHS to support the mode of capital 
accumulation is as a result of political strategy and organisational ambiguity and a
lack of coherent policy making.
Taking these factors into account the establishment of the causal relationship requires 
the use of a case study on decision making in the NHS. Chapter 8 will begin this
process with a study of a health authority aimed at demonstrating the modes of 
decision making involved, highlighting how the causal relationship may be 
demonstrated and outlining the processes involved in decision making in the reformed
NHS.
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CHAPTER 8 Establishing the Causal Relationship Between the 
Elements of the Hypothesis Part 1 - A Study of Decision making in a 
Health Authority
8.1 Keypoints of the Previous Chapter
Chapter 7 concluded with the argument that the 1990 NHS reforms were not a 
coherent policy and the manner in which the reforms were implemented led to a
continuation of the institutional imbalance. In addition the post-reform NHS failed to 
support the mode of accumulation and deliver some services to at risk groups. This 
brought together all of the elements of the hypothesis generated in chapter l. The 
question remains about establishing a causal relationship between these elements and
the decision making about purchasing health-care. This cannot be determined at a
macro-level, as such an analysis will not allow for the post-policy modifications 
determined by the street level decision-makers. Instead a bottom-up analysis is
needed.
8.2 Objectives for this Chapter
The objective for this chapter is to introduce Southampton and South West
Hampshire Health Commission (Southampton Health Commission) as a case study to
explore the causal relationship between the elements of the hypothesis. In particular 
this chapter aims to introduce the structure of the Authority, its objectives and
describe the decision making procedures used.
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8.3 Introduction
The reforms of the NHS were aimed at establishing an organisation sensitive to local
market needs; therefore no national study can establish the causal link between the 
institutional imbalance, the mode of accumulation and the failure to provide services. 
Instead a local, bottom up, study is needed. Performing a local study, however, brings 
into question the ability to generalise the results of a local study to the national NHS. 
rn this thesis the issue of generalisation has been tackled by working with a Health 
Commission which is close to the national norms and using validated methods to 
assess the results. Southampton Health Commission is a well-established Commission
with a history of performing research. In 1993 the Commission decided to review its 
decision making processes. This provided the opportunity to look in great detail at the 
institutional behaviour involved in decision making. The environment of decision 
making in Southampton Health Commission is examined in greater detail in chapter 
10. However before embarking on this discussion it is important to understand the 
workings of the Commission - the subject of the current chapter - and the tools to be 
used in the analysis - covered in chapter 9.
8.4 A Profile of Southampton and South West Hampshire Health 
Commission
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8.4.1 Geographic Profile of Southampton and SW Hampshire Health 
Commission
Data from this section are drawn from published documents (Southampton Health 
Commission 1993; Southampton Health Commission 1993b).
Southampton and SW Hampshire Health Commission (Southampton Health 
Commission) covers an area of 78,000 hectares stretching from the Hamble River to the
New Forest, Figure 8.1.
FIGURE 8 1 THE GEOGRAPHY OF SOUTHAMPTON AND SW HAMPSHIRE HEALTH 
COMMISSION
8.4.2 The History of the Southampton Health Commission
A merger of the District Health Authority and part of the Family Health Services
Authority - based in Winchester established the Commission in its current form in 1992. 
A full merger was achieved in 1996 with the passing of legislation to create unified health
authorities.
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8.4.3 The Provision of Health Care in Southampton
(Data drawn from the Annual report (Southampton Health Commission 1993))
1. Primary Care
68 GP practices across the district provided primary care. These practices accounted for 
238 GPs. Eleven GP practices were Fundholding - covering 31% of the population - 
although the number of practices Fundholding was set to rise to about 30 practices in 
1995-96 covering 50% of the population.
2. Secondary Care
There were two major providers of secondary care - Southampton University Hospitals 
NHS Trust - providing most of the acute care - and Southampton Community Services 
Trust - providing some acute care but also community and mental health services.
In addition to these providers there were several other local providers. These included 
Bournemouth and Christchurch NHS Trust for acute services; Salisbury NHS Trust for
acute community and mental illness services; Winchester NHS Trust for acute services
and Portsmouth Hospitals NHS Trust for acute and community services.
In addition to the local providers the Commission also held contracts with Guys and St




Additional to the NHS providers the Commission also held contracts with several local
voluntary groups. These included the Red Cross, Mind and Southampton Care 
Association. These providers mainly provided community care. Several other voluntary
bodies also received funding from either charitable donations or from joint finance.
8.4.4 The Demographics of the Local Population
Southampton Health Commission was responsible for purchasing the health care for a 
population of 450,000 people These individuals lived within the local authority 
boundaries of Southampton City, the New Forest, Test Valley and the southern wards of 
Eastleigh. From April 1995 the Commission also purchased health care for the 
population of Ringwood and Fordinbridge.
47% of the resident population live within Southampton City and the surrounding urban 
communities, while the remainder is mostly rural. This population pattern is not static, 
with an expected decline in the city population and corresponding increase in the urban 
numbers. The population is growing at about 1% per year, although the over 65 year age 
group is growing at a rate of about 5% per year. This growth is a particular problem as a 
high percentage of the elderly live within the rural communities giving rise to access and
other problems. At the other end of the spectrum the very young are also increasing at a
rate of about 1% per year. Therefore, Southampton is facing increases in the populations
most likely to need access to health care services.
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Overall the population is roughly in line with national average figures. The mate to 
female ratio is about 0.95 to 1, although the proportion of females over the age of 65 is
considerably higher, as would expected due to the longer female life span.
8.4.5 The Population Socio-Economic Health Factors in Southampton and SW
Hampshire.
Figures for this section were drawn from the Lifestyle Survey and Director of Public
Health Report (Southampton Health Commission 1992, Southampton Health
Commission 1993 (b))
1. Unemployment
Overall the district's unemployment rate is below the national average. However the 
picture is not unifonn across the area. Unemployment in the city averages at 9.4%, with
some areas as high as 15%. The expectation is that unemployment will continue to rise
with the city showing the steepest increase.
2. Homelessness
In common with many south coast areas Southampton has a high proportion of its
population either homeless or living in low standard accommodation. This is due to the
high rate of influx of people seeking jobs. The problem has been exacerbated by the
recession and increasingly homes are leased from housing associations.
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3. Ethnicity
The city has a comparatively low ethnic population. Across the Commission about 3% of 
the population have an ethnic origin beyond Europe. The majority of this population - 
totalling about 12,000 - live within the city. The content of origin of the population is 
unusual in that it shows a preponderance of Indian subcontinent compared with the 
national average. The age distribution of the population also tends to be younger.
4. Deprivation
The only index available for the entire district is the Jarman UP8 index. The score overall
is about +1 reflecting an above average affluence. This figure masks some areas of quite 
severe deprivation balanced out by areas of high affluence. The inner city areas of 
Bargate and St Lukes have scores of about -23, reflecting moderate deprivation.
Summary
The average picture of Southampton was that of an affluent south coastal town. However
this masks some areas of moderately severe deprivation and socio-economic factors
causing ill health. This wide spread of population affluence contributes to the challenge 
of health care in Southampton and SW Hampshire.
8.4.6 The Health of the Local Population
The figures quoted are drawn from Southampton Health Commission Publications
(Southampton Health Commission 1992; Southampton Health Commission 1994).
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The health of the local population can be gauged by a variety of factors. First there are 
census variables available from the 1991 census, and second there is the direct
measurement of several key health indicators.
(a) Long Term Self Reporting Illness (LSSI)
This was a factor collected in the census for the first time in 1991. Overall Southampton 
and SW Hampshire reported 11% of the population with LSSI - a figure inline with the 
national average. The population reporting LSSI corresponded with the areas having a 
high proportion of elderly patients, with the exception of the inner city wards - which had
a higher rate than expected.
(b) Hospitalisation rates.
Overall the Commissions population has a hospitalisation rate about 2% above national 
average. This effect may be due to the presence of a teaching hospital, but may also 
reflect some health factor in the population. The inner city and the Western City - both 
sites near the large hospital in Southampton had the largest hospitalisation rate.
(c) Lifestyle health factors ’
Southampton district is below the nationally recorded averages for both obesity and 
smoking, but has a higher proportion of children on the protection register and a high 
proportion of unwanted teenage pregnancies.
(d) Mortality rates
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As might be expected from the deprivation and socio-economic factors Southampton and 
district has a favourable Standardised Mortality ratio of 91.7 years. This masks some 
particular problems, however, in the area of stroke injury and mental illness where there
was some evidence - based on high rates of hospital admission - that there were some 
problems in the health of the local populace. These areas will be covered further when 
the subject of strategy development is discussed.
Given the picture of Southampton as a town of mixed prosperity, with a mixed economy 
of dockyards and hi-tech areas with average, if not above average health, how does the
Health Commission work?
8.5. The Function of the Southampton Health Commission
8.5.1 The Purpose of Southampton Health Commission
The purpose of the Commission is dictated by national guidelines - in common with all 
health authorities. The Southampton interpretation of these guidelines is set out as 
principles published within the health strategy (Southampton Health Commission 1994).
These are
• Seeking the continuous improvement of services
• Developing partnerships with other purchasing agencies e.g. local government
• Developing primary care
• Involving local people
• Purchasing better services
• Commissioning for health on a needs basis
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Priority setting and the responsibility for deciding where resources are spent.
These guiding principles provide an image of the purpose of the health Commission as a
market manager and regulator of health care services in a market model of health care
administration using commissioning, purchasing and priority setting to achieve its aims.
They also reflect national policy in terms of developing primary care.
8.5.2. The Organisation of Southampton Health Commission
The health Commission is responsible for purchasing both primary and secondary care.
The objectives of the Commission are to
• Identify health problems in the area
• Recommend which services to purchase
• Negotiate purchasing contracts with NHS Trusts
• Develop both the purchaser and provider role of General Practitioners
• Set and monitor standards in primary and secondary care
To assist the Commission about 100 staff was employed in an office in central
Southampton. The staff is organised into three directorates. The organisation is
graphically depicted in Figure 8. 2.
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FIGURE 8.2 THE ORGANISATION OF SOUTHAMPTON HEALTH COMMISSION
The overall direction and command of the Commission are the responsibility of executive 
and non-executive directors - the chair of which is appointed by the Secretary of State for 
Health. The committee of directors meets twice a month in public session to discuss 
policy and strategic issues. Therefore, as the entire organisation is non-democratically
elected, it can be viewed as an organisation that receives a licence from the State to 
purchase health care.
The organisation seen in Southampton is interesting as it gives equal weight to 
professional values; to the professional views from the public health directorate; and to 
the purchasing directorate. Also although primary care is a governmental priority it has a
secondary position in the structure.
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8.5.3 The Function of Southampton Health Commission
The mission of the Commission is to: -
‘Secure Better Health for Local People’
The promotion of good health and the minimisation of distress in patients and caregivers
are the tools to achieve this aim.
The mission is achieved by the accomplishment of several tasks (Southampton Health
Commission 1994). These include:
• Ensuring the equity of services
• Maximising health gain
• Maximising value for money
• Ensuring that care is given close to home
• Protecting choice
• Encouraging personal responsibility
These are reflected in the contracting and decision making processes adopted by the 
Commission. Before going into this, however, it is important to understand how the
activities of the Commission are financed.
8.5.4. The Financing of Southampton Health Commission
(The data presented are derived from the Annual report (Southampton Health
Commission 1993))
In common with all health authorities Southampton Health Commission was funded via
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the Regional Health Authority, (RHA). The allocation was based on an age and sex
adjusted weighted capitation budget. This allocation was to cover Hospital and
Community Health Services, (HCHS). In addition to this allocation the Commission also 
influenced the expenditure in primary care. Cash limited and non-cash limited General 
Medical Service budgets were handled by the Commission, as was prescribing
expenditure. GP Fundholding budgets were also allocated and monitored by the
Commission. However as the Commission did not have statutory rights over the primary
care funds accountability for these funds was maintained by the Family Health Services
Authority and in presenting its final accounts the funds were presented as belonging to the 
District Health Authority of Southampton and SW Hampshire.
8.5.5. The Activities of Southampton Health Commission
The data presented are drawn from the Annual report (Southampton Health
Commission 1993)
The function of the Commission was to purchase health care for local people. The 
Commission achieved this function by distributing the resources at its disposal into health
care contracts.
The Commission spent approximately £219 million on health care - approximating to 
£480 per head of population. This was made up of £153 million in DHA funds and £66
million in FHSA funds (Southampton Health Commission 1993). In addition to this 
figure, which was cash limited, a further sum was spent from non-cash limited 
expenditure. Non cash limited expenditure includes GP prescribing and health promotion
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payments. The DHA funds were spent on
Hospital and Community Organisations £148 million
Joint Finance programmes with Local £ 1 million
Authorities
Commissioning Organisation £ 4 million
Total DHA Funds £153 million
The Commissioning expenditure on services, £149 million, was spent with seven main 
providers
Southampton University Hospitals £73 million
Southampton University Health Services Trust £55 million
Salisbury Hospitals £ 4 million
Hampshire Ambulance Services £ 3 million
Bournemouth Hospitals £ 3 million
Portsmouth Hospitals £ 2 million
Winchester Hospitals £ 2 million
Totals £142 million
The remainder of the expenditure was divided among both local and distant providers and 
amounted to
Extra-contractual referrals £ 3 million
Direct investment in services and special
Placements £ 3 million
Joint Finance £ 1 million
The £149 million Commission expenditure on health care services could be divided into 
specialities
General and Acute £ 93 million
Primary Care £ 18 million
Mental illness £ 16 million
Maternity £ 7 million
Mental handicap £ 6 million
Other Contracts (e.g. day services) £ 6 million
Accident and Emergency £ 5 million
Total expenditure on patient services £149 million
In addition to these funds a further £66 million of expenditure was accounted for from the 
FHSA. These funds were: -
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Prescribing £ 25 million
Ophthalmic services £ 2 million
Pharmacists £ 2 million
GP Fundholding £ 12 million
General Practitioners £ 24 million
Commissioning Organisation £ 1 million
It can be seen within these categories that the Commission represents a complex 
purchasing organisation. Decision making within the Commission was a complex
process. The functional aspects of the decision making processes are best illustrated by 
considering the provision for the care of patients who have suffered a stroke as a case
study.
8.6. Characterising Decision making Within the Commission Using 
Stroke as an Example.
Decision making within the Commission was performed on two levels. These were the
development of strategic purchasing and the development of purchasing contracts.
8.6.1. Decision Making About Strategy
The Commission had held an exercise in 1991 looking at the decision making methods it
could employ to improve health. The outcome of this exercise was a ‘Bite-sized chunk
approach’ to purchasing decisions (Heginbotham C 1992). This approach relied on 
breaking up the health problems of Southampton into smaller problems and developing
strategies to deal with each identified problem. At the time of writing, ten such strategies
had been developed or were under development. These were
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• Children with special needs
These topics had been selected as special problems in the local community. The process 
can be best explained by using an example of the strategy for Stroke management.
8.6.2. The Development of a Stroke Strategy in Southampton Health Commission
Details of the process are drawn from the published Strategy for Stroke (Southampton 
Health Commission 1993)
Stroke is one of the ‘Health of the Nation’ target areas (Department of Health 1992). The
targets set in the Health of the Nation are to
♦ Reduce the death rates from stroke in people under the age of 65 by 40% - from 11.3 
per 100,000 in 1990 to no more than 6.8 per 100,000 by the year 2000.
♦ To reduce the death rate from stroke in people aged 65-74 by at least 40% - from
244.3 per 100,000 in 1990 to no more than 146.6 per 100,000 by the year 2000.
The morbidity and mortality Figures in the Southampton area were higher than these rates 
suggesting that locally, the disease burden from stroke was higher than the national
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average. Therefore the purchasing of stroke services was both a national and local 
priority, and the health Commission decided that a strategy for stroke was desirable. 
Accordingly it ordained that a piece of work be prepared. A strategy team was assembled.
The team consisted of:
Dr A Mortimer 
Ms A Woolnough 
Ms B Hayden 
Dr A Lockett 
Ms J Dutton 
Ms M Topliss
Consultant in Public Health Medicine (chair) 
Contracts Manager 
IM&T Manager
Head of Financial Planning and HealthEconomics 
Quality Manager 
Primary Care Manager
In addition to these core individuals, other members of the Commission were co-opted on 
an ‘as needed’ basis. This included IM&T staff and public relations managers.
The team began meeting in July 1993 with the aim of producing a completed strategy by
October 1994.
Initial discussions
The initial discussions among the group decided the remit of the project. It was decided 
to limit the scope of the strategy to acute and rehabilitation care, as long-term care was 
being covered under other strategies. The group also decided that it would address all
cerebrovascular events, that is stroke ICD9 code 431-434 and 436-438 including
subarachnoid haemorrhage and transient ischaemic attacks ICD9 code 435. All codes
were taken in the primary position only. In this review the term stroke is taken as a
generic term covering all three diagnostic groups - unless otherwise stated. The group 
made the decision that it would follow the process along classical strategic lines with a
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situation analysis taken first.
Situational analysis
The situational analysis had several factors to address:
• The current provision of services
• The current needs of the community
• The future needs
• The outcomes of current services
• The political environment
This stage first addressed the needs of the district. Examining the demographics of 
Southampton and SW Hampshire set the benchmark and by calculating the expected 
number of strokes based on national averages rough estimates of expected demand could 
be achieved. This was compared to the number of strokes recorded on the minimum data
set records. The difference between the two was taken as a measure of unmet need. In
order to predict future needs a similar exercise was done using the population estimates 
for the year 2000. Estimated numbers of strokes were calculated using current incident
rates. In a sophistication of this analysis the changes in incidence were reflected by the
local authority area.
As a second part of this analysis, the current services were examined in greater detail. 
This laid particular emphasis on the provider types and distribution of services. Also 
considered were the delivery of services and any routinely recorded outcomes of
treatment. An estimate of the expenditure on stroke was also obtained, both in terms of
finished consultant episodes and occupied bed days, using average speciality costs and 
day costs. The providers of care provided the figures on the costs of care.
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Comments on the current standards of service were obtained from both stroke patients 
and their carers - facilitated by the local stroke group. Attempts were also made to look at 
community stroke provision by visiting social services centres and questioning staff
The results of this analysis indicated that in 1992/93 (the most recent complete set of 
records), 1,214 finished consultant episodes for stroke were recorded. This represented 
954 patients - 445 male and 509 female. 14 providers - the 7 main providers of care to 
the commission plus extra contractual hospitalisations, were responsible for the care of 
stroke victims. The median length of stay for these patients was 14 days, but this varied
between one day and 2 years. In all, 67 patients had a stay of greater than 3 months. These 
patients were all with local providers of care. The highest incidence of stroke
corresponded with the highest population of elderly and was in the New Forest and 
coastal parts of the district. Overall, 500 finished consultant episodes were recorded in the
greater than 75 age group.
Of the 954 patients 71 died (93 % were over the age of 65), and 500 patients returned to 
their usual place of residence. The remainder was discharged to either relative’s homes or
to other hospitals. However only 38 patients could be identified as being sent for
rehabilitation care.
Looking forward to the future the incidence of stroke had peaked in the New Forest and
coastal areas but was not going to peak in the Eastleigh area for several years. These
changes would result in a considerable unmet need in the Eastleigh area, but excess 
supply of care in other areas. However the estimate of need was based on the prevalence 
of strokes requiring hospitalisation remaining constant - a dubious assumption when
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faced with the increasing age of carers in the community which would have a knock-on
effect on hospital admissions.
As a summary of the findings, current needs appeared to be met, but future demands 
would put the system under considerable pressure. The distribution of current services
was one of long lengths of stay in acute hospital beds with veiy little use of community or 
rehabilitation facilities. These finds were supported by discussions with social services,
users and carers. The picture was one of adequate acute services but with inefficient use
of resources during the recovery phase. The user/carer groups raised additional concerns
about the distance travelled by carers and relatives and a more local based service was
demanded.
Strategy Formulation phase
The strategic formulation phase had to balance the competing pressures on stroke care.
The demands of users and caregivers could result in a more expensive service at a time
when there was evidence that the current treatments used offered poor value for money. 
The formulation process also had to make allowance for the increase in the number of
stroke patients predicted over the next 5 years and the different geographical distribution
of the cases.
As a starting point for the formulation process the Commission’s values were used. These
values were established in 1991 when the Commission was formed. They give an
emphasis to
2l&
Equity Access to health services for all on the basis of need,
irrespective of social and ethnic status and geographical
location.
Health Gain To secure an improvement in health for the local
population, adding years to life and life to years.
Value for money To secure the best use of resources in terms of
efficiency, quality and effectiveness.
Care closer to home To ensure that services are delivered in the best setting,
and to give people the opportunity to have their health and
social need met in their own home or as locally as
possible.
Choice To give people as much choice as possible over the
kind of service provided for them and its location.
Personal responsibility To develop individuals’ personal sense of responsibility
for their own health.
With these guiding principles in mind the strategy group set about reviewing the stroke 
services. This proceeded in a number of steps.
1. Restatement of the problem
The first task of the team was to restate the problem in relation to the formulation. The 
challenge was to develop a local service that is sensitive to the needs of sufferers and
caregivers. The service also needed to provide a co-ordinated rehabilitation in a setting
appropriate to the disease of stroke.
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2. Review of effectiveness
In accordance with NHS guidelines, suggesting that that purchasing decisions should be 
based on evidence for effectiveness, strategies developed in the Commission were 
‘evidence based’. This required that literature reviews of current practices were
performed and the interventions described. The interventions said to have the most
evidence for effectiveness - i.e. those based on randomised clinical trials - are used to
provide a basis for the strategy. As a first step in this process, a literate review was 
conducted reviewing the evidence for effectiveness and cost benefit of stroke 
management. The search was conducted in the acute and rehabilitation phases using 
Medline databases available at the University of Southampton.
In the acute phase there was little evidence for any effective interventions - although 
potentially there may be some in the future. What appeared to matter in the acute phase 
was good nursing care.
In the rehabilitation phase there was evidence for the effectiveness of team approaches to 
rehabilitation, but little evidence that the individual components had any effect on
recovery.
The only piece of concrete evidence that was discovered concerned carotid 
endarterectomy as a treatment for transient ischemia. Here there was strong evidence of a 
beneficial effect for the procedure in a subgroup of patients with transient ischemia and 
narrowing of the carotid arteries of greater than 80%.
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3. Initial model formation
Based on the problem statement, and the evidence for effectiveness, five possible 
strategies were outlined.
(i) A special assessment service for transient ischemia.
(ii) Acute and rehabilitation care for all stroke patients based at general hospital units.
(iii) Acute care based at general hospital units, but rehabilitation care based in the 
community hospital and home based.
(iv) Acute care community hospital based and rehabilitation home based.
(v) All stroke care to be home based.
All five of these options were considered to be viable, however, clearly there were some 
further considerations. In order to narrow down the options, it was decided to discuss the
options with the health Commission. At a general meeting of the Commission it was 
decided to proceed with option (i) and (iii). The reasons for disregarding option (ii) was
based upon the costs of the service and the value for money - as it was, if anything, an 
intensification of the current system. Option (iv) was removed as it was felt not to be
feasible due to the complexities of co-ordination a service.
The development of an acute and community based model
Having made the decision to have an acute and community based model the team then set
about designing the service. There were already similar sites working within the country
and these were visited. A generic model was constructed using the experience of sites
such as Portsmouth and St George’s Hospital, however this was felt to need some 
adaptation to the local situation. This was done by holding focus groups with the
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clinicians, the caregivers and victims of stroke. After a series of meetings a service was 
designed. The key elements of this service were for
• A specialist clinic for patients with either mild stroke or transient ischemia. Patients 
seen in this clinic could be assessed and interventions planned. This clinic would 
avoid unneeded admission.
• A hospital based acute care service offering care in dedicated stroke units. The 
average length of stay on these units to be no more than 7 days.
• Community hospital based rehabilitation providing both inpatient and day care 
facilities. The total length of rehabilitation spread over 6 months but allowing for 35 
days (average) active rehabilitation.
The costs of this new service were calculated based on existing similar models and was
found to match closely with the costs of the existing service and the capacity of the new
service could meet the future demands.
This new model was taken to the health Commission and approved in June 1994.
Conclusions
The stroke strategy typifies the bite-size chunk approach seen in other strategies 
developed by the Commission and in other health authorities (Heginbotham C 1992). The 
bite-size chunk approach had two principal features. First it had an emphasis on data and
information. Data were used to calculate the service levels and typify the needs of the 
population. Second is the limitation of the input to the design of strategies by 
professionals - such as doctors and nurses - and to a more limited degree, interest groups.
-7??
This method of decision making and policy detennination has a long history in the UK 
and can be traced back to the early Victorian social reformers such as Chadwick, (Harris
J 1990). The approach has been characterised as the ‘Positivistic’ approach to social 
policy and involves the description of the problem as a system - thereby legitimising the 
existence of the problem without assigning social roles or pathological causes (Henshel
RL 1990).
From the way in which strategies about health care provision, exemplified by the stroke 
strategy, were conducted it is apparent that the majority of the objectives of the NHS
reforms are achieved during the process. The plan was conducted looking at a priority 
group with an objective of improving equity and efficiency. The plan involved the
development of competition of the service and covered the use of community services.
In terms of the tripartite relationship the stroke strategy gave an emphasis, although not 
necessarily a balanced emphasis, to the state-economy and state-civil society relationships 
as it allowed the users of the service direct access to the fonnulation of the new strategy. 
As the stroke strategy was not immediately implemented, but instead was modified by the 
purchasing process, it is not possible to say if the final outcome of the strategic process 
was in tripartite balance. However, the de-emphasising of the state-economy relationship 
that developed as part of the process means a balance is more likely.
8.6.3. Decision making About Contracts - the Purchasing Strategy
The existence of a strategy did not automatically guarantee its implementation. Once a 
strategy had been formulated an implementation group was established and this group
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formed input into the assignment of purchasing strategies, plans and contracts.
In deciding its purchasing strategy, the Commission had to take into account a wide
variety of factors.
(i) Political initiatives - such as waiting time reduction and Health of the Nation 
strategies.
(ii) The needs of the local population for services as evidenced by health strategies.
(iii) The demands of co-purchasers such as social services and GP Fundholders.
(iv) The performance assessment of the authority through tools such as the efficiency 
index.
(v) The access the authority might have to discretionary funds through the adoption 
of certain strategies - for example the funds ear marked for assisting authorities to 
re-settle long stay patients in psychiatric institutions.
(vi) Demands from local providers.
(vii) Demands from the local community and media.
These pressures on decision making come from a variety of sources. Political, national 
and performance management pressures are usually applied via documents provided from 
the regional offices. The major document in this respect is the Regional Planning 
Guidelines produced annually. These documents lay out the resource assumptions the 
Commission is to use in setting its plans. Therefore the guidelines defines the strategic
direction the RHA wants the Commissions to take, and the priorities - both national and 
local - for the provision of services. For example the 1993/94 plan from Wessex Regional
Health Authority specified (Wessex Regional Health Authority 1993)
• An emphasis on the patient’s charter and Health of the Nation targets.
• A commitment to reduce waiting times.
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• A three- percent increases in the efficiency of resource use.
• A commitment to the development of primary care.
The document also outlines the timetable to achieve these aims and sets out the structure
by which success will be monitored.
Pressures on the authority from the local community are either delivered by the media or
via the Community Health Councils (CHC). The CHC acts as a watchdog on the
activities of the purchasing authority - although in reality its power is limited, (Brown
RGS 1977)
Provider and joint purchaser expressions were usually established through the use of non­
statutory forums at which ideas could be discussed. However, the power of these groups
was limited and disputes were usually adjudicated at regional level.
Hunter as has described the process of decision making at Commission level as
‘muddling through elegantly’. Although Ham in 1993 more accurately drew a distinction
between the process of policy making, as represented by the stroke strategy, and the
implementation of services represented by contracting (Ham C and Hill M 1993). Clearly
the implementation of policy involves more than the rational analysis of services. Instead
the implementation of the policy is best viewed as a game between the choices of 
guaranteeing services and satisfying the regulation of markets by political institutions 
(Scharpf FW 1997). This analysis would classify the purchasing decision making in
Southampton as a variant of a hierarchical negotiating state (Scharpf FW 1997). Decision
making in these states has been described as incremental - as the process takes small 
steps based on the immediate pressures faced by the authorities (Ham C and Hill M
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1993).
In these circumstances the implementation of the Stroke Strategy was to be no different
to the implementation of other ideas to improve services; it would have to be discussed at
Commission level and incorporated into the discussions with providers. In this case, 
however, the opportunity arose to examine how the strategy influenced the provision of 
services. This is gone into greater detail in the subsequent chapters.
8.7 Conclusions
This chapter has established the geographic, social, political and decision making 
characteristics of the Southampton Health Commission. It is an average district in the 
national population sense, with some special problems in terms of the incidence of 
teenage pregnancy and strokes. The chapter has also highlighted the modes of decision 
making as strategic and purchasing. If any causal relationship existed between the three 
elements of the failure to provide services, the lack of a balance between the economy, 
civil society and state, and the failure of the reformed NHS to support the mode of 
accumulation, it must be manifest at the level of decision making about the purchasing of 
services. As we have discussed the decision making about the strategic elements of
service provision was data driven, and did not incorporate all the factors involved in
purchasing.
The study of the decision making about the purchasing of services is a complex exercise, 
as it involves the balancing of values, pressures and interpretations, rather than data 
alone. In order to achieve the analysis of purchasing a special analysis was formulated
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using Judgement Analysis. This technique will be introduced in the next chapter
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Chapter 9 an introduction to Judgement Analysis
9.1 Key points from the Previous Chapter
The previous chapter introduced Southampton Health Commission as a case study for
decision making, and for establishing the causal link between the failure to provide
services, the imbalance of state - economy - civil society interactions and the failure 
of the reformed NHS to support the mode of capital accumulation. The chapter
demonstrated that the causal link must lie in the decisions that surround the
development of purchasing plans - since the decision making relating to strategy 
included all of the reform ideals and was data driven. However, in order to study the 
elements of decision making at a purchasing level some special tools were needed as 
decision making about the purchasing plan was only partially based on data analysis 
and fitted the mode of decision making described as incrementalist.
9.2 Aims for this chapter
This chapter sets out to introduce Judgement Analysis, explain its background and 
why it was selected for this exercise. It also will explain the structure of the exercise 
and the subsequent analysis of the data gathered during a study of purchasing decision 
making in the Southampton Health Commission.
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9.3 Determinants of the Analysis
At the outset of the analysis it is important to specify what the final analysis is to
achieve. If a link between the institutional imbalance and the ‘failure’ of the reform
exists this will be manifest in the decision making process, either as a factor, or in the
environment that surrounds decision making. Therefore, in determining if the link
exists the factors and environment that influence the purchasing decisions made by
Southampton Health Commission must be analysed by a method that allows the
elements of decisions to be both examined individually and combined - in order that
the totality influences can be taken into account. Furthermore the description of
decision making has to occur in the setting of a group, operating under quasi-ralional
rules. It was for these reasons that Judgement Analysis was selected as the analysis
tool.
9.4 An Introduction to Judgement Analysis.
9.4.1. Background
Judgement Analysis, a research tool for the study of decision making, has its roots in
the study of psychology. An Austrian psychologist, Egon Brunswick, proposed that
the actions of an organism in an environment could be explained on the basis of clues
given by the environment the organism operated within as to the appropriate response
to a given task. The combination of the environment and the task were referred to as
an ‘ecology’. Brunswick’s methods postulated that a functional relationship between
the ecology of behaviour and the actions observed existed. Brunswick termed this
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relationship probabilistic functionalism in recognition of the fact that there was not a 
one to one correlation between a given ecology and an organism’s action. Instead a 
given ecology gave clues to the decision making environment; the environment is 
under the control of a distal criterion that takes no direct part in decision making but 
sends out clues as to its presence and determines the validity of response by the
decision making organism. These clues are not an exact match to the distal criteria
but reflect its presence to the organism in the language and action of the situation and 
so are called proximal clues. Brunswick hypothesised that the organism makes
choices based on the proximal clues of the distal criterion. The organism used these
proximal clues to rationalise its actions, and in all likelihood would be oblivious to
the identity of the distal criteria. Therefore the actions of an organism were only
probabilistically related to its ecology, and for a given action a number of clues would
have to be assimilated and the information processed. This idea permits the behaviour
of organisms to be expressed in terms of the correlations between ecology and
behaviour - rather than the absolute required in other behaviour models (Brunswick E 
1943; Brunswick E 1955).
The idea of proximal clues also enabled organisms to behave differently under
identical ecological situations, providing the distal criteria offers a range of different,
but interrelated proximal clues. This phenomenon - so called vicarious medication 
between clues - permits an organism to trade off between different responses in
respect of outcome. In such a way the trade-off could be constructed to allow an
organism some individual satiation in response - rather than mandating a causal
relationship (Brunswick E 1943).
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Brunswick's ideas proved to have far-reaching consequences, not only in the field of
psychology, but in many disciplines where choice was being exercised. This
development occurred because Brunswick's ideas permitted the design of experiments 
to directly test the probabilistic relationship between events. The design of studies to
test the relationships have been termed Representative Designs and have found favour
in circumstances where decision making is entangled in a web of complicated
environmental factors (Hammond K.R 1966).
Brunswick created a system of clues and criteria to explain how he thought. His ideas
are best illustrated using the lens diagram he created to explain probabilistic
functionalism (Brunswick E 1962).
FIGURE 9.1 THE BRUNSWICK LENS MODEL
Modified from Cooksey RW 1996
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In the lens model the distal decision making influence - e.g. an environmental
constraint or reporting relationship - scatters its effects as a series of clues as to 
appropriate decision making behaviour. The decision making organism collects the 
clues and uses them to guide decision making. The resulting decisions are then fed
back to the distal criteria as an achievement. The construction of a lens diagram
allows the underlying function of a system to be precisely displayed in a manner that
allows further experimentation.
9.4.2 Delineating the Structure of the Lens - Representative Design
Representative Designs - as the name suggests - aim to construct experimental models 
that assess the impact of the distal criteria, ecology and scattered clues in the context 
of the organisms’ response. In order to achieve this, results of decision making and 
behaviour impulses must be obtained within the sphere of influence of the ecology
(Hammond KR 1966). This can be achieved in two ways
1. Substantive situational sampling refers to sampling schemes aimed at examining
the organism in a "natural environment". This includes random sampling of behaviour
in the normal ecology (Brunswick E 1955).
2. Formal situational sampling concerns the role of the ecology in defined decision 
making circumstances and seeks to define the impact of the ecological clues on the
decisions made. In this way the ecology may be defined irrespective of the task
content (Hammond KR 1966).
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9.4.3 The Statistical Analysis of Representative Design
The development of representational sampling methods has permitted a different 
statistical approach to be adopted to the analysis of decision making. Previously 
decisions were analysed in terms of a number of performance characteristics of 
decision making - for example the efficiency of the process or the efficiency of the
behaviour in terms of the use of resources - a situation that ignores the ecology and
seeks to average behavioural responses. The concept of representational sampling 
permitted a statistical approach to the inclusion of ecological factors in decision 
making. This approach is the so-called ideographic-statistical approach and allows 
decisions to be set in the context of the ecology before averaging takes place. The aim 
of this approach is to assess the strength of the clues used in the decision making 
process (Hammond KR Mumpower J and Smith TH 1980).
9.4.4 Judgement Analysis and Decision making
The ideas of Brunswick were rapidly adapted to the arena of social research. It had
been recognised for some time that in the analysis of social judgements, such as
investments in welfare services, decisions were often made that ran at odds with the
economic concept of efficient decision making. Hammond in 1955 explained these
anomalies in terms of Brunswick's vicarious functioning (Hammond KR 1955). Later
Hammond and his group went on to derive an equation mathematically and
statistically explaining the lens model - opening the door to the use of probabilistic
functioning in social analysis. This development they termed ‘social judgement
theory’ (Tucker LR 1964). This name is somewhat of a misnomer as social judgement 
theory gives rise to no hypothesis about social judgement. Instead it is a theoretical 
methodology for questioning the modus operandi of social decision making. The
foundation of this theory is a modification of the lens model to accommodate the
specific instances of social decision making Figure 9.2
Zone of ambiguity
FIGURE 9.2 THE BRUNSWICK LENS MODEL ADAPTED FOR SOCIAL JUDGEMENT
This theory' made the primary focus for the analysis the interaction between the
decision-maker and clues given by the distal ecological criteria. However these clues
are now weighted for the organisms preference. The preferences attached to the clues
are unique to both the organism and the ecology. Therefore, implicit in the analysis is 
the zone of ambiguity between the decisions made and the distal criteria driving them,
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Figure 9.2. In other words a complete description of the decision making process can 
never be possible due to the number of ways in which clues can interact with each
other and the vicarious functioning involved. Therefore, the application of clues to
decisions may not be linear, but couched by related curvilinear relationships. These
relationships may be unique to the situation the decision-maker is in and so are
ambiguous. This development added a new dimension to social research, as now in
addition to the weight attached to a proximal clue, a functional relationship was also
required (Hammond KR Stewart TR Brehmer B and Steinmann DO 1975). The
application of social judgement theory to decision making was therefore very specific,
and the results could not be directly applied to any decision making situation.
However an offshoot of social judgement theory was Cognitive Continuum Theory -
an enduring theory of general decision making.
9.4.5 Cognitive Continuum Theory
Cognitive Continuum theory focuses on the analytical and intuitive elements of
decision- making that characterises the functional relationship between the clues and
the distal criteria in terms of the mode of thinking used to clarify the uncertainty that 
is implicit in the zone of ambiguity (Hammond KR 1990). It is based on the following
5 precepts
1. Decision making moves on an analytical/intuitive continuum, i.e. analysis and 
intuition are not competing modes of thought but a continuum of cognitive










2. The most common form of decision making sits between the analytical and
cognitive extremes and is called quasi-rationality. The concept of quasi­
rationality has much to do with the concept of common sense or bounded
rationality. Decision-makers will analyse up to a point then use intuition to fill
in any gaps. In this manner quasi-rationality is an averaging process that lends
itself to averaging statistical methods such as regression.
3. The position a decision has on the intuition/analysis continuum depends on the
type of thought process, i.e. the cognitive mode, employed by the decision­
maker. In turn the cognitive mode is determined by the complexity of the task 
in hand, the ambiguity of the task and the way in which the task is presented.
All of these facts can and are influenced by the ecology. The complexity of the
task encompasses the complexity of the task in relation to other tasks. The
ambiguity of the task reflects the difference between stated and actual aims
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and the task presentation controls how the ecology states the task is to be 
completed. As the value of each of these factors increases, the task moves
towards the intuitive end of the spectrum and the ecology cannot be
determined by conventional statistical methods.
4. The mode of cognition is time-dependent in that as a decision making body 
becomes more familiar with the pattern of decision making the mode of
thought used to determine decisions changes towards intuitive modes.
5. Cognitive modes of decision making can rely on pattern recognition as a mode
of reducing analysis.
Although initially controversial, Hammond’s and Brunswick's ideas gained
acceptance in social research due to the ability to resolve problems in the analysis of
group decision making - particularly when the decision making process involves
elements of quasi-rationality. In these instances Judgement Analysis works hand in
hand with the cognitive continuum theory to permit the description of decision
making processes (Cooksey RW 1996)
9.5 Why Conduct Cognitive Continuum and Judgement Analysis 
Research
The theoretical underpinning of cognitive continuum based Judgement Analysis gives
it a unique position in the study of decision making. Classical decision making study
tools vary between the mathematical, for example Expected Utility methods, through 
to those with a pure psychological bias, for example Conflict Theory (Table 9.2). On
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this scale, Judgement Analysis sits roughly in the middle (Cooksey RW 1996). 
Therefore the use of Judgement Analysis is appropriate when a mixed mode of
cognitive and intuitive thought in decision making is being studied.
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TABLE 9.2 THE DECISION ANALYSIS TOOLS
Modified from (Cooksey RW 1996)
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In addition to the method of reasoning behind the analysis the application of 
judgement analysis has other advantages in certain decision making scenarios.
1. Methods of the study of decision making differ in what they are intending to
achieve. Many tools are descriptive in origin and seek to describe how judgements 
are made. Others are predictive in that they propose the correct decisions to be
made under a given set of circumstances. A few of the techniques are descriptive 
and predictive and are considered to be explanatory. In general those techniques
with a strong mathematical bias tend to be prescriptive in orientation. Intuitive 
methods tend to be descriptive. Those methods in the middle - like Judgement 
Analysis tend to be explanatory - covering the reasons behind the process of 
decision making. Therefore the use of Judgement Analysis can be used both to
describe and predict the effect of decision making
2. Another way of looking at the value of certain decision making methods is to
examine the coherence of judgements based in a correspondence between
decisions and real world events. In this classification the mathematical tools such
as decision analysis tend to focus on the coherence between the decision made and
other decisions in a mathematical, non-real-world, sense; those tools that focus on
psychological aspects look to the correspondence between external events and
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decisions made. This contrasts with Judgement Analysis where the decision system 
can be studied from whatever perspective is needed.
3. The focus on either the correspondence or the coherence of decision analysis tools 
leads logically to a discussion on the focus of the concepts of the methods
concerned. Research has indicated that there are four loci of decision making
(RosenheadJ 1992). These are:
1. Environmental Loci
A focus on the environmental factors in decision making.
2. Peripheral Processes
The focus here is the interaction between the environmental factors and the 
decision maker.
3. Central Processing
The locus of attention is the way in which the decision maker processes 
information.
4. Feedback Processing
How the decision maker handles the information provided by feedback on 
decisions.
Each of the methods outlined in Table 9.2 use one or more decision making foci to
a greater or lesser degree when assessing correspondence or coherence (Cooksey
RW 1996).
Decision analysis employs a purely central analysis locus, where most of the others
employ a peripheral bias. Only Judgement has the capacity to fully assess the
environmental factors involved in the decision making process. Correspondingly,
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Judgement Analysis is the only field of research that permits a full analysis of the 
social impact of decision making.
4. The final benefit of Judgement Analysis as the legitimate tool for the investigation
of the social and political influences involved in decision making comes from the
consideration of the levels of uncertainty handled by each technique. Uncertainty
may be said to arise either from internal sources or the external environment.
Decision analysis handles the external uncertainties while the intuition-based
schemes handle the internal ones. Only Judgement Analysis considers the
interaction between the internal and external uncertainties.
The profile of Judgement Analysis as expounded above implies that it is the ideal tool
to study decision making in groups, where decisions involve both internal and
external uncertainty, and where the environment heavily influences the decisions. The
downside of Judgement Analysis is that the analytical exercises require careful
construction if valid results are to be obtained. In addition the modes of decision­
making being employed in the area of study should not be too close to the analytical
or intuitive extremes of the cognitive continuum - if they are then Judgement
Analysis will draw the wrong inferences (Hammond KR 1966).
9.6 The Performance of Judgement Analysis - the Selection of the 
System
The performance of a Judgement Analysis exercise relies on the characterisation of 
the mode of decision making within systems. Three such systems are recognised, and 




The single system represents the simplest system examined using Judgement 
Analysis. In this system the distal criteria are lacking and the only criteria 
applied reflects the internal environment. This system is therefore not capable 
of making any policy impact analysis.
B. Double systems
Double systems are an explicit examination of the impact of the environment
on decision making. They are the most commonly used system for studying
the impact of external regulation on decision making. Double systems may or
may not have ecological criteria attached, therefore two types of double
system are possible.
C. Triple systems
Triple systems add in the complexity of interpersonal conflict into the realm
of environmentally influenced decision making. It allows for systems in which
the judges of the efficiency of decision making are included in the analysis.
From the discussion of the systems involved it would appear that the double system
design would allow for the delineation of the ecology of decision making. The
remainder of this chapter will focus on the use of double systems.
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9.7. The Statistics of Judgement Analysis Applied to Policy Decisions
The first step in the performance of a Judgement Analysis research programme is to
define the statistical framework. In deciding this framework the double systems is
well understood (Tucker LR 1964)
/. Parameters to be estimated
Figure 9.3 shows a lens diagram for a double system with the statistical parameters to
be estimated. The majority of studies revolve around the calculation of the clue
weights - often called the clue validities - (Rx and Ry) and the achievement of the 
ecological aims Al. The majority of estimates of these parameters are done using
various forms of linear regression models. This methodology is accepted where the
outcomes are continuous, however where categorical decisions are made, multivariate 
techniques are more appropriate. The clue validities estimated can take a variety of 
forms. It is possible to calculate the raw weights - assuming no interrelations between
variables. However it is more common to calculate relative weights or unit weights.
These relate the raw rate to the overall variance in decision making - and thereby
account for any interactions. The use of relative weights depends on the objectives of
the study and is used where predictive validity of the analysis outside the system
being studied is an issue. .
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2. Other estimates
Other factors to be estimated include the function forms, validation and predictability
of the clue weights.
FIGURE 9.3 THE BRUNSWICK LENS MODEL ILLUSTRATING ESTIMATED PARAMETERS 




The majority of analyses assume that the underlying function of the clues is additive,
i.e. the action of clues on the decision results from the additive effect of the clues.
This additive effect can take a variety of forms depending on the overall relationship
between clues and judgement. Therefore judgements may be linearly related to clues,
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or related in a quadratic manner. In the case of additive functional form the equation 
deriving the relationship can usually be found in the raw data using either power
polynomials or range methods. •
In some instances the functional form may be non-additive. In this instance the 
relationship between clues and judgements depends on order of presentation, or 
organisational issues. The development of the functional form in circumstances where 
the functional form is non-additive is complex and involves the use of clusters and 
patterns of clues in an attempt to improve predictability
The underlying functional form is important as it defines the validity of the result.
B. Validation
It is important that the results of the exercise are internally consistent. Generally this 
is achieved either by replicating the exercise or by holding a pre-exercise. The test 
used will depend on the nature of the investigation being undertaken.
C. Predictability
Predictability measures the use of the analysis to other situations. In general it is
desirable to produce a model with a high predictability for the tests being considered. 
The level of acceptable predictability, however, depends on the situation being
analysed and the tools being used.
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3. Sample size considerations
In general the more profiles the better. However this has to be tempered against time
constraints and judge fatigue. It has been suggested that a minimum of 10 profiles is
needed and the profile: clue ratio should not be less than 5:1. This figure is a 
guideline only and can be modified. For example where pre-validation is performed a
ratio of 3:1 has been used (Keeley SM and Doherty ME 1972).
9.8 The Construction of Judgement Analysis Research Experiments
The critical feature in the design of Judgement Analysis for a double system is the
design of the study to obtain both the factors driving decision making and the results
of the exercise. There have been many studies using Judgement Analysis to examine
tasks and wide ranges of methodologies have been developed to cope with a variety of
scenarios. However, as the key aim of Judgement Analysis designs is to allow a
natural flow of decisions to be made within a system that maximises the statistical
integrity of the results, a number of prerequisites must be met (Cooksey RW 1996).
1. The decision-makers must be experienced with the ecology in question. This
is important as it provides a stable baseline of study. However, this criterion
does not imply that the decision-maker should have completed the tasks
before, merely that he or she is familiar with the working environment.
2. The decisions to be made should be representations of the task ecology, either
in abstract terms, i.e. the tasks being performed have a similarity to real tasks 
or in terms of the decision being made having a concrete effect on the
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environment.
Based on the responses to these questions a variety of designs are possible.
A. Familiar Judges and Concrete Tasks.
This situation can be exemplified as physicians making decisions on patient 
management based on clinical variables - e.g. blood pressure. Here environmental 
clues can be represented directly in terms of a naturally occurring unit (the measured 
blood pressure and the drugs formulary) and the outcomes easily identifiable - the 
number of drugs added. Therefore it is expected that a close mapping between the 
environmental and decision making outcomes can be obtained. This situation is best
studied by direct observational studies.
B. Familiar Judges and Abstract Tasks
This is the commonest type of analysis encountered. Here the challenge is to establish
a realistic link between the decisions made and the ecology under study, where there
is no clear understanding of the impact of the decisions on that ecology. The clues in 
this type of abstract study are generally representative of the factors present in a given 
decision, i.e. a factor is either present or absent. Therefore the clues in this type of
analysis tends to be unitless.
This type of research is common in the field of investment analysis, for example the 
planning of new buildings, where multiple clues are brought together to make 
decisions. The results of such analysis are, however, considered to be specific for the
situation under study.
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C. Unfamiliar Judges and Abstract or Concrete Tasks
These tend to be laboratory-based studies of human learning, rather than research of
decision making ecology. Very little research has been done in the area of unfamiliar 
judges with concrete tasks, as most concrete task reasoning requires professional
knowledge. There is a considerable body of experience, however, in unfamiliar 
judges handling abstract tasks. This methodology is often used to review the impact 
of policy decisions. These studies have used the interpersonal conflict and learning 
paradigms to explore the impact of social research. In both situations where
unfamiliar judges are used, the ability to generalise the results is often limited.
From the preceding discussion it is apparent that where obtaining generalisable results 
are key it is important that judges must be fully familiar with the tasks in hand.
Familiar judges are also needed where the valuation of intended outcomes is the
target for analysis.
Furthermore, in situations where examination of policy options is the target for the 
analysis the judgement analysis design adopted must be to produce measure-sensitive 
validities of the clues to the decision making ecology. These validities should be 
directly correlated to the natural unit outcome, or at least explain the relationship to 
the abstract tasks understudy.
9.9 Designing a Judgement Analysis Study
From the discussion above the key component to performing a Judgement Analysis is
constructing the tasks in such a manner that they reflect the task ecology and permit
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the estimation of the statistical parameters needed. This is a balance, and in the end a
pragmatic solution normally results (Cooksey R and Freebody P 1986). This
pragmatic solution is usually influenced by (Cooksey RW 1996)
1. The focal intent of the research
Where it is the intention to examine the judgements of individuals, the single system
or the double system is the most appropriate. Where the intention is to look at the
behaviour of a group, a double or triple system design - where there is an ecological
criterion present - is best.
2. The judges
Where experienced judges are available then double or triple designs are best.
3. The depth of clue information available.
The clue information is at the core of the representative-ness of the study design. In
general, the information should be derived from real-life situations in double and
triple systems.
Obtaining the clues also relates to the type of judges. Familiar judges will rapidly
highlight absent clue information. Therefore it is essential that clue information is
accurate. In general there are three methods used to obtain clues. These are
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A. Structured interview
The interview of experienced judges.
B. Document analysis
A review of the documents relating to judges.
C. Objective analysis
Reviews of published research materials.
4. The methods available to obtain clue specific weights
This is the central issue to the design of judgement research. Ideally the clue weights
should be obtained in as natural a way as possible. Various methods have been 
employed. For example, Roose and Doherty used randomly generated errors within
existing profiles to highlight changes in clue weights that could then be used to
generate the specific weights themselves in comparison to a random population
(Roose JE and Doherty ME 1976). However, most studies are not as sophisticated, 
instead clue weights are derived from responses to actual cases (Cooksey R and
Freebody P 1986). These responses may be obtained from within the decision making
forum, where available. However the majority of studies use a sampling technique to
examine the responses across a range of individuals. If sampling techniques are used 
then consideration should be given to the statistical validity of the methods.
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5. The nature of the response
The use of concrete examples calls for concrete responses; similarly, where abstract 
studies are being performed abstract measures can be used. Where categorical 
responses are being made, for example yes/no decisions, special data handling 
techniques are required - for example the use of logistic regression. This technique 
imposes some limitations on the way data are interpreted.
9.10 Designing the Southampton Priority Setting Judgement Analysis
The exercise in Southampton was called the Purchasing Dilemmas exercise. Based on 
chapter 8’s discussion of the Commission it is possible to design the Judgement 




FIGURE 9.4 THE OUTLINE BRUNSWICK LENS MODEL ADAPTED FOR SOUTHAMPTON 
PURCHASING DILEMMAS
Fundholding
9.10.1 The Features of the Design
The determining factors for the design of the experiment can be broken down into;
The decision making ecology’
The ecology of decision making reflects the environment and the tasks. In the case of
the DHA, the environment is the demands for the efficient purchasing of health care
as specified by the mission statement of the health authority - which in itself is
reflective of ‘ working for patients’. The RHA specifies the tasks to be achieved
within that environment. These were discussed in the previous chapter and are
summarised below:
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The health Commission is required to meet the aims of
1. Political initiatives - such as waiting time reduction and Health of the Nation 
strategies.
2. The needs of the local population for services as evidenced by health strategies.
3. The demands of co-purchasers such as social services and GP Fundholders.
4. The performance assessment of the authority through tools such as the efficiency 
index.
5. The access the authority might have to discretionary funds through the adoption of
certain strategies - for example the funds ear-marked for assisting authorities to re­
settle long stay patients in psychiatric institutions.
6. Demands from local providers.
7. Demands from the local community and media.
Taken together the tasks and the environment specify the ecology.
77?e clues
The ecology for action does not necessarily match directly into clues for action. The
clues for action are by nature ambiguous and reflect the objectives of the distal
criteria that originated them, modified for political and social acceptability and the 
ability of the Commission to reassemble the clues (Hammond KR, Stewart TR,
Brehmer B and Steinmann DO 1975).
Taking each of the objectives in turn, we can highlight the associated clues as follows
1. Political initiatives - such as waiting time reduction and Health of the Nation 
strategies.
This is reflected as the need to purchase extra activity in order to achieve these
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aims, although this may be in specialities where there is no demand - in other 
words, excess activity. This activity may either be in the community or hospitals
or reflected in the weighted activity index that is used to calculate efficiency.
2. The needs of the local population for services as evidenced by health strategies.
This is reflected in two ways - either by internal Commission pressure to
implement strategies or by pressures from outside of the Commission - for
example the media or patient pressure groups.
3. The demands of Commission members and co-purchasers such as social services and 
GP Fundholders.
The demands of co-purchasers are reflected as bids put to the Commission and the
pressure both internally and externally to the Commission to implement change.
Internal pressure within the Commission also arises de-novo, either as the need to
fulfil the Commission core values, for example care closer to home, or the demand to
fulfil strategies.
4. The performance assessment of the authority through tools such as the efficiency 
index.
This is again reflected as the purchasing of excess activity.
5. The access the authority might have to discretionary funds through the adoption of
certain strategies - for example, the funds ear-marked for assisting authorities to re­
settle long stay patients in psychiatric institutions.
This is reflected as the financial strategy that the Commission adopts to get these 
funds.
6. Demands from local providers.
Reflected as provider bids to the Commission as part of the planning process.
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7. Demands from the local community and media.
Reflected as both internal and external pressures within the Commission - in a 
similar manner to provider demands.
Based on this discussion, it is possible to identify a list of clues to use in making decisions
that will satisfy the ecological conditions, these are
1. The health Commission values and pressures -




• care closer to home and local care
• the existence of a suitable purchasing strategy
2. The political clues
• purchasing extra community, hospital and weighted activity in areas that 
will generate excess activity
• national priority purchases - such as Health of the Nation targets
3. Community clues
The needs of the community. This can be defined in two ways
a. Where there is an absolute community need
b. Where the local community has an excessive problem over the national
average.
4. Financial strategy clues
• The costs of development and the access to discretionary funds.
5. Provider and co-purchaser pressures -
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The bids from the hospitals and the GP and Social Services priorities
It is possible to define the bids placed before the Commission in accordance with 
these clues and measure each proposal in line with the associated values The clue 
information can be readily obtained from the purchasing environment by either survey
or in depth interview.
The system
The Southampton Health Commission represents a panel of experienced judges 
making real life policy decisions - reflected as investment decisions in public 
purchasing. These decisions are categorical i.e. a yes no decision but are based on
abstract clues.
The achievement
The achievement of the decision making process is an acceptable purchasing plan 
placed before the Commission. It is therefore possible to look at the achievement in 
terms of what went into the plan.
Statistical considerations
The recommendation that was introduced above, was that of a 5:1 ratio. In the
purchasing exercise it was unlikely that such a ratio could be achieved. Therefore, in 
order to achieve a lower ratio a pre-validation exercise would be needed.
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Experimental design
The design of the study therefore appears most amenable to a double system, with 
ecological criteria. The corresponding lens diagram is depicted above, Figure 9.4.
9.10.2 The Objectives of the Design
The object of the study is to determine the measure-sensitive clue weights and relate 
these weights back to the ecology. In order to achieve this, a pre-validation exercise
would be conducted before the final analysis made. The final exercise would involve
a ranking exercise within the Commission to determine the clue weights. The primary 
outcome variable was the presence or absence of the investment on the purchasing
plan. The output of the experiment would be used to determine the meaning of the
ecological criteria.
9.11 Conclusions
The design of the Judgement Analysis exercise concludes this chapter. The 
framework and design as outlined above was then applied to the decision making 
system about contracts in Southampton Health Commission. The analysis would be
constructed as a two-stage design - in order to maximise statistical validity. The
overall construct of the analysis reflects Brunswick’s lens theory, together with the
elements of representative design. These features have been adopted in order to
maximise the determination of the ecological criteria involved. By describing these
criteria the causal link between the institutional imbalance, the failure to provide
services and the failure to support the mode of capital accumulation can be described.
259
Chapter 10 Establishing the causal relationship between the elements 
OF THE HYPOTHESIS PART2. EXPLORING CONTRACTUAL AND IMPLEMENTATION 
Decision making in Southampton Health Commission using Judgement 
Analysis
10.1 Key points from the Previous Chapter
In order to examine the causal relationship between the failure to provide services, the 
institutional imbalance and the failure to support the mode of capital accumulation a 
case study of contractual implementation is needed. Because of the closeness of the 
demographics and the willingness to undertake research the case study is centred in
Southampton. From a review of the activities of the Health Commission it was
apparent that decision making within the organisation was a very complicated 
exercise. Therefore the study of the factors involved in decision making required a 
special technique to be adopted. The tool selected was Judgement Analysis. Using the 
principles explained by Brunswick and his contemporaries a lens framework for the 
analysis of the decision making process in Southampton was described. The
characteristics of this model is of a double system with ecological criteria, using
experienced judges in an exercise involving a pre-validation step before the main
exercise.
10.2 Objectives for this Chapter
This chapter will apply the Judgement Analysis framework to Southampton Health
Commission. Its objectives are to examine the background to the exercise, the data
gathered to support the exercise and the conduct of the exercise.
260
10.3 The Decision Making Environment in Southampton
The basic features of Southampton Health Commission were introduced in chapter 8. 
The Commission was characterised as a hierarchical negotiating agency with 
responsibility as a contract agency for providing services to local health care users. 
The Commission also has a significant regulatory role - being responsible for the 
performance of GP Fundholders and fulfilling the performance targets set by the 
regional offices. This places the Commission in an ambiguous position and the 
Commission is left to balance its role. In doing so, it uses the objectives it is set and 
the options it is presented with. The purpose of this study was to determine how the
presented options and objectives influence investment decisions.
10.4 The Background to the Exercise
At the time of conducting the exercise the Commission had several factors which
influenced the conduct of the analysis (Honigsbaum F 1994). These factors can be
broken down into
10.4.1. The Purchasing Environment.
Southampton is a giowing district with high numbers of elderly. Therefore the 
Commissions capitation payments are likely to increase. The Commission estimated that 
it would have growth funds available over the next 5 years ranging from £22 million (on a 
low growth assumption of 1% per year) to £34 million (on a high growth assumption of
2% per year) (Southampton Health Commission 1993).
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Despite the financial position the Commission wanted to see whether alterations should 
be made in its basic structure of expenditure with the possibility of disinvestments 
(meaning the restriction or cessation of services) in some areas of health care in order to 
fund new developments. This entailed a detailed review of priority setting methods.
10.4.2. Changes in Priority Setting and in Purchasing Strategy.
In many districts, the decision making process begins with the public health directorate 
inviting bids from providers and, with the aid of other executive officers, compiling a 
short list for the health authority to consider. Usually, only about 10 to 15 bids are
referred in this way (Heginbotham 1992).
Southampton had used a bid attraction process in the past, but on this occasion the 
Commission decided to take a more pro-active stance (Honigsbaum F 1994). It
wanted to develop its own purchasing strategy and not simply respond to the wishes 
of providers. This situation arose due to the failure of the Health Commission to 
implement any of the strategic proposals and it had developed (Honigsbaum F 1994). 
This was a major concern of the non-executive members of the authority. The non­
executive members were keen to play a more active role and wanted all suggested
changes referred to the Commission. This meant that no short list of bid proposals 
would be compiled, and a more complex procedure would ensue.
The adoption of a pro-active stance implied that all bids were on the table, however these 
bids had to be found. Therefore bids were attracted from the strategy review teams, for
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instance the stroke strategy team described in the chapter 8. To these bids were added 
proposals from the providers who sought £1.3 million more in specialist services and
finally there were the national and local priorities to include.
In order to handle such a complex number of bids a framework was needed. The
establishment of a Programme Budget provided this framework.
10.5. The Establishment of the Programme Budget as a Purchasing 
Framework.
10.5.1 The Programme Budget Structure
rn order to establish a Programme Budget structure the Commission conducted an
expenditure exercise. In this exercise it was decided to follow the RAND methodology
developed during the 1950’s (Wildavsky A 1975). Therefore the members of the
Commission agreed a programme format, and a programme analysis was to be perfonned
to support it. The programme fonnat was closely allied to the Commission’s objectives as
a contracting agency.
The Commission decided to fonnat the programmes according to disease rather than care 
group categories as this was felt to give a strategic advantage to the operation of contracts 
(Cohen D 1994). Accordingly the programme categories are produced in Table 10.1. The
groups had, as a basis, the ICD9 classification, enabling enmeshment with DRG’s and
other diagnosis related categories (McMahon L 1989).
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TABLE 10.1. THE PROGRAMME BUDGET STRUCTURE
Programme Subprogramme




2. Mental Health 1. Mental illness
2. Learning disabilities
3. Cancer 1. Lung and respiratory





4. Circulatory Disease 1. Heart disease
2. Cerebrovascular disease
3. Other vascular diseases
5. Mobility and the Senses 1. Nervous system
2. Diseases of the senses
3. Musculoskeletal
6. Infection and Internal Disease 1. Infectious disease
2. Endocrine metabolic and immune disorders
3. Blood disorders
4. Respiratory disease
5. Digestive tract disease
6. Genitourinary disease
7. Unspecified symptoms and illness
7. Pregnancy and the New-born 1. Fertility
2. Pregnancy and childbirth
3. The new-born
8. Other Health Programmes 1. Supportive and social care
2. Healthy lifestyle promotion
3. Child surveillance
4. Other health protection
Once the programme format was established the analysis was done using the local
purchaser and providers data collection systems. The number of finished consultant
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episodes by programme was calculated and these priced at average speciality cost. In the 
case of care in the community - where no routine data were available, expenditure was 
apportioned from the hospital costs. Primary care costs were allocated from the Morbidity
Survey in General Practice 4 and the PACTLINE prescribing information under British
National Fonnulary headings (MB5 no 3 1994). The final distribution of expenditure is
shown in Table 10. 2
TABLE 10.2 EXPENDITURE BY PROGRAMME
Programme Spend £ million Percentage
Injury 14.4 6.5




Infection and Internal 68.0 30.6
Pregnancy and the new-born 18.7 8.4
Other 20.7 9.3
10.5.2 Alignment of the Programme Budget with the Strategy of the Commission
The Commission then decided to align its overall strategic purchasing direction with the
Programme Budget (Honigsbaum F 1994). As was explained in the previous chapter, the ' 
role of the Commission is to secure better health for local people via the use of contracts. 
Given this aim the Commission set priorities based on the mortality and morbidity in the
community, the effectiveness of available interventions and measures of resource
efficiency. These latter values were expressed on a subjective assessment of value for
money. The Commission decided to express the priority of the programme in terms of
weighting for change. Weighting a programme as one implied no change, less than one
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implied priority for disinvestment, greater than one implied priority for investment. Given 
this framework the Commission decided that its priorities were expressed as weightings -
given in Table 10.3






Infection and internal disease 1.04 
Pregnancy and the new-born 0.88 
Other 0.88
Therefore the Commission wanted to increase spending on mental health and circulatory
disease, while decreasing spending in other programme areas. The establishment of the
priority weights enabled discussions on both an investment and a disinvestment strategy.
10.6 Investment Strategy and the Attraction of Bids
From the priorities identified, the public health directorate identified health problems that
were either a major cause of mortality and morbidity in tenns of the number of people
affected, or where the local health problem was relatively large (Honigsbaum F 1994).
Prominent among the former were heart disease, various cancers, stroke and mental
illness, while child dental health and teenage pregnancy had caused much local concern
in the latter group. The full list of concerns is reproduced as Table 10. 4. The diseases
where there was a large disease burden by and large conformed to national and regional
priorities since Southampton's population profile is similar to that on which the
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Department of Health based its health targets in the Health of the Nation. In all, 29 health
problems were identified. Targets were then set for each health problem with the
selection of interventions best designed to meet them. The selection of interventions was
based on the criteria of
Local Needs - defined as the ability of an intervention to target the local problem - given
any unique local features.
Effectiveness - defined as the ability of the intervention to have an effect, based on
published knowledge.
Value for money - an assessment of the number of treatments offered is comparative to
its cost.
This part of the process had much in common with the strategy processes described in the 
previous chapter. In many cases where the health problems and the strategy overlapped, 
the assessments were taken directly from the existing strategies.
For example, the injury programme area. The Commission focused on trauma and
poisoning where figures suggested that the problems in Southampton were greater than 
the national average. Where accidental injuiy was concerned the use of safety devices -
such as fireguards - and the implementation of immediate care in the Accident and
Emergency Department could reduce the local impact. Safety devices were assessed as
effective and having high value for money. This contrasts with immediate care in
Accident and Emergency Departments, which was found to be effective with moderate
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value for money. As there was no Commission strategy for these areas the assessment
was made by the Commission’s Public Health Consultants. In total to provide
preventative measures for those residents at risk of suffering an accident eight
interventions were considered and from these three programme changes were proposed,
(one was also designed to reduce the risk of accidental poisoning). Similarly, to reduce
the impact of injury, six interventions had been considered and from these five
programme changes were proposed, one being based on a pilot exercise. There were thus
eight programme changes from the injury care group for the Commission to consider.
A similar exercise was gone through in each of the programme areas and a list of
interventions developed. These were added to the strategic developments and the
proposals from providers. This made in total 49 potential investments to be discussed as
part of the exercise - Table 10.5
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Care in the community
Suicides Local health problems




In line with Health of the Nation
Mobility Visual impairment Local health problem




Dental disease Local health problems














TABLE 10 5 INVESTMENTS FOR CONSIDERATION
Injury
1. Mixed Crew Trials (abbreviated as mixed crews)
The use of mixed crews of qualified and basic grade ambulance staff to transport non­
urgent patients. Provider bid costing £29,000 in order to start a pilot.
2. Immediate Care for Injury (abbreviated as immediate care)
The provision of crash call GP’s to attend accidents. Provider bid £20,000 for pilot.
3. Community First Aid Training
Commission suggestion - £10,000.
4. Patients Charter Accident and Emergency (abbreviated as A and E)
National Priority - £137,500.
5. Multiagency Accident Prevention (abbreviated as accident prevention)
An accident prevention strategy involving education; health care and social services.
Commission suggestion - £27,000.
6. Accident Prevention Information (abbreviated as accident info)
Health of the Nation requirement £20,000.
7. Provision of Safety Equipment (abbreviated as safety aids)
Commission bid £10,000.
8. Trauma Centres




9. Community Mental Health Teams
The provision of five mental health teams to work in the community. In line with 
national priorities Commission bid - £1,300,000.
10. Locality Based Hospital Units (LBHU)
Providing residential care for individuals with learning disability, a local priority 
Commission bid - £900,000.
11. Home and Day Detoxification ( Detox)
Providing local services for the management of alcoholism and drug related disorders. 
Local priority. Commission bid - £100,000.
12. Brief Interventions
The practice based counselling of substance misuse. Local priority. Commission bid - 
£2,000.
13. Substance Misuse Education
School programmes of education about drug abuse. Local priority. Commission bid -
£40,000.
14. Improved Information and Support for Carers (abbreviated as info to carers) 
Information to caregivers about services on offer and how to obtain them. Local priority.
Commission bid - £10,000.
15. Increased Respite and Day Care for the Mentally Ill (abbreviated as respite 
care)
National and Strategy priority. Commission bid - £400,000.
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16. Improved Management of Depression in Primary Care (abbreviated as 
depression management)
Local priority. Commission bid - £ 20,000.
17. Counselling in Primary Care (abbreviated as Counselling)
Local priority. Provider bid - £600,000.
18. Supported Housing




Increased provision of palliative care in the community. Local Need. Provider bid - 
£50,000.
20. Specialist Cancer Treatments (abbreviated as Cancer teams)
Centralising the management of cancer. Provider bid - £350,000.
21. Skin Cancer Prevention
National priority. Commission bid - £50,000.
22. Skin Cancer Recognition




The provision of after care services in cardiac care. Local priority. Provider bid - 
£50,000.
24. Community Stroke Rehabilitation ( abbreviated as stroke rehabilitation)
Local need. Commission bid - £250,000.
25. Targeted Stroke Prevention
Local need publicly stated in stroke strategy. Commission bid - £10,000.
Mobility and the Senses
26. Care Attendants
Provider bid - cost not known.




Provider bid cost not known.
29. Community Rehabilitation
Rehabilitation in the community following minor surgery. Provider bid - £570,000.
30. Pre-admission Clinics
Community based clinics for the assessment of patients prior to hospital admission
Provider bid - £7000.
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31. Equipment to Assist the Disabled (abbreviated as Equipment)
Commission bid - £150,000.
32. Mobile Retinopathy Screening (abbreviated as retinopathy screening)
Assessment of vision in diabetics. Provider bid - £50,000.
Infection and Internal Disease
33. Asthma Education in Primary Care (abbreviated as asthma)
Local need. Commission bid - £10,000.
34. Sex Education in Schools (abbreviated as sex education S)
Local need strategy based. Commission bid - £32,000.
35. Needle Exchanges
Local need strategy based. Commission bid - £25,000.
36. Oral Health Education
Local need. Targeted at vulnerable groups. Provider bid - £10,000.
37. Oral Hygiene Education
Local need. Provider bid - £10,000.
Pregnancy and the New-born
38. New Models of Maternity Care (abbreviated as maternity care)
Strategy based national priority. Commission bid - £100,000.
39. Unwanted Teenage Pregnancy Education (abbreviated as sex education T)




41. Pre-Conceptual use of Folic Acid (abbreviated as folic acid)
Commission bid £10,000.
42. Ambulance Obstetrics
Patient Charter objective for obstetric training in paramedics. Provider bid £25,000.
Other Health Programmes
43. Reduction in Waiting Lists (abbreviated as waiting lists)
National Priority. Commission bid £1,900,000.
44. Child Protection Training
Local need. Commission bid £10,000.
45. Child Protection Assessment
Local need. Commission bid £20,000.
46. Smoking Cessation Support (abbreviated as smoking)
Local need. Commission bid £10,000.
47. Dietary Advice in Primary Care (abbreviated as dietetics)
Provider bid £25,000.
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48. Communication Service for Ethnic Minorities (abbreviated as 
communication service)
Joint bid local need £50,000.
49. Domiciliary Care
A hospital at home scheme. Provider bid £100,000.
10.7. Disinvestment Strategy
There were two proposed mechanisms for the setting of disinvestments. First would be 
the withdrawal of funds from ineffective interventions. Second would be the top slicing 
of funds for special services. Both of these mechanisms were discounted, however, as it 
was felt to be impossible to define effectiveness and the regulatory structure posed by the
efficiency index made top slicing difficult to perform (Honigsbaum F 1994).
10.8 The Judgement Analysis Information Needs
The attraction of the bids completed the first stage in the revised planning process. These
bids formed the basis of the Judgement Analysis framework as these were used as the
decisions to be made. The Commission staff then collected information on the purchasing
clues. The clue information came from several sources.
10.8.1. Commission Clues -The Ranking of Benefit and Commission Values
The staff of the Commission provided direct information about the clues being applied to 
decisions when the proposals were reviewed internally. It was decided that the best way
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to express these clues was in terms of a relative weighting. As was stated in the previous
chapter the clues provided by the Commission translated into the Commission values.
Therefore, the commission staff scored the bids in accordance with the Commission
values that were introduced previously in order to obtain the clue weighting.
First the 49 options were scored in terms of desirable features drawn from the Health
Commission Mission Statement - introduced in the previous chapter (Southampton
Health Commission 1993). Therefore the Commission scored the investments in terms of
Health Benefit
Ranked 0-3 depending on the benefit assessed to the local population.
Equity
Ranked 0 or 1 if the intervention improved equity - defined as equalising
access to care across the district.
Choice
Ranked 0 or 1 depending if the intervention increased choice.
Personal Responsibility
Ranked 0 or 1 depending if the intervention increased responsibility of
individuals for their own health care.
Access to Waiting List
Ranked 0 or 1 depending if the intervention decreased waiting times.
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Access to Local Care
Ranked 0 or 1 depending if the intervention increased local care.
In addition the Commission intended to add a seventh value - the number of quality
adjusted life years added by the investment - the so-called marginal QALY value. 
However, the majority of the bids proposed could not be described in terms of QALY 
values and so this scoring was dropped (Honigsbaum F 1994).
Investments were also noted to be either of strategy origin, provider investment requests,
primary care origin or other
For example, here is the score assigned to palliative care Table 10.6






Access to wait list 0
Access to local care 1
Marginal value (QALY) not available 
Provider Origin yes
10.8.2. The Current Allocation of Resources and the Projections for the Future - 
the Financial Clues
The Commission decision making process was also influenced by the financial
projections and so the financial clues were also collected. This involved two exercises.
First the share of current resources allocated to each of the eight health programmes was
calculated an estimate of how these might change with demographic pressures over the
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next five years obtained. These were then matched with the estimated increase in
funding. In view of funding uncertainties, high (2% per year) and low (1% per year)
growth figures were estimated (Honigsbaum F 1994).
Mental health was to change most under these conditions. Its share of resources was to 
increase from 13.7% to about 15%. Maternity services were set to decline by about the 
same amount. This change was due to the ageing of the local population. However, the
remainder of the services remained static.
Also, as part of the financial strategy, the costs of each investment were assessed and the
likely impact of any discretionary funds included.
10.8.3. The Views of the Stakeholders — the Local Pressure Clues
To aid the planning process, the Commission had formed a Health and Social Care 
Alliance. This included GPs (Fundholders as well as non-Fundholders), the Community 
Health Council, social services, education, local authority environmental health, housing 
and leisure services representatives, secondary care providers (Southampton University
Hospitals Trust and Southampton Community Health Services Trust), and the 
independent and voluntaiy sector. In order to gain a clearer picture of the investment 
strategy, this group was asked to comment on the investments. No attempt was made to 
consult the general public but the Alliance did contain groups representative of public 
opinion (Honigsbaum F 1994). It went beyond this form of public consultation to seek 
the views of the Commission’s partners in the provision of health care.
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Between December, 1993, and February 1994, the Alliance partners supplied views,
information and ideas for the future strategy development. An attempt was made to
obtain some sense of the values employed by the community in setting priorities. This 
was done by means of case vignettes (for example, one concerned the pros and cons of
expensive drug treatment for depression) so as to reveal more clearly the way preferences
were made. These were presented in a seminar to the respective groups and the 
discussion recorded. Five such meetings were held with about 15 members per group. A 
concern for equity and a fair allocation of resources was apparent, along with a call for a
locality approach to needs assessment. Also, more effective links between GPs and
social services were felt to be crucial. Though some consultation was seen as desirable,
the main message coming from the stakeholder community was that it wanted the 
Commissioners to make the hard decisions. It felt the subject was too complex for
general consideration; the public did not have the infonnation needed to make careful
evaluations of clinical need and cost-effectiveness. However, sufficient infonnation was
gleaned to discover if the options presented were of local concern (Honigsbaum F 1994).
In addition to the discussions, stakeholders were given the opportunity to apply their own 
rankings to the options presented. Stakeholders were asked to assign priorities within the 
eight health programmes, using a score of three for high, two for medium and one for
low. Of the 375 questionnaires sent out, only 72 were returned and 34 came from GPs.
When questioned on the failure to respond, many respondents found the ranking process
difficult. Most felt that more information was needed about outcome, cost and the
number of people affected by each service.
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The responses from GPs were of particular importance because of the influence they 
exert on Commission spending. Because the replies from GPs represented nearly half the 
total received from stakeholders, their separate rankings did much to determine rankings
as a whole. The ranking obtained from the GPs is given in Table 10.7. They assigned the 
highest priority to waiting times for elective surgery and the lowest to information for
accident prevention.
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TABLE 10.7 GP RANKINGS
Waiting list 1
Trauma centres 2
Community mental health teams 3























A and E T1
Supported housing 28









Skin cancer prevention 36
Needle exchange 39
Depression management 39
Oral health education 41
Safety aids 42
Skin cancer detection 43











The other rankings are more difficult to interpret. Eleven responses were received from
professions allied to medicine, nine from CHC members, and eight from hospital services
and four from social services and other councils of community service. In this instance
the spread of priorities was very large. However very high ranks were given to
community mental health teams, waiting lists and trauma centres while low rankings
were given to the information based initiatives such as carer infonnation. A full ranking is
given in Appendix A.
Stakeholders were also given the chance to suggest changes in the way funds were 
distributed across health programmes. Of the 43 respondents who disagreed with the 
way in which money was allocated across programmes, the responses appeared to 
indicate that more expenditure was needed in the cancer and circulatory disease
programmes, while spending should be reduced in the infection and internal disease
and mobility and the senses programmes. However, where the allocation of 
additional funds were concerned, the priority differed. All 72 responded to this 
question and the mental health programme received the highest percentage.
The findings of the consultation suggested that four areas for concerns stood out. These 
were waiting time, local access, choice and health benefit. Less importance was attached 
to personal responsibility and equity. Within the stakeholders mental health was seen as 
a priority area for growth by additional funds, while cancer and circulatory diseases were 
the choices for receiving more funds from disinvesting.
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10.8.4. National Clues
The national clues were obtained from the priorities and planning guidance documents 
and, the perfonnance targets and the efficiency index requirements (Wessex Regional
Health Authority 1993). In addition the impact of changes on activity levels were
assessed using provider based estimates of change (Honigsbaum F 1994). .
The national clues were the last to be assembled. The final set of collected infonnation
appears as the initial dataset displayed in appendix B.
10.9The Conduct of the Exercise
10.9.1 Assembling the Panel of Judges
The central judges involved were the members of the Health Commission executive
panel. However, in view of the complexity of the issues a support group was fonned. 
These were non-voting members designed to help the panel reach decisions. The full 
panel is produced as Table 10.8. For the members of the health Commission this was the 
4th purchasing plan produced, therefore, they could be counted as experienced judges.
t
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10.9.2 The Learning Exercise
So many changes were made in the months prior to the exercise that it was doubted if 
the judges were sufficiently familiar with the new procedure to make the decisions 
needed. Therefore it was decided to hold a learning exercise based around a single 
subject and assisted conception was the intervention chosen. It was one of the more
common procedures excluded by health authorities and would provide an opportunity for 
clear criteria to be developed. A full day session of the Commission executive and non­
executive members was called in order to conduct this exercise.
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TABLE 10.8 THE JUDGES IN THE EXERCISE
1. Members of the Southampton and South West 
Hampshire Health Commission
Professor JBL Howell (Chairman)
Mrs. IF Candy (Vice Chairman)
Mr. JB Burdekin (non-executive)
Professor CF George (non-executive)
Mr. BI Irish (non-executive)
Dr. R Lee (non-executive)
Reverend BL Strevens (non-executive)
Mr. PA Shaw (Chief Executive)
Dr. NA Allen (Director of Health Strategy and Public Health)
Mr. L Judd (Director of Health-care Commissioning and Primary Care)
Mr. IV Marriott (Director of Finance, Information and Performance)
Mr. AM Cochrane (Associate Director, Performance and Development)
Mrs. A Jeffrey (Associate Director, Primary Care)
Mrs. R Archer (Assistant Director, Social Services)
Mr. J Whale (Chairman CHC - observer)
2. Health Services Management Centre, Birmingham University
Professor Chris Ham 
Mr. Frank Honigsbaum
3. Staff of the Southampton and South West Hampshire Health Commission












Representatives of the community health council
Representatives of the four district councils
Six students from Brockenhurst College
Representatives of the NHS Executive (South and West)
Representatives of Glaxo Pharmaceuticals pic, NHS Relations Division
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The Dilemma of the Learning Exercise
Southampton had long offered tubal surgery but it had rejected funding in-vitro 
fertilisation (IVF) in 1986 when the procedure had a low success rate. At that time, 
patients could be transferred elsewhere for treatment but, with the 1991 reform, it could 
be done only as an extra-contractual referral with costs bom by the Commission. This 
places the responsibility in the hands of the public health director - a role he found 
uncomfortable (Honigsbaum F 1994). This exercise would give the Commission an
opportunity to apply its own judgement since it was ultimately responsible for the
expenditure incurred.
The Discussion
After presentation of the issues a discussion was started. During the discussion, two
conflicting criteria emerged: cost-effectiveness and equity (Honigsbaum F 1994).
Though more cost effective than tubal surgery, IVF had a low success rate and each cycle
was expensive to perform. On the other hand, infertility caused much distress and could
result in emotional disability for couples. If money could be spent on abortion, it was
argued, why not infertility?
The issue proved difficult to resolve since no data were available on current costs or the
effectiveness of the infertility services that Southampton offered. The main difference
then centred on this question of IVF and health care; was IVF a health or social problem?
If the latter, some members felt it could be excluded. However, it was noted that other
districts had restricted access and made only limited sums available for IVF.
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The session did not produce a clear result on IVF, as the members felt that one treatment
could not be discussed in isolation. However, the members felt that the understanding of
the process had been improved and they felt more prepared for the following discussion.
10.9.3.The Judgement Analysis Exercise
The Judgement Analysis exercise was held four weeks after the learning exercise. It was
of identical fonnat and attendance
The Validation Procedure
The first phase of the exercise was a validation of the clues to be used. The experiences 
of the learning exercise led the Commission initially to focus on its internal values. The
initial discussion centred on the six criteria derived from the mission statement and the
main issue revolved around the importance of health gain and value for money as 
opposed to equity. Setting priorities according to health gain and value for money would 
ensure that the Commission made best use of the limited resources available, but equity 
was also important to consider so that services were extended to groups that were hard to
reach like ethnic minorities and the homeless. In the end both were considered to be valid
clues (Honigsbaum F 1994).
Conflicting views were expressed about the value of choice. On the one hand, it was
argued that choice conflicts with value for money in that it entails the duplication of 
services. However, others felt that it could have the opposite effect where, for example, 
home delivery was offered in the case of pregnancy. Health gain could also be promoted
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if patients were given more information, so that with the aid of doctors, they chose care
appropriate to their circumstances. Under these circumstances choice could be considered
a valid decision making clue.
At this stage the Commission considered that these were the only valid clues. In order to
test this the Commission was asked to weight the clues. Since limited cost data were
available, the Commission decided to put value for money aside initially and assign
weights to the other five criteria in its mission statement. To make this assessment 100
points were to be spread across the five criteria in order to allow greater scope for
scoring. Each of the 12 members of the Commission assigned scores and the results are
given in Table 10.9
TABLE 10.9 THE RESULTS OF THE WEIGHTING EXERCISE







50 20 10 5 15 1
28 18 18 18 18 2
25 35 10 10 10 3
24 26 23 13 14 4
50 20 10 5 15 5
35 25 10 15 15 6
50 20 5 15 10 7
30 30 10 10 20 8
40 10 10 20 10 9
40 20 10 20 10 10
40 20 10 10 20 11
40 40 10 5 5 12
Health gain was clearly the criterion to which all but two members attached the most
importance. Equity came next; only one member put equity below one of the remaining
three criteria. The Commission votes were then used to assign the average weights. The
averages of the weights assigned are given in table 10.10.
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Preliminary Ranking of 49 Options
With its criteria in mind, the Commission then made two rankings of the 49 interventions
- one based on the five criteria which had weights assigned to them, the other based on
the cost data that was available. The results are displayed in Table 10.11 and 10.12.
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TABLE 10.11 - RANKING BY HEALTH BENEFITS
Option Title Ranking
Communication service 1
Sex education S 2
Infonnation to carers o
Equipment 4

















Child protection training 22
Child protection assessment 23










Skin cancer screening 34
Needle exchanges 35
Waiting times 36
Community fust aid 37
Substance misuse education 38


















Infonnation to carers o3
Folic acid 4
Stroke prevention 5 .
Oral health 6
Oral hygiene 7
Child protection training 8
Asthma patient education 9
Smoking advice 10
Community first aid 11
Accident prevention 12
Depression management 13
Child protection assessment 14
Pre-admission clinics 15
Communication services 16
Sex education S 17
Palliative care 18

































The Commission, however, rejected both prioritised lists on the basis that they did not
reflect the other values the Commission applied to decision making and while legitimate 
they were not acceptable to the process of producing a purchasing plan. When 
questioned by the moderator the Commission members stated that they wished to include 
the value of the investment decision in terms of the alignment that the investment has
with national priorities and the public perceptions of the actions of the Commission. In
addition there was concern that the Commission had made choices based on the
population and medical needs - not the business of being a contractual agency, and so
financial and internal strategies would need to be considered (Honigsbaum F 1994).
In further discussion it appeared likely that these values were very complicated. In an
attempt to understand the values used, a discussion was held about potential investments
to the programme pregnancy and the new-born. The five maternity options were ranked 
by a voting procedure, each member of the Commission having one vote, with the results
given in Table 10.13.
TABLE 10.13 THE RESULTS OF A VOTE ON THE OPTIONS FOR INVESTMENT IN 
PREGNANCY AND THE NEWBORN
Option Criteria strengths Rank





equity, choice, local access 
health gain, equity, personal 
responsibility
health gain, equity, choice 








The first two options were clear choices in this exercise. The results of this exercise
confirmed that it was difficult to relate rankings to the health Commission’s operating
statements and implicit value judgements appeared to be more important. For example 
new models of care came second despite the fact that the criteria with the largest
weighting and health gain, was not considered to be one of its strengths. These finding
implied that the factors being applied were complicated some rational thinking could be
applied. Further open discussion revealed a second set of values being applied. These
were in many instances directly related to the clues obtained (Honigsbaum F 1994).
1. The number of people who would benefit, (local priority)
2. The perceived severity of the condition, (needs)
3. The ease and swiftness of implementation (is there a worked-up purchasing
strategy? - a Commission value).
4. The sphere of jurisdiction/control (Is it within the sole control of the Commission
or is it dependent on the commitment of other agencies like social services? This
conflicted to some extent with a priority that had been given to developments that
involved work with other agencies - this relates to discretionary funds and
Commission values).
5. The continuity with current purchasing shifts and the ideas of co-purchasers e.g.
Fundholders and Providers.
6. The strategic impact on the future of the Commission (Commission value).
7. The stakeholder expectations and the priorities set by the national or regional 
level.
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8. Needs assessments (based on distance from target and availability of effective
interventions).
9. National Priorities and regional pressures e.g. waiting lists.
This provided a validation for the remainder of the clue list and following this discussion 
the remaining clues were added to the list.
The Ranking Exercise
It proved too complex to perform a simple ranking system - as had been done in the
validation exercise - to produce the final investment list (Honigsbaum F 1994). Therefore
a voting system was instituted. The Commission proceeded to assign rankings within
health programmes. This was done by a scoring system. Each member was asked to
score (vote) for an option, and the total scores added. A ranking was then produced based
on the total number of votes cast. Since the maternity options had been ranked earlier (on
the basis of criteria strengths rather than individual scores), only the seven remaining
Programmes had to be prioritised. Here are the rankings for all eight programmes:
TABLE 10.14 PROGRAMME RANKINGS
A Injury
1) Trauma centres
2) Accident and emergency
3) Accident prevention
4) Mixed crew trials






1) Community mental health teams
2) Respite care
3) Substance misuse education
4) Counselling








3) Skin cancer prevention




3) Targeted stroke prevention












4) Targeted oral hygiene
5) Oral health
299
G. Pregnancy and the New-born
1) Education and contraception
2) New models of maternity care
3) Paramedic obstetrics
4) Assisted conception
H. Other Health Programmes
I. Waiting Lists
2. DomicilIaiy care
3. Child protection training






The rankings within each health programme were then combined into an overall order 
using the growth funding proportions assigned to each programme. The weightings used 
were determined by the public health department taking into account the needs
assessments performed and is given in Table 10.15.





Mobility and the senses 1.04
Infection and internal diseases 0.88
Pregnancy and the new-born 0.88
Other health programmes 0.88
This combined procedure produced a new investment list produced as Table 10.16
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TABLE 10.16 THE FINAL INVESTMENT LIST
Option Title Ranking
Community teams/mental health teams 1
Waiting lists 2
Trauma centres 3
Accident and emergency 4
Specialist teams 5
Sex education S 6














Respite care stroke prevention 21











Skin cancer prevention 33
Stroke rehabilitation 34
Skin cancer screening 35
Substance misuse 36
Counselling 37
Information to carers 38
Assisted conception 39













The Final Purchasing Plan
The Commission approved the final prioritisation and the rankings went into the 
Commissions planning cycle where the following options were selected for
implementation, Table 10.17


















There are some significant changes between the purchasing plan and the prioritisation 
list. In part this was due to the providers not being ready to implement the changes
indicated (Honigsbaum F 1994). This was the case with the trauma centre
implementation, mixed crews and maternity care. These options were replaced by the 
implementation of procedures that the providers were ready to implement - such as
stroke and cardiac rehabilitation. So despite the exercise the final factors in decision
making lie in negotiation not rationalisation. This confirms the view that the Commission
is an example of a hierarchical negotiating state. Despite this finding the result remains 
valid. The majority of the options selected for implementation are in the upper part of the 
list, and the finding of provider pressure is important. The validity of the exercise is also
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confirmed by the acceptance of the purchasing plan by the Regional Health Authority.
The production of the final ranking and the purchasing plan marked the end of the
exercise. The next phase was the analytical phase. This proved to be a complex exercise, 
covered in the next chapter. Before proceeding to this, however, it is important to
conclude the observations of the Judgement exercise.
10.10 Conclusions
The conduct of the Judgement Analysis exercise revealed some important factors about
the mode of decision making in the purchasing of health care. First the process was more
complicated than initially was thought, with the number of clues involved being more
extensive than the Commission initially believed the list to be. Second is the power of the 
providers of care - which is already evident in the rejection of some options because the 
providers were not ready. Third on review all the factors involved in the operation of an 
internal market were present in the decision making factors uncovered. What was not
clear, however, was the weights attached to these factors, as in addition a considerable
number of non-market factors - such as the Commissions internal pressures - had been 
applied. Finally, whatever the complexity involved the Commission was clearly
responding to external influences, as the final product of the exercise was an acceptable
purchasing plan.
At the end of the exercise it was not possible to state if any causal relationship between 
the failure to support the mode of accumulation, the failure to provide services and 
institutional imbalance was present due to the complexity of the exercise. However some 
sense of one emerged. Some evidence of a causal relationship was particularly in the area
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of institutional imbalance where the power of the state economy relationship was evident 
in the power of the providers. The formal description of the relationship would however, 
rely on the analysis.
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Chapter 11 The analysis of the Judgement exercise.
11.1 Key Points from the Previous Chapter
The previous chapter demonstrated the complexity of the decision making process 
about purchasing contracts in Southampton Health Commission. In particular more 
clues were involved than the authority had anticipated and the interaction of these
clues appeared to be complicated. However the exercise confirmed that all of the
other factors known to be involved in the running of an internal market were
important in the Commission decision making process, however there was a 
suggestion that the provider values may be dominant. The complexity of the 
procedure involved implied that the analysis of the exercise needed special methods.
11.2 Objectives of this Chapter
The objectives of this chapter are to use the analytical methods introduced in chapter 
9 to determine the important factors in decision making in the setting of contracts,
and to interpret the results at a local level.
11.3. The Aims of the Analysis, Ensuring Applicability and Assumptions
The aim of the analysis is to calculate the clue weightings in the lens diagram created
for this study, Figure 11.1. These weights have to be calculated in a manner that
enables them to be generally applied to studying purchaser behaviour, under the






FIGURE 11.1 THE OUTLINE BRUNSWICK LENS MODEL ADAPTED FOR SOUTHAMPTON 
PURCHASING DILEMMAS
These clue weights will indicate the relative importance of the factors involved in 
decision making, and also indicate how these factors interact. In order to complete 
this analysis it was assumed that the decision-makers in the NITS work under a 
constraint of intentional action (Scharpf FW 1997). Intentional action assumes that 
the decision-makers are driven by a combination of natural impulses and external 
constraints that are considered before the decisions are taken, and that no contracts
are signed unintentionally. Under this assumption we are able to look at the decisions 
made and infer backwards into the values and factors driving the decision. The 
concept of intentional action has been validated in other systems of institutional 
decision- making, (King G, Keohane RO and Verba S 1994), although no studies of 
intentional action exist within the NITS, its existence is inferred in studies of priority
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setting, for example Hunter (Hunter D 1990)
Assuming intentional action also increases the application of the results. Due to the 
complexity of the exercise, and the depth of research needed it is unlikely that the 
analysis and process could be repeated across a number of health authorities and the 
results pooled to create wider applicability (Rosenhead J 1992). However, the 
external constraints of finance and demands to increase activity in the face of 
considerable demographic pressure are not unique to Southampton. Every health 
authority in the UK currently faces these pressures (Ham CJ 1992). Therefore if in the
results of an analysis the responses to the clues can be shown to be of importance, the
intentional actions based on these clues are likely to be widely applicable if the judges 
are representative. In this, the demographics and the voting members of the
Commission do not appear unusual when compared to the rest of the country
(Southampton Health Commission 1993; Health Committee 1995).
In addition to the complexity constraints, there are statistical reasons why a single
case study is valid. In describing the intentional framework it is apparent that we are
describing a multidimensional space. This would argue that there is little to be gained
from the examination of large similar cases where different factors and dimensions
may be involved and where the opportunity to conduct statistical meaningful research
is limited. Instead attention should be focused on searching for the effects of factors 
in small number situations with an emphasis on forward-looking strategies, (King G,
Keohane RO and Verba S 1994). Under this ideal when the effects of independent
variables are examined for causal inference a chain of causation is established such
that change in the dependent variable can be assessed. If the causal chain is kept
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sufficiently short then smaller sample sizes are possible. Therefore in this analysis a 
forward-looking framework will be used, and events before the purchasing dilemmas 
exercise considered only when they impact current decisions. In this way the causal 
chain can be kept short and wider applicability ensured (Elster J 1992). Obviously this
reduces the ability to explain why the clues are important, but enables a statistically
valid analysis to be performed.
The forward-looking framework that has been chosen to support the Judgement 
analysis is a quasi-rational institutional actor making purposeful decisions
(Rosenhead J 1992). This actor will be making decisions that effect social states by
interacting with other actors. The basis for the decisions is by nature quasi-rational
both in terms of the other actors and the intentions of the interaction itself.
Specifically in the case of Southampton Health Commission, where we have 
characterised the decision making process as a hierarchical negotiating situation, we
will be looking for elements of decision making that fit into the framework of a
market based quasi-rationality (Culyer AJ, Maynard and A Posnett J 1990). This
implies we are expecting the authority to purchase a mixed ‘basket’ of contracts from
the providers of service, in order to satisfy the aims of the Commission introduced in 
chapter 8 and the acceptance of the purchasing plan by Wessex Regional Health
Authority.
11.4 The Output of the Analysis
The output of the analysis is to calculate the measure-sensitive weights applied to the 
various clues assembled in order to determine the factors applied in decision making. 
These must be of a format that can be input into the lens diagram.
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11.5 A Description of the Data Gathered
The data gathered represent categorical outcomes (present on purchasing plan, not 
present on purchasing plan) and the clues associated with each of the purchasing plan 
intentions. Both the clues and the decision arrived at are non-metric, There is only
one dependent variable - the purchasing intention. As the Commission had already 
debated the options in the first ranking exercise it was decided to add another variable
and the first ranking was included in the analysis set.
11.6 Plan of the Analysis
The analysis plan was based on chapter 4, 12 and 13 in Tabachnick and Fidell’s
textbook ‘Using Multivariate Statistics’ (Tabachnick B and Fidell L 1997). This
called for data cleaning and preparation, factor analysis and regression techniques in
order to maximise the value of the data collected.
11.6.1 Data Entry
Data was entered into a Paradox database (Paradox for Windows 1992). The data set
used is produced as appendix B
11.6.2. Data Cleaning Prior to Analysis
The data file was proof read against the data published in Priority Setting in Action
appendices A to F, (Honigsbaum F 1994). Overall the data had four missing variables,
namely the costs and rankings of two of the proposed options. The lack of costs for 
these two options led the Commission not to rank them. Missing variables were 
excluded from the analysis where it was appropriate. Means and standard deviations
of the continuous variables are produced Table 11.1.
TABLE 11.1 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF THE DATA SET
Factor N Minimum Maximum Mean Std Deviation
Cost 47 2.0 1900.0 230.479 441.865
Choice 49 .0 1.0 .347 .481
Community 49 .0 5000.0 224.490 770.965
Activity
Discretionary 49 .0 1.0 .327 .474
Funds
Equity 49 .0 1.0 .224 .422
Hospital 49 -200.0 1900.0 31.429 276.443
activity
Needs 49 .0 1.0 8.163E-02 .277
Political 49 .0 1.0 .306 .466
statement
Purchasing 49 .0 1.0 .327 .474
plan
Responsibility 49 .0 1.0 .490 .505
Utility 49 .0 3.0 1.673 .851
GP ranking 49 1.0 49.0 24.347 14.165
Local care 49 .0 1.0 .347 .481
Excess 49 .0 1.0 2.041E-02 .143
activity
First ranking 47 1.0 47.0 24.191 13.943
Waiting list 49 .0 1.0 .102 .306
Weighted act. 49 -60.0 1440.0 87.429 268.554
On inspection of the data none of the variables considered were thought to be outliers 
or spurious values.
11.6.3 Preparation of the Data for Analysis
I. Data linearity and normality
The assumption of linearity and normality in the data is important as it enables more 
accurate tests for collinearity and therefore a better description of the clue weights. 
Therefore the data set was assessed for normality and linearity. Homoelastisity was 
not assessed due to the complexity of the data and the problems associated with 
adjusting a large number of variables simultaneously (Sharma S 1996).
Normality was assessed using SPSS for windows version 8 using the Frequencies 
Subroutine. This calculates both skew and kurtosis and enables a visual inspection of
the data (SPSS 1996). The results are shown in Table 11.2.
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TABLE 11.2 THE ASSESSMENT OF NORMALITY OF THE DATA SET - SUMMARY DATA
Responses Skewness Kurtosis
clues Valid Not Valid
Statistic Std error Statistic Std error
Choice 49 ■ 0 .664 .340 -1.628 .668
Community 49 0 5.272 .340 31.709 .668
Activity
Cost 47 2 2.574 .347 6.238 .681
Discretionary 49 0 .763 .340 -1.479 .668
Funds
Equity 49 0 1.363 .340 -.151 .668
Hospital act 49 0 6.684 .340 46.101 .668
Needs 49 0 3.153 .340 8.280 .668
Political 49 0 .868 .340 -1.301 .668
Statement
Purchasing 49 0 .763 .340 -1.479 .668
plan
Responsibility 49 0 .042 .340 -2.085 .668
Utility 49 0 -.149 .340 -.513 .668
GP ranking 49 0 .053 .340 -1.138 .668
Local care 49 0 .664 .340 -1.628 .668
Excess act 49 0 7.000 .340 49.000 .668
First ranking 47 2 .020 .347 -1.219 .681
Waiting list 49 0 2.713 .340 5.588 .668
Weighted act. 49 0 4.098 .340 17.617 .668
2. Applied Transformations
On inspection of the data it was decided that the variables cost, weighted activity first 
ranking and personal responsibility had an unacceptable skew. A transformation was 
applied. Initially these variables were transformed using a log transformation. This 
improved the skew of the cost variable but did not affect the others. An inversion 
transformation was then applied to the data. This improved the weighted activity, but
did not affect the remaining variables. Therefore the transformed variables cost and
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weighted activity ware retained and no further transformations were applied.
3. Tests for Linearity
The ability of linear combinations of variables to reflect the importance of the factor
of variations requires that linearity of the variables be assessed. Linearity was
assessed using the linear diagnostics routine of SPSS. The variables were considered
sufficient linear to be included in the analysis - appendix C.
4. Tests for Collinearity
Tests for Collinearity were performed on the SPSS Linear diagnostics subroutine 
(SPSS 1996). Waiting time and Weighted activity were shown to have collinearity
coefficients greater than 30 and were excluded from the analysis. The results are
reproduced in appendix C. The waiting time and weighted activity variables were
excluded on the basis that the levels of collinearity observed would distort the final 
result and the factors had already been taken into account in assessing the other 
variables. Therefore the inclusion of these variables would lead to a spurious 
assessment of the strength of the relationship.
3. Results of Data Screening
After screening a data set was prepared of 15 variables, with two variables being 
transformed from the original. This data set is reproduced as appendix D.
315
11.7 The Analysis of the Data
The description of the multivariate analysis is in two parts. First is a description of the
underlying data structure. Second is the description of the relationship between the
factors and an assessment of the clue weights
11.7.1. The Selection of Methodology
The data that was used in the analysis is composed of both continuous and categorical
variable types. Therefore the data analysis selected must accommodate both data
types. As a result the description of the underlying data structure was performed using 
a principal component analysis.
The estimation of clue weights in most judgement analyses is achieved by the use of 
regression analysis. However, in the case of this analysis the judgement was a two
level categorical variable as the dependent variable and many of the clue distributions 
were non-normal. Therefore a logistic regression was used to calculate the clue
weights (Shanna S 1996).
11.7.2. The Analysis
A. The principal component analysis
The principal component analysis was performed on SPSS Factor Subroutine (SPSS
1996). The principal component analysis was selected, as the aim was to reduce the
number of variables to a meaningful number without a loss of information value. The
analysis was constructed such that the given value was greater than one (Cliff N
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1988). The appropriateness of the components extracted was confirmed using a scree 
plot (Cattell R.B. 1966) looking for the elbow in a plot of the given values against the 
number of components. In order to explain the resultant factor structure a quartimax
rotation was adopted.
The results reproduced in appendix C suggested that no underlying data patterns can
be observed and no simplification of the data is possible, as every significant factor
includes all of the factors available. This result also suggests that the functional form
of the interaction between the clues may be additive.
After this result it was decided to proceed with the regression analysis.
B. The estimation of clue weights - the logistic regression analysis.
A stepwise logistic regression analysis was performed on purchasing plan status as
outcome and the environmental clues. The analysis was performed using SPSS
logistic regression (SPSS 1996). The analysis was performed on the completed,
cleaned data set
1. Forward selection
The forward selection was done on a p>0.25 in accordance with the principles for
selection set by Hosmer (Hosmer DW and Lemeshow S 1989). This exercise selected
utility, GP ranking, equity, needs, community and excess activity, national priorities, 
discretionary funds, provider pressures, Commission pressure and local priorities as
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the likely factors. These factors were confirmed by re-running the analysis without the
factors and achieving a non-significant result, The results are reproduced in appendix
C. The results are in agreement with the findings of other studies of NHS decision 
making, (Health Committee 1995). Therefore no other factors were included.
2. Building the model
The model was built in LiMDeP by an inclusion strategy (LiMDeP 1997). An
inclusion strategy was used to maximise the number of factors involved (Hosmer DW
and Lemeshow S 1989) The results would suggest that only utility, GP ranking, local 
priority, Commission pressures and provider pressures have a significant role in 
decision making. The inclusion of other variables, either on statistical grounds or
previous history does not improve the model, the results are reproduced as appendix
E.
11.8 The Results of the Analysis
11.8.1. The Final Estimated Clue Weights.
The final estimated clue weights of the Judgement Analysis are based on the summary 
statistical output adapted from appendix C shown in Table 11.6.
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TABLE 11.6 THE SUMMARY CLUE WEIGHTS
Variable Coefficient S.E. T PROBABILITY
UTILITY -2.77 0.95 2.899 .004
GP RANKING -0.07 0.004 -1.788 .073
NATIONAL 1.38 1.11 . 1.239 .21
PRESSURE
LOCAL 2.63 1.39 1.888 .06
PRIORITY
COMMISSION 4.59 2.42 1.893 .06
PRESSURE
PROVIDER 3.57 1.97 1.807 .07
PRESSURE
B. Estimation of goodness of fit
This model correctly classifies 46 of the 49 options Table 11.7
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TABLE 11.7 THE GOODNESS OF FIT OF THE MODEL
Predicted
On Plan Off Plan
Actual On plan 14 2
Off plan 1 32
The maximum likelihood estimates are given in Table 11.8.





The outlying implementation options were identified as
1. Communication Services - on plan when the model predicted off. This change was
due to the pressure of the local medical officers and the providers
2. Maternity care and the provision of mixed ambulance crews - off plan when the
model has predicted on. This, as previously discussed was due to the providers not 
being ready to implement the changes - despite the fact that these bids were originally
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provider bids
In terms of the overall importance of the factors the highest weighting was given to
the Commission pressures, followed by provider pressures health benefit local
priority, and national pressure. Although GP ranking was significant in the model the
contribution made was minimal.
11.9. The Final Lens Model




FIGURE II.2 THE FINAL LENS MODEL
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11.9.1. The Validity of the Final Model
As no repeat exercise was included in the final analysis, it is not possible to estimate 
the consistency of the result directly. However the factors identified have been 
postulated as the factors driving decision making by other investigators and reviews 
of purchaser decision making (Ovretviet J 1995; Health Committee 1995; West R
1993).
11.9.2. The Achievement of the Final Model
The achievement of the final model in this experiment cannot be assessed
mathematically. For a mathematical assessment of a non-linear judgement model all
events are assumed to be conditionally independent - i.e. all of the events and
responses must be carried by the clues as presented to the judges, (Bjorkman M
1973). In the naturalistic design we have adopted this is clearly not the case and as
such no calculation of achievement as a score is possible. However, the model has a
high achievement of the ecological criteria applied as the final product of the exercise 
- the purchasing plan - was accepted by the Regional Health Authority as a reasonable
representation of purchasing intentions (Honigsbaum F 1994).
11.9.3. The Impact of the Ecology
As the estimations of the achievement cannot be estimated, an estimation of the




The analysis of the data produced from the Judgement Analysis exercise within 
purchasing dilemmas has indicated that the decision-makers involved in the exercise 
do respond to external influence in deciding the patterns of contracting. Furthermore 
this rationality reflects the ambiguous position of the Commission. This assertion is
supported by
1. The statistical analysis of the decision making process in the selection of
investments has demonstrated a high degree of residual variability, i.e. the factors
selected explain the reasons behind most of the choice.
2. The factors selected reflect the ambiguity of the institutions involved. For
example the selection of factors that value both the supply and demand of health
care and the Commissions valuation of its own internal factors.
The analysis has enabled the production of a lens model that allows the principle 
factors of decision making to be delineated. The model is acceptable on the basis that 
the output of the exercise, the purchasing plan, was accepted by the RHA. The results
of the analysis suggest that decisions about the implementation of contractual options
in the health authority are dominated by consideration of the effects on the
Commission itself and the demands by health care providers (although health benefit 
and local needs play a role). This result confirms the findings of the top-down 
analysis conducted earlier in this thesis, that decision making about service levels in
the reformed NHS is dominated by state-economy interactions. In the case of
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Southampton Health Commission this is manifest as the Commission provider 
relationship being dominant.
This is an important result for it highlights that although the factors influencing the 
development of an internal market are present as factors in decision making - such as
local need and benefit — these factors are secondary to the non-market factors of the 
providers and the Commission itself. This would suggest that the institutionalisation 
of the NHS had a major impact on the distribution of health care benefits. This result, 
while significant in itself, has a wider implication with respect to the failure of the 
reforms to achieve the expected gains and the imbalances in the institutions and
modes of accumulation that were documented earlier in the thesis. Therefore a wider
discussion is called for, one which encompasses the results of this exercise and the 
hypothesis of the thesis that a causal relationship exists between the imbalances and 
the failure to achieve aims. This is contained in the following chapter.
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Chapter 12 Conclusions of the case study and discussion on the overall 
Hypothesis
12.1 Key Points from the Thesis so far
Several conclusions can be drawn from the thesis.
I. There is a long-standing tripartite interaction that surrounds the NHS. This 
interaction can be analysed as an institutionalisation of state, economy and civil
society. This tripartite interaction has a rote in deciding distribution of health care
benefits and thereby acting to regulate market developments.
2 The institutional analysis of the tripartite relationship shows that the NHS was not
in balance pre-reform, as the state-economy relationship predominated. The
reforms of NHS reforms seen in 1990 did not influence this long-standing
institutional imbalance that surrounded the NHS. This is reflected as a dominance
of Commission and provider demands in decisions taken by Southampton Health
Commission.
3. The post reform NHS changed the structure of the service such that the reformed 
NHS no longer supported the mode of capital accumulation seen in the UK, in 
that the reforms promoted a service that was not sensitive to the needs of the
individual.
4. The NHS reforms failed in the aim to target services to at need groups - this was 
particularly evident in the case of elderly services and some specialities.
5. The reform of the NHS was assocaited with a number of ad hoc changes of policy 
during the implementation process. These ad hoc changes were administrative in 
nature and aimed to make the service managable and responsive to the political
325
needs. These adhoc changes can be attributed to the fact that policy was
formulated without involving the tripartite relationship and argues that the NHS
reforms seen in 1990 were not totally consistent from the organisational
perspective.
The way in which these conclusions have been reached is suggestive that these results
may be interlinked - as was indicated in the hypothesis introduced in chapter 1. As
yet no linkage has been established.
12.2 Objectives for this Chapter.
The objectives for this chapter are to explore the relationship between the five
conclusions drawn in section I2.l in a manner that looks to establish the causal
relationship that may exist between the elements of the hypothesis.
12.3 The Overall Hypothesis of the Thesis
The hypothesis underlying this thesis was introduced in chapter I, and is reproduced
below.
In the search for efficiency the NHS has undergone a series of ideologically motivated
reforms aimed at changing health care provision. These reforms, as they were 
ideologically motivated, have required ad hoc modifications in the face of problems 
that cannot be accounted for in the ideology. These ad hoc changes to the reform have 
been dominated by the organisations that are involved in the implementation of the
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reforms and so have led to the loss of consistency across the reform process such that 
the reforms fail to meet the objectives.
Establishing the validity of this hypothesis rested on proving a number of 
proposistions
1. Establishing the existence of a significant extra-policy, tripartite, interaction in
health care decision making and that an institutional analysis of the tripartite
interactions demonstrated a lack of balance in decision making. This was covered
in chapters 2 and 3
2. Demonstrating that the 1990 NHS reforms failed to deliver the expected
advantages in terms of targeting resources and improvements in efficiency.
3. Confinning that the reformed NHS failed to support the mode of capital
accumulation.
The results of chapters 4-7 demonstrated that propositions 2 and 3 can be upheld. This 
leaves two unproven propositions.
4. Can a causal link between propositions 1-3 be established? This causal 
relationship must demonstrate that the imbalance between the institutions of state, 
economy and civil society are the cause of the failure of the NHS to provide 
services to at need groups. This in turn must reflect why the NHS no longer 
supports the mode of accumulation - which in turn increases the institutional
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imbalance.
5. Can any causal link be explained as a result of the reforms being ideologically
motivated?
The answer to these questions lies in the results of the Judgement Analysis, conducted 
in chapters 8-11.
12.4 The Results of the Judgement Analysis and the Failure of the 1990 
Reforms to Deliver Expectations.
The principal criticisms of the NHS refonns in terms of failure to meet objectives 
were introduced in chapter 7. To recap these are
• Failure of competition
• A lack of provision in elderly care services
• A failure to protect community services in face of increasing demand
• A Lack sensitivity of contacting with regard to specialist services such as cardiac
surgery.
• A failure to develop labour flexibility.
• A failure to develop long term efficiency
• A failure to effect mortality or morbidity.
It is possible to explain the failure of the NHS reforms to meet these objectives based
on the findings of the judgement analysis exercise conducted in Southampton. Taking
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the bullet points in turn.
12.4.1. The Failure to Develop Competition.
The result would indicate that the elements of competition in are present in the 
decision making of the Commission; i.e. the demand of the local population and the 
supply of the providers influence decisions. However, the supply side in terms of the 
providers is a dominant factor of the decision making process, leading to the failure of
the market. In addition other non-market values such as the role of the Commission
support provider dominance. The decision making described in the judgement 
analysis exercise resembles the dual monopoly hypothesis suggested by Appleby
(Appleby J 1994) in which the failure to develop competition was attributed to the
presence of a monopoly on purchasing and supply. Therefore the results of the
Southampton exercise argue that the imbalance of power between the purchaser and 
provider with respect to the tripartite relationship is the major reason for the failure to 
develop competition.
12.4.2. The Failure to Protect and Enhance Services for the Elderly
There is no evidence that the implementation decision making process targets the 
elderly other than as part of the general decision making about service levels. This is 
despite the fact that the majority of service pressure in Southampton comes from the 
elderly community (Southampton Health Commission 1993). The failure to develop 
services for the elderly can in part be explained by the lack of specific proposals 
presented to the Commission by the providers, but also is caused by the Commission 
not providing incentives to attract them. Therefore the failure to develop elderly 
services can explained by the power of the provider - Commission relationship in a
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similar way to the failure to develop competition.
12.4.3. The Failure to Protect Community Care Services and Develop Specialist 
Services
The purchasing plan is overtly biased towards the acute general hospital services. This 
effect is due to the current performance management system that favours the acute 
providers. Therefore the failure to protect community services and develop specialist 
services can be explained on the basis of Commission - provider dominance in 
decision making - on this occasion supported by performance management. It is 
apparent that most of the Commission’s decisions were made in favour of the acute 
services and community services fared badly (Honigsbaum F 1994; Appleby J Little V 
1993). This result is confirmation of the Clinical Standards Advisory Group who, in 
1993 found that the contractual process was biased towards acute services (Clinical 
Standards Advisory Group 1993; Hadley TR and Goldman H 1995).
12.4.4. The Failure to Develop Labour Flexibility
It is apparent from the bids submitted by the providers that these organisations 
primary aim is to increase patient numbers. This is aim is also supported by the 
Commission seeking to purchase activity as part of its performance management role. 
In these circumstances it is hardly surprising that the purchasing plan did not focus on 
labour flexibility and once again demonstrates that the power of the providers - 
supported by the Commission - can explain the reason that the objective of promoting 
labour flexibility cannot be attained (Honigsbaum F 1994).
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12.4.5. The Failure to Develop Long-Term Efficiency.
It is difficult to assess the long-term efficiency of the implementation process
developed by the Commission for the reasons that were introduced above. However,
in terms of the delivery of an efficient health-care service three features stand out.
First is the low priority given to the local needs, second is the block purchasing of 
activity to fund performance management and finally is the use of annual planning 
cycles that do not permit disinvestments. In these circumstances the structure of the
implementation process seen in Southampton appears biased against long term
efficiency gains. As was previously introduced these barriers to efficiency can be 
explained on the basis of the strength of the Commission - provider relationship.
12.4.6 The Failure to Influence Morbidity and Mortality
The Commission - provider relationship led the decision making process to focus on
services not needs (Honnigsbaum F. 1994). In this circumstance it is not surprising the 
impact of change on the morbidity and mortality of the population was limited - 
except where these were considered to be a health problem or impacted on national 
figures. Therefore the strength of the Commission-provider relationship again lies
behind the failure to meet this objective.
12.4.7. Conclusions on the Interaction Between the Judgement Exercise and the 
Failure to Meet Objectives
It is evident from the results of the judgement analysis that the failure of the NHS
reforms to meet many of its clinical and economic objectives has a basis in the
influence that the Commission-provider relationship has on contractual decision
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making (Honigsbaum F 1994). However the other features of the reforms undoubtedly 
compound this effect. In particular the effects of the information imbalance and the
contracting currencies used undoubtedly act synergistically with the presence of
provider dominance and non-market values to further distort the decision making
process.
12.5 The Results of the Judgement Analysis Exercise and the 
Institutional Imbalance
The dominance of the Commission and providers in the decision making process
provides evidence that the reforms are not in tripartite balance - and confirms the
results of the top down institutional analysis conducted earlier. The judgement
analysis adds to this result by suggesting that this imbalance is not result of the reform
policy being unsuitable, but provides evidence that the imbalance results from the ad
hoc changes seen in the implementation process.
In the Judgement Analysis exercise the clue weights calculated for the local needs 
was far exceeded by the provider pressure (2.63 Vs 3.57 Table ll.lO). If a balance 
was to be achieved it is to be expected that these coefficients might be closer 
together. Yet the sum of the state led coefficients (national and Commission
pressures) and the economy and civil society pressures is roughly similar (6.07 and
6.2). This suggests that any imbalance is due to the influence of the state economy
interaction and any imbalance could potentially be corrected if civil society input was 
increased. It is possible to argue that this imbalance is not a true reflection on the lack 
of power of the patient as - based on the figures presented above - the system could be 
in balance if the providers act as an agent for the patient. However, other studies
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would argue against this being the case. In a review by Old and colleagues (Old P. 
1998), no correlation could be found between hospitalisation rates and local need. 
Indeed the hospitalisation rates had more to do with local history than need. Therefore 
it appears likely that the effect of the strength of the providers on the provision of 
services is likely to be a distortion, rather than a supplementation. This implies that 
the reflection of national imbalance in favour of the providers of services seen at a 
national level is reflected at a local level (Spiers J 1995), and supports, but does not
prove the proposition that the imbalance in the NHS reforms resulted from the
implementation process.
12.6 The Results of the Southampton Exercise and the Failure to 
Support the Mode of Capital Accumulation
As was discussed in Chapter 7 the reformed NHS doe not appear to support the mode 
of capital accumulation. This is evidenced by the degree of disparity between the
NHS services and the other welfare services such as housing and education, and the
lack of support for the changes in the labour market. These problems are also seen in
the implementation decision making process, where no proposals for increasing
flexibility of labour, or empowering of patients were deemed to be acceptable. The
reasons behind the failure to support the mode of accumulation appear to lie in the 
dominance of the Commission and providers. This dominance discourages flexibility
and leaves the power to decide over the services provided with the hospital and not
the patient, or their representatives the GPs.
w
12.7 The Causation and the Hypothesis
From the discussion above it is apparent that the failure of the NHS to provide 
services, the institutional imbalance and the failure of the NHS to support the mode of 
capital accumulation can - at least in part - be explained by the dominance of the 
Commission-provider relationship in the decisions made about the provision of 
services. Furthermore the results of the judgement analysis exercise appears to 
suggest that there is a causal linkage. Institutional imbalance leads to the failure to
supply needed services, as evidenced in Southampton by the lower rankings given to 
local priority and need, and the high priority to provider bids. The failure to provide
services leads to the lack of support for the current mode of capital accumulation, as
the services that promote individual responsibility, provide care for those most need 
and interface with the other dimensions of the welfare state - such as personal social 
services - are lacking. The failure to support the current mode of accumulation leads 
to further institutional imbalance - as the representation of the civil society is reduced 
due to the loss of the inter-relationship between wages and welfare is disturbed. This 
would suggest that the analysis of the Southampton Judgement exercise has indeed 
confirmed the thesis that the elements of the hypothesis are linked by the dominance 
of the Commission and providers in decision making. While this result confirms part 
of the hypothesis, it does not provide a link to the ad hoc changes seen in the
implementation process, and further analysis is needed.
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12.8 Explaining Commission-Provider Dominance
There are two possible causes for Commission -provider dominance in the reformed
NHS. Either health care is not amenable to market mechanisms and so the
Commission and providers act to maintain the supply of health care, or the market 
mechanisms applied to UK health care have developed in such a way that provider -
Commission dominance developed as a result of ad hoc change (Appleby J 1994).
The claim that health care is not suitable for market management will be examined
first. It is claimed that health care is so special and the objectives so vague that the
use of a market to ensure the efficient delivery of services could not work, and hence
led to an imbalance of power (Barry N 1994). There is certainly some evidence for
this claim - particularly in some medical specialities (Clinical Standards Advisory
Group 1993). This finding is borne out in the Judgement Analysis exercise, where a
considerable amount of the emphasis was placed on non-market factors such as the
values of the Commission and the national pressures. The appearance of these non­
market values in the decision making process appeared to arise as a result of the
institutional ambiguity surrounding the Commission in its role as both purchaser of a
limited range care and regulator of achievement (Appleby J 1994). In managing this
ambiguity the providers have the upper hand. As discussed in chapters 6 and 7 the
Commission has to rely on the providers delivering the efficiency gains required by
the Department of Health. Furthermore the flexibility of the Commission is reduced
by the capital charges and contracting schemes that prevent the Commission from
withdrawing contracts from providers at full price without encountering a penalty on
other contracts (West P 1998). These facts would argue that at least part of the reason
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for provider dominance lies in the organisational ambiguity that surrounds the NHS
reforms. As was discussed earlier in chapters 4-7 this organisational ambiguity is a
necessary feature of the function of the Commission in that it allows the development 
of services in face of uncertain economic conditions. The problem with the ambiguity
generated in the 1990 reforms is that it has not been managed - leading in part to
provider dominance.
However, the findings of the Southampton exercise would indicate that the non­
market nature of health care cannot be the only reason why the provider -
Commission values dominated. The judgement analysis demonstrated that the 
elements of market based decision making exist within the process of deciding 
contracts (Appleby J 1994). Instead some of the reason behind provider - Commission 
domination must lie in the way in which the market was constructed and how political
and organisational pressures shaped the workings of the market.
In looking at the results of the Judgement Analysis exercise it is apparent that the
balance is in favour of the supply side with the heavy emphasis being placed on
provider bids. The reasons behind provider domination in market based decision
making in the refonned NHS are not hard to find. As was covered in chapter 6, 
purchaser development has been deliberately slowed and changed in order for the
providers of service to develop. This, taken together with other measures such as the 
development of the Patient’s Charter, as considerably increased the market power of
the providers (Laing AW Shiroyama C 1995). The advanced development of 
providers of care was important for political reasons, for as we discussed in chapter 6,
one of the major benefits to some sections of the medical profession was the return to
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the autonomy of teaching hospital status, while maintaining the continuity of the 
NHS. Therefore the slowing of purchaser development has a political and 
administrative aims. However - as was discussed in chapter 7 - the long-term effects 
of such changes to the market were not considered (Ham C 1994; Spiers J 1995).
Taken together the reasons that underlie provider - Commission dominance in
Southampton appears to have resulted from a combination of political strategy, 
organisational ambiguity and ad hoc changes made to policy in order to make an
ideologically driven reform work.
12.9 Conclusions of the Analysis and the Hypothesis
The last section has demonstrated that the provider dominance (that underlines the 
institutional imbalance, the failure to support the dominant mode of capital 
accumulation and failure to provide services that protect vulnerable groups) arises
both from a failing of market mechanisms and the failure to select and enforce market
models. These failures have been enhanced by the overt politicisation of health-care 
markets in the UK (Spiers J 1995). Underlying these failures have been organisational 
ambiguity, open ended political strategy and the failure to develop a coherent strategy 
towards the NHS, which has allowed ad hoc changes to the implementation of policy
initiatives and the continuation of the institutional imbalance seen since the
foundation of the NHS. This is almost certainly an unintended action. The Thatcher
administration did not intend to create a provider dominated market, indeed the
providers were a target for reform (Thatcher M 1993).
Taken together the findings of the review and the analysis of the judgements made at
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Southampton imply that the hypothesis we posed in chapter one and reiterated above 
is proven. Therefore, the results of this thesis have shown that health care provision is 
institutionalised within a tripartite relationship. This relationship has a significant
effect on the distribution of health care benefits, and that no real change can be
achieved in the NHS without the development of a coherent strategy involving all the 
organisations involved in the tripartite interactions. The lack of a coherent strategy as 
part of the 1990 reforms acted to skew benefits away from groups of citizens that 
would benefit most for example the elderly, provided a barrier to efficiency and 
reduced the effect of the NHS as a regulator of capitalism.
12.10 Conclusions
The finding that health care policy that does not accommodate the tripartite
interaction that surrounds the NHS leads to a failure of the reform process uncovers a
paradox in policy making. Ad hoc changes as a part of the tripartite interaction are
necessary if the NHS is to be sufficiently flexible to accommodate the changing
economic and social picture in the UK. Yet reform of the service is not possible
unless ad hoc change is managed. This paradox appears to be the result of the
introduction of market based reforms into the health care system. For example in the
Health Care Maintenance (HMO) system in the United States, similar conclusions are
being reached with regard to the distribution of benefits. In a study conducted by
Ware it was found that the elderly in HMO had significantly poorer outcomes and
benefits compared to those in Fee for Service (FFS) systems (Ware JE, Bayliss MS,
Rodgers WH, Kosinski M and Tarlov AR 1996). In this study it was remarked that
the institutionalisation of care in HMO was inherently biased against the elderly.
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The conclusions of this thesis are also confirmed by Teulings and Hartog (Teulings C
and Hartog J 1998). In a review based in the labour market these authors found that
the benefits of the wage negotiations process were dependent on the way that the 
market was institutionalised. This institutionalisation, in their experience was a 
product of the historical background of the interacting organisations, and society 
norms. The institutionalisation in the authors experience proved resistant to change
and very stable. The authors also found that in countries with a history of competitive,
decentralised labour markets, the resulting distribution of wage benefits was subject
to undue influence by the economy such that an inefficient distribution of wages
resulted. This effect appeared to be due to the extraction of rents, and rent seeking
behaviour. The degree of rent seeking behaviour also appeared to have an effect on
the stability of the economic system, with countries associated with high rent seeking
activity having only short term economic stability, and repeated crises requiring
central intervention (Teulings C and Hartog J 1998). This is a scenario mirrored in the
NHS. While this thesis has not demonstrated rent seeking activity plays a role in the
decision making process of Southampton Health Authority, (the research was not
designed to investigate the existence of rent seeking) rent-seeking activity has been
described in the post reform NHS decision making process. In reviews of contractual
arrangements for the NHS the diversion of resources to more profitable areas has
been described (Clinical Standards Advisory Group 1993). The diversion of resources
has also been described in the setting of GP Fundholding budgets (HFMA 1994;
Stewart-Brown S Surender S Bradlow L Coulter A Doll H 1995). These studies are
suggestive that rent seeking behaviour does indeed occur in the NHS - although
measuring it would require other exercises. However, if the results of these studies are
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similar to what has been described in other areas it is likely that the mechanism by 
which provider-Commission dominance will be expressed is rent seeking behaviour.
The conclusions reached in this thesis imply that policy making should not be 
performed by the state alone. This is a conclusion reached in reviews of other 
organisational changes - where the modes of implementation have had a significant 
impact on the outcome (Elenore RE 1998). Instead policy making for the NHS 
requires a far broader remit than previously considered and requires interaction of the 
State, economy and Civil Society. This result in many ways runs counter to the
prevailing logic of policy making, which is to look to market solutions. However, the 
research covering the role of tripartite decision making in areas of social policy 
implies that the solutions reached can have greater efficiency than market solutions
alone, (Teulings C and Hartog J 1998). If true this has profound implication for the
NHS reforms of the future. This is the subject of the concluding chapter of this thesis.
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Chapter 13. The Impact of the Research on the Future of the NHS
13.1 Overview from the Previous Chapters
The previous chapters concluded that throughout the history of the NHS the
organisation can be analysed as an institutionalisation of services bounded by the state
the economy and civil society. The analysis suggests that the power structure within
this institution has never achieved a balance, even after the recent reforms. As a result
the NHS has frequently failed to achieve its aims and has repeatedly required changes
to its structure. The institutional imbalance that surrounds the NHS after the 1990
reforms is reflected as a dominance of purchaser and provider priorities in decision
making. This situation has arisen because the tripartite relationship and the regulator}'
function of the NHS have not been taken into account in the development of new
policy initiatives. As a result social policy with regard to the NHS has not been
consistent in taking account of all of the possible outcomes of change and ad hoc
changes have allowed the providers to gain dominance..
13.2 Objectives for the Current Chapter
The aims for the current chapter are to review the 1997 NHS reforms in the light of
the results of this thesis.
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13.3 The Current Round of NHS Reforms
In May 1997 the Labour Party won the General Election and ousted a Conservative 
Government that had been in power since 1979. The Labour Government, under 
Prime Minister Tony Blair, is ideologically committed to economic stabilisation 
policies and supply side reform as a way of ensuring the prosperity of the country 
(Brivati B and Bale T 1997). The Labour Government has pledged to achieve the aims
of stabilising the UK economy by the greater involvement of the public in the
governing of the country, together with a tight control on government expenditure.
Accordingly the new government has insisted that there is no new money available for
the welfare services unless significant efficiency gains can be made, and the public
are involved to a greater degree in the running of the services (Ellison N 1997). The
government believes that both of these objectives can be achieved by changes within
the management system in the NHS; the market structure, inherited from the
Conservative administration, being seen both as a barrier to public involvement and
resource intensive (Lee-Potter J 1998). Therefore, government has pledged to
dismantle the GP Fundholder and general management system in the NEIS (Baker M
1998).
The basis for the Labour Government’s social reform programme is the report of the 
Commission for Social Justice (CSJ). The CSJ was a Commission funded by the
Labour Party in 1990 to look at how equality may be achieved in British society. The
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conclusions of the CSJ report made a commitment to establish social justice as a
hierarchy of four ideas (Social Justice 1994).
1. Equal worth for all citizens
2. Food, income, shelter and health care are basic rights to all citizens and should be
provided by the state.
3. Equal opportunity to gain access to life’s opportunities should be guaranteed by the
state as a right to all citizens.
4. Reducing inequality should be the primary goal of state action.
The Labour Government has equated the recommendations of the CSJ to a policy of 
fair taxation, full employment or training, long-term investment in people and the 
establishment of a basic set of citizens rights (Ellison N 1997). This shift brings 
Labour policies closer to the ideal of a Schumpeterian social state, with emphasis on 
the empowerment of the individual matched by state power. In effect this implies a 
workfare state, with people encouraged to make the transfer from welfare to work 
assisted by housing, education and health care policies. Here the State is enabling
rather than paternalistic. The approach is marked by a civic duty to look for work
where this is available rather than having a right of access to welfare until suitable
work becomes available. By adopting the CSJ position the Labour Party has taken a 
step away from welfare collectivism, to a state which supports the action of the
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individuals backed by strong state intervention to ensure change (Ellison N 1997).
This vision has been applied to health care. Tony Blair has termed the concept of the
‘One Nation NHS’ to encapsulate the ideas of the CSJ into the modern health care 
service (Baker M 1998). In a speech given in 1996 he asserted a vision of an NHS 
giving a hand-up, not a hand out, to the public; a vision of an NHS seen to be patient 
centred and technology driven, (Blair T 1996). Labour has pledged to achieve this by
creating a Minister for Public Health, with the role of co-ordinating Whitehall 
departments to'improve population health and reduce inequality (Baker M 1998).
However, the state expects that the beneficiaries of care - the citizens - will in return
look after their health. Therefore the one nation NHS will have a focus on prevention 
as well as the achievement of targets such as the Health of the Nation (Department of 
Health 1998)
The One Nation NHS will continue to be founded on taxation and provide a universal
service to those that need it, but within this framework considerable reductions in red
tape are suggested as a means to increase the expenditure on patients. A key target for 
this is the removal of the internal market with a system based on co-operation. Central 
to this change is the development of long-term agreements between providers and 
Commissioners of care. The purchaser side is seen as essential to promoting an 
efficient service, however it is recognised that it needs to be made more sensitive to
the requirements of patients if the ideal of the one nation NHS is to be realised (Baker
M 1998; Department of Health 1998).
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Like previous reforms, however, the changes in the NHS will build on existing 
structures. In designing a replacement for the NHS market the purchaser provider split 
will not be removed. Nor is new Labour committed to a strategy of equality as was 
seen in the 1948 Consensus (Baker M 1998). The Labour Government is committed 
to spend what it can afford where it can afford to spend it. Therefore the sort of 
selectivity seen in the welfare services since 1989 looks set to continue with NHS 
expenditure being targeted on those most in need (Baker M 1998; Department of 
Health 1998).
Tn looking to re-balance the NHS the government has signalled a shift of power 
towards the GP’s as the purchasers of care for their populations, the system being co­
ordinated by the District Health Authorities. These ideas were laid out in a series of
white papers (Baker M 1998). These give a commitment to reorganise the NHS
around the individual by focusing on primary care. These papers stress
• The role of public health professionals to determine at need populations,
• The strategic planning of health care for at need populations
• The activities of the NHS as an enabler of health via the use of suitable
preventative services and health care delivery.
The changes are based on two themes
1. The use of technology.
Technology is seen as the glue pulling together the practice of medicine and its
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management. The Labour Party envisions that the One-nation NHS will make greater 
use of technology both in systems and medical management (Department of Health
1998).
2. The development of primary care groups.
Primary care groups, as the name suggests are primary care organisations responsible
for commissioning health services for the local population (Baker M 1998). It is
envisioned that they will function by managing a global budget for hospital services
prescriptions and community services. It is also the responsibility of the primary care
groups to ensure that practice is evidence based and conforms to current standards of
medical practice - this latter aspect is termed clinical governance. These primary care
groups will be self-regulating, with a nominal line to the District Health Authorities. It
is planned that these primary care groups will form around natural geographic
boundaries, and serve about 100,000 individuals (Department of Health 1998). The
primary care groups are to be governed by representatives of primary care, social
services and community care services. Discussions about the role of public health
expertise, DHA representatives and the public are yet to be held, and so no role is
currently defined for these stakeholders (Baker M 1998).
Although this is the overall arrangement there are significant differences between
England, Scotland, Northern Ireland and Wales. In Scotland the focus is for
independent groups reporting to a single authority. In Northern Ireland and Wales the
groups will report to the regional offices, and then to the local assemblies once
created (Department of Health 1998).
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13.4 The Expected Impact of Change and the Results from 
Southampton.
Although the final structure of the One Nation NHS is unclear the expectations for the
effects of the reform are not. The reforms are expected to have an impact on health 
care provision and the organisation of the NHS. However, both of these expectations 
are subject to the post-policy modifications that we have seen take place previous
reforms.
13.4.1 Health-care Delivery Change
The objective of the proposed primary care groups is that they will encourage a
patient focus element in health care (Department of Health 1998). This will have the
effect of balancing the state economy relationships, but will the proposals achieve this
alone?
The lessons from the Southampton exercise are valuable in this aspect. In the results
from chapter 10 the list of GP priorities from the investment list were presented and
the top twenty priorities are reproduced below, together with the final purchasing plan
Table 13.1 and 13.2 (Honigsbaum F 1994).
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TABLE 13.1 GP RANKINGS FROM THE PURCHASING DILEMMAS EXERCISE
Waiting List
Trauma centres


























































There are some remarkable similarities between the two lists. Of particular interest is 
the focus on waiting times, community mental health and the Health of the Nation
targets. This would argue that in the current circumstances the decisions made by the 
General Practitioners would have the same effect as the decisions currently being 
made by the District Health Authority. In this the GP’s would not specifically target at 
need populations nor promote efficiency. This finding was re-enforced in a study of
general practitioners conducted by Norwich Union where these factors were 
identified as key in decision making (Norwich Union 1995).
The potential for GP led services not to target those most in need has been recognised 
by the government (Baker M 1998) and so several initiatives have been proposed.
First the government intends to create a situation where the District Health
Authorities are responsible for directing care to target groups - so called health
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improvement zones. GPs will be required to demonstrate a commitment to these 
zones and support the health authority initiatives (Department of Health 1998). 
However, as we saw from the Judgement Analysis in chapter 11 the decisions made 
by a health authority were influenced by the provider demands and the decision 
making environment. Therefore, unless the provider influence in the health authorities 
is diminished, the improvement zones will be provider led and unlikely to have much
effect. It has already been noted that the government reforms have not given any
indication of reform of the providers of care (Baker M 1998).
The second initiative by the government is to increase the focus of the General
Practitioners onto the needs of the patient by the introduction of Evidence Based
Medicine (EBM). The practice of EBM relies on the existence of evidence to suggest
that the patient will benefit before treatment is dispensed. Evidence in EBM is 
interpreted as a hierarchy of experience, with randomised clinical trials as the highest
fonn of evidence, and anecdotal forms as the lowest (Muir-Gray JA 1997;
Department of Health 1998). The hope is that by introducing EBM is that the GP’s 
and other health care providers will become the patient’s agent.
However, the approaches used in EBM cannot enable the GP to become the patient’s 
agent alone. Many of the treatments currently being used have not been subjected to
trials and there are no guarantees that what is seen in research will be reflected in
practice (Muir-Gray JA 1997). In addition the conduct of trials is very expensive. This
has two effects. First the trials are, by and large, under the control of the large bodies
that can afford to sponsor them. This implies that the generation of future information
may have a commercial bias (Muir-Gray JA 1997). Second under current 
methodologies trials can be best conducted in well-specified areas with large numbers
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of patients. This implies again that trials into less specific areas - like old age - will 
not be conducted (Elwood M 1998). Therefore the potential is that EBM may further
enhance inequalities in health care.
13.4.2 Organisational Change
It is part of the Labour Party strategy to move health-care out of the political arena 
and into the civil society. This is a strategy seen in other Labour initiatives such as
economic control where monetary policy is under the control of the Bank of England
(Brivati B Bale T 1997). There are several initiatives underway. One example is the
National Institute for Clinical Effectiveness (NICE). NICE is an attempt to weaken
the political implications for priority setting in the NHS (Baker M 1998).
13.4.3 Concerns About Reform.
The moves to shift priority setting in health care out of the political arena, coupled
with the emphasis on patient power have led to some concerns.
1. The changes have been viewed by some political analysts to be contingent on the
government achieving its economic and social goals. This approach, it is argued,
is inherently risky for the NHS as an organisation, as any failure to achieve these
goals would leave the NHS bearing the brunt of any shortfall as the funds for
change dry-up (Ellison N 1997).
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2. Some commentators have suggested that the political forces at work have 
influenced the shape of the changes. They quote the differences seen between the
Scottish, English and Welsh Primary Care groups as an example, where the
political potential for self-rule may have altered the provision of health care (Baker
M 1998). The concern is that the outcome of changes under these circumstances
may be unpredictable and undesirable - in a similar fashion to the outcomes of the
Conservative government reforms. It is possible that reforms may lead to some 
unusual alliances of political and social elements that could damage the integrity
of the service (Ellison N 1997).
In addition to these economic and political opinions there are concerns that the
empowerment of the individual may lead to the end of welfare services in the UK.
This arises from the hypothesis that the growth of consumerism may lead those 
individuals who are ‘better off resenting the payment of a collective service and to 
the placing of pressure on the political powers to allow the wealthy to opt out. In 
effect this would further the development of a two-tier society, and leave the NHS 
under-funded for the remainder of the population who cannot afford private care 
(Ellison N 1997).
13.4.4 The Wider Picture
The potential problems reflected in the proposed changes to the NHS under the 
Labour Party are part of a much wider picture. Elenore, in a review of implementation 
policy, has commented that the current proposed organisational changes for the NHS
have been constructed without the overall outcomes of policy and the coherent action
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of the ‘Street Level’ implementers being examined (Elenore RE 1998). This suggests 
- on the basis of the findings in this thesis - that the reforms will not lead to the
resolution of the problems within the NHS. Therefore is there a way to implement 
health care policy that does not result in an unbalanced health care system?
13.5 The Applications of the Results of this Thesis to the Development 
of Solutions to the Organisation and Management of Public Sector 
Services
The results of this thesis would argue that the only way to restore the balance in the
NHS to increase the role of the civil society in the organisation and management of
the service. There are three possible scenarios that could achieve this (Hughes G,
Clarke J, Lewis G and Mooney G 1998).
1. The transfer of power from the purchasers and providers of services to the patients 
themselves - a citizen based approach
2. A decrease in the power of the providers and purchasers with a transfer to the
community.
3. An increase in patient power at the centre - leading to patient focussed national
directives - a strategy based on re-inventing the public sphere of management
In the face of the problems of policy implementation some analysts have argued that
the only way to achieve a balanced health care system, that is efficient and not a
burden on the taxpayer, is the creation of independent health care services i.e. the
citizen-based approach. These services should be funded through the use of insurance
schemes and a corresponding safety net to assist in those that cannot afford insurance
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(Barry N 1994). Indeed there are some suggestions from the current government that a 
move to a fonn of social insurance is desirable for these very reasons (Baker M 1998). 
However, as we have already covered in this thesis the use of market and free 
enterprise cultures in social problems does not always lead to either efficient or 
equitable solutions (Teulings C and Hartog J 1998). It is not surprising, therefore, 
that the introduction of insurance based health care is viewed by many with a degree
of caution, but given the circumstances what is the alternative?
Given the current and historical levels of investment in the provider organisations any 
transfer of power to patients and the community for the provision of services appears
unlikely, and historically this has not been achieved (Enoch Powell 1966). However,
without provider reform the environment of decision making within the NHS would 
argue that achieving a balance of state, economy and civil society is not possible at a 
local level (Hoggett P 1997). Furthermore, the concerns about individual 
empowerment being potentially damaging to the welfare state implies that the 
empowerment of patients at a local level is not desirable (Ellison N 1997). These 
arguments augur for patient empowerment at a policy making and implementation
level - i.e. the creation of a new consensus and tripartite relationship and a 
reinvention of public management (Goold SW 1996). This implies under current
structures that the patient empowerment should occur at the level of advice to the 
Ministry of Health and its outposts. However, as we have seen the inequity of services 
is not due to simply having a voice, it is also due to the ‘lack of interest’ on behalf of 
providers. The lack of interest by providers implies that there is considerable risk that 
if the elderly were to be directly empowered funds may be diverted away. Instead this 
argues for a constitutional right rather than an economic right to care in conjunction
354
with the central voice (Goold SW 1996). This is a new direction for public 
management in the UK, but common with many of our European neighbours.
Across Europe a common form of health care provision is emerging. A prototypic 
health care system in Europe now has the separation of purchaser and provider roles,
with the funding for the system being paid into a central fund, discrete from other 
welfare funds. Additional payments are made either in the form of copayments by the
patient or as supplemental premiums into an insurance fund (Hoffmayer UK and 
McCarthy TR 1994). The movement to this hypothecated form of funding is also
marked by a greater definition of the availability of care and what care is available,
either by the use of limited treatment lists, or by restricting the reimbursement of
treatments.
An example of how this model is being implemented within Europe is Gennany
(Hoffmayer UK and McCarthy TR 1994). Under the original German health care
system funds were fragmented - there were over 650 Sickness Funds. Citizens were
free to join most of these. These sickness funds reimbursed whatever the patient and
the Doctor demanded. In the reformed system there are fewer than 650 funds, and
there is now a fixed reimbursement list, from which patients may add to by paying 
insurance or payment out of their own funds. Similar reforms are taking place in
France, Holland and other European countries (Ham C, Robinson R and Benzeval M).
The fundamental change that underlies the health care reform process in Germany is
the creation of patient empowerment (Ginsberg N 1992). This is achieved by
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1. The separation of funds - an indirect empowerment as the funds must continue to
. serve the interest of the members
2. In most Sickness Funds patient interest groups sit on the board of the funds
(Hoffmayer UK and McCarthy TR 1994).
These approaches permit the development of social medicine to continue, without 
creating resentment that the better off are over supporting the system. The success of
these reforms has been mixed. In Germany the massive budget problems have been
reduced standards have not fallen (Ham C, Robinson R and Benzeval M). However at
this stage it is difficult to assess the impact of individual empowerment on the system.
In the UK in the short-term it is unlikely that a change involving a shift to 
independent, centralised funds, and increasing copayments is acceptable (Rivett G 
1998). Indeed the applicability of such a change is doubtful. The Sickness Funds in 
most European countries developed from the friendly societies that were a feature of 
nineteenth century health care in the UK. Therefore, the UK system has had a 
different evolutionary path. However from the results of the thesis, and the 
developments in Germany, it is necessary to consider the use of patient empowerment 
to change the environment of NHS decision making. In looking at the UK system
similar change to the German patient empowerment could be obtained by
I. Creating a centralised fund for health care, and exempting it from the
parliamentary votes system. This would involve a shift to hypothecated taxation.
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2. Creating an independent Ministry of Health as a 'next steps' agency to ensure the 
independence of health care provision and prevent the use of health care resources for 
political and economic purposes.
3. The creation of a reimbursement strategy for UK health care - defining the basic
rights to care for the individual.
4. The creation of an independent body, similar in operation to the law Commission 
to advise the Ministry of Health on the changes in the system. This Health 
Commission to be made up of representatives of the civil society, the economy and
state.
In this manner decision making in the NHS can be changed to ensure more of an 
influence of patients and individuals on the running of the service and ensure a 
balanced NHS, without developing a potentially damaging citizen based approach to
health care.
13.6 Conclusions
The NHS has been, and will continue to be, a cornerstone of welfare in the UK.
However its foundation on a Consensus based on the family and manual labour in no
longer tenable. It has been the trend to abandon this Consensus and tripartite 
relationship of the state economy and civil society and move to a market based 
distribution of health care benefits. This trend may not be the most efficient way to 
deliver care, however, and may result in a provider led service - which fails to
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support the economic aims of the government or deliver care to those most in need. In 
order to reverse this trend a new consensus is required in UK health-care - where an 
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Appendix A The results of the Stakeholder Analysis
Appendix F Stakeholder consultation results
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Key
Utility - Utility of care in terms of Health benefit - see chapter 9
Fr = first ranking
GP - GP ranking
Purchasi - presence or absence on the purchasing plan - the dependant variable 
Equity - a commission value see chapter 9 
Choice - a commission value see chapter 9
Responsib - personal responsibility a commission value see chapter 9 
Waiting - impact on the waiting list in Southampton 
Lc - access to local care
Hospital - increasing hospital activity
Community Increasing community activity
Needs -identified local health need - a commission value see chapter 9 
Discress - access to discretionary funds - either from region or copurchasers 
Provider - provider submitted bid
Commission - commission submitted bid
Cost - cost to the commission
Ea - extra activity purchased
Weighted - activity gained according to the efficiency index
Co2 - the transformed cost variable
National - national priority
Lp local priority











































a. All requested variables entered.
b. Dependent Variable: Purchasing plan
Model Summary







1 "'".794a .630 .369 --------- :w
a. Predictors: (Constant). WEIGT2, EQUITY, WAITING, PROVIDER, UTILITY, Gp ranking, Discrossionary funds,
NATIONAL, Hospital activity, CHOICE, Local care, NEEDS, Community activity, local straegy, CO2, Responibility, First 



















a. Predictors: (Constant), WEIGT2, EQUITY, WAITING, PROVIDER, UTILITY, Gp ranking, Discressionary funds, 
NATIONAL, Hospital activity, CHOICE, Local care, NEEDS, Community activity, local straegy, CO2, Responibility, First 
ranking, Commission, Excess act












B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIFi Oonsiang -.494 .451 -1.096 '.253 •* —x-----—
CHOICE -1.14E-02 .198 -.011 --.058 .954 .350 2.853
CO2 .148 .208 .225 .709 .484 .136 7.357
Commission .318 .319 .318 .995 .328 .134 7.440
Community
activity 5.911E-05 .000 .097 .501 .620 .366 2.733
Discressionary
funds 2.909E-02 .155 .028 .188 .852 .616 1.622
Excess act -.237 3.325 -.072 -.071 .944 .013 74.793
EQUITY .174 .203 .155 .857 .399 .417 2.396
First ranking -8.23E-04 .011 -.024 -.075 .941 .134 7.463
Gp ranking -5.97E-03 .006 -.177 -1.035 .310 .466 2.145
Hospital activity 2.834E-04 .002 .167 .169 .867 .014 71.500
Local care -.205 .178 -.205 -1.152 .259 .433 2.310
local straegy .169 .187 .178 .904 .374 .352 2.841
NATIONAL 7.993E-02 .174 .083 .458 .650 .420 2.379
NEEDS .381 .262 .269 1.455 .157 .402 2.488
PROVIDER .199 .291 .206 .682 .501 .151 6.630
Responibility -.246 .208 -.260 -1.184 .247 .284 3.520
UTILITY .200 .139 .348 1.439 .162 .234 4.264
WAITING -.245 .347 -.144 -.706 .486 .329 3.043
WEIGT2 .124 .169 .119 .735 .469 .523 1.911










































































1 1 .00 .00 .00 .......... .00 .. .06 W
2 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00
3 .00 .01 .00 .00 .03 .00
4 .00 .00 .00 .00 .05 .03
5 .00 .01 .00 .00 .01 .00
6 .00 .02 .00 .00 .02 .14
7 .00 .07 .00 .00 .00 .09
8 .00 .00 .00 .00 .13 .09
9 .00 .09 .00 .00 • 07 .16
10 .00 .01 .00 .00 .03 .10
11 .00 .22 .00 .01 .11 .06
12 .00 .05 .00 .00 .13 .14
13 .00 .00 .00 .00 .04 .00
14 .00 .00 .00 .02 .01 .05
15 .00 .05 .01 .01 . .00 .00
16 .01 .17 .06 .02 .19 .02
17 .04 .13 .00 .60 .02 .00
18 .11 .07 .44 .07 .00 .03
19 .78 .03 .05 .25 .04 .02














straegy1 1 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 " .00 W
2 - .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .ob .00
3 .00 .03 .00 .00 .00 .03 .00
4 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .01
5 .00 .04 .00 .00 .00 .00 .01
6 .00 .03 .00 .00 .00 .01 .03
7 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00
8 .00 .09 .00 .00 .00 .08 .01
9 .00 .10 .00 .00 ■ .00 .25 .03
10 .00 .21 .00 .04 .00 .01 .00
11 .00 .02 .01 .03 .00 .05 .04
12 .00 .02 .01 .02 .00 .22 .15
13 .00 .02 .01 .06 .00 .00 .15
14 .00 .02 .04 .01 .00 .01 .08
15 .00 .16 .02 .32 .00 .00 .19
16 .00 .04 .01 .03 .00 .13 .03
17 .01 .02 .00 .32 .00 .15 .04
18 .06 .07 .25 .02 .08 .00 .00
19 .00 .07 .34 .01 .00 .01 .01






NATIONAL NEEDS PROVIDER Responibility UTILITY WAITING WEIGT21 .00 .00 .06 .60 .00 • .00
2 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 " .02 .00
3 .00' .00 .00 .01 .00 .00 .00
i 4 .00 .02 .01 .00 .00 .01 .01
5 .02 .14 .01 .00 .00 .00 .00
6 .00 .00 .00 .01 .00 .07 .00
7 .01 .05 .00 .01 .00 .13 .00
8 .04 .12 .01 .01 .00 .01 .00
9 .01 .00 .00 . .00 .00 .00 .00
10 .07 .02 .00 .11 .01 .05 .02
11 .00 .07 .03 .00 .00 .15 .01
12 .07 .02 .00 .03 .02 .01 .04
13 .00 .01 .01 .03 .00 .06 .32
14 .13 .11 .05 .03 .05 .00 .12
15 .31 .00 .00 .05 .01 .04 .02
16 .20 .10 .13 .54 .21 .10 .00
17 .02 .04 .40 .11 .00 .10 .33
18 .00 .04 .08 .00 .10 .00 .04
19 .02 .18 .26 .05 .55 .17 .04
20 .10 .07 .00 .02 .05 .08 .03













Excess act 1.000 .901
EQUITY 1.000 .701
First ranking 1.000 .813
Gp ranking 1.000 .547
Hospital activity 1.000 .897
Local care 1.000 .625





















1 3.652 20.290 20.290 ------- TW 20.290 20.290
2 3.215 17.860 38.151 3.215 17.860 38.151
3 2.535 14.081 52.231 2.535 14.081 52.231
4 1.750 9.721 61.952 1.750 9.721 61.952
5 1.487 8.262 70.214 1.487 8.262 70.214
6 .982 5.457 75.671
7 .726 4.031 79.702
8 .692 3.842 83.544
9 .602 3.347 86.890
10 .597 3.318 90.208
11 .490 2.720 92.928
12 .366 2.034 94.963
13 .330 1.832 96.795
14 .284 1.578 98.373
15 .143 .795 99.168
16 8.196E-02 .455 99.623
17 6.107E-02 .339 99.962










1 2.919 16.214 16.214
2 2.849 15.826 32.040
3 2.708 15.043 47.084
















Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
Component Matrix3
Component
1 2 3 4 5
CHOICE .541 "7.15E-62 .491 --------rrsr- .375
CO2 .722 .325 .157 -.206 .310
Commission -.498 .696 .186 -.277 -2.90E-02
Community
activity .393 .242 .615 -.138 -.153
Discressionary
funds .117 .327 .326 .404 -.403
Excess act .319 .638 -.452 .433 2.653E-02
EQUITY -.531 8.687E-02 3.819E-02 8.848E-02 .634
First ranking .715 .220 -.139 -.424 .235
Gp ranking -.517 -.257 -.312 -.306 -.147
Hospital activity .307 .591 -.514 .434 3.044E-02
Local care .556 -.223 .411 -1.92E-04 -.311
local straegy -.135 .695 .150 -.389 .204
NATIONAL -2.00E-02 .543 -5.28E-02 -.375 -.418
NEEDS -.171 .139 .474 .393 .417
PROVIDER .495 -.671 -.211 .210 .195
Responibility -.705 .147 .196 6.408E-02 .178
UTILITY -.101 .265 .596 .515 -.140
WAITING .239 .433 -.554 8.952E-02 8.087E-02
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis, 




1 2 3 4 5
Choice .782 -.158 -------- 722S" 5.553E-02' "873TGE-02
CO2 .850 5.643E-02 .239 -1.39E-02 -9.00E-02
Commission -.104 .879 1.851 E-02 9.001 E-02 .230
Community
activity .545 .230 -.211 .435 -.222
Discressionary
funds -1.65E-02 .119 .144 .696 -.184
Excess act 7.077E-02 6.929E-02 .928 .170 -2.49E-02
EQUITY -.117 .120 -3.27E-02 -.151 .806
First ranking .741 5.314E-02 .268 -.341 -.269
Gp ranking -.527 .123 -.238 -.442 -3.79E-02
Hospital activity 3.060E-02 2.762E-02 .938 .117 -3.08E-02
Local care .395 -.256 -.258 .345 -.467
local straegy .284 .757 .121 -6.22E-02 .210
NATIONAL -6.80E-03 .661 .144 3.690E-03 -.394
NEEDS .146 -1.90E-02 -7.10E-02 .431 .624
PROVIDER .187 -.857 -1.11E-03 -.200 -.114
Responibility -.364 .341 -.202 9.390E-02 .542
UTILITY -5.67E-03 9.876E-02 -5.71 E-02 .815 .204
WAITING 5.600E-02 9.091 E-02 .715 -.192 -7.59E-02
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.
a. Rotation converged in 7 iterations.
Component Transformation Matrix
Component 1 2 3 4 5
.744 -.368 .065 --------
2 .185 .752 .573 .252 .093
3 .381 .161 -.638 .627 .170
4 -.286 -.498 .415 .648 .281
5 .430 -.161 .093 -.346 .813
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 





Total number of cases: 49 (Unweighted)
Number of selected cases: 49
Number of unselected cases: 0
Number of selected cases: 49
Number rejected because of missing data: 2 











Dependent Variable.. PURCHASI Purchasing plan
Beginning Block Number 0. Initial Log Likelihood Function 
-2 Log Likelihood 60.283829
* Constant is included in the model.
Estimation terminated at iteration number 2 because 
Log Likelihood decreased by less than .01 percent.
Classification Table for PURCHASI






Observed +- -+- -+
.0 0 I 31 I 0 I 100.00%
+ - -+
1.0 1 I 16 I 0 I .00%
+ - - +
Overall 65.96%
- Variables m the Equation
Variable B S.E. Wald df Sig R Exp(B)
Constant -.6613 .3078 4.6154 1 . 0317
Beginning Block Number 1. Method: Forward Stepwise (COND)
Page 3
Variables not in the Equation ---------------------------------
Residual Chi Square not computed because of red
Variable Score df Sig R
UTILITY 10.7478 1 . 0010 .3809
FR .0396 1 .8423 .0000
GP 6.0670 1 .0138 .2597
EQUITY 2.6881 1 .1011 .1068
CHOICE 2.7503 1 .0972 .1116
RESPONIB .0109 1 .9167 .0000
WAITING .4957 1 .4814 .0000
LC .0844 1 .7715 .0000
HOSPITAL 1.2780 1 .2583 .0000
COMMUNIT 4.3267 1 .0375 .1965
NATIONAL 2.3957 1 .1217 .0810
NEEDS 13.3251 1 .0003 .4334
EA 1.9795 1 .1594 .0000
DISCRESS 2.2607 1 . 1327 .0658
PROVIDER 2.3974 1 .1215 .0812
COMMISSI 5.0120 1 .0252 .2235
LP 7.7417 1 .0054 .3086
CO2 3.6649 1 .0556 .1662
Variable (s) Entered on Step Number
1.. NEEDS
Estimation terminated at iteration number 8 because 
Log Likelihood decreased by less than .01 percent.
-2 Log Likelihood 45.555
Goodness of Fit 41.001
Cox & Snell - RA2 .269
Nagelkerke - RA2 .372
Chi-Square df Significance
Model 14.729 1 . 0001
Block 14.729 1 .0001
Step 14.729 1 .0001
Classification Table for PURCHASI 














1.0 1 I 10 I 6 I 37.50%
Overall 78.72%
Page 4
Variables in the Equation
Variable B S.E. Wald df Sig R Exp(B)
NEEDS 10.3341 40.6756 .0645 1 .7994 .0000 30765.139
Constant -1.1314 .3637 9.6786 1 .0019
------------- Model if Term Removed -
Based on Conditional Parameter Estimates
Term Log Significance
Removed Likelihood -2 Log LR df of Log LR
NEEDS -31.239 16.923 1 . .0000
Page 5
Variables not in the Equation
Residual Chi Square5 not computed because of red
Variable Score df Sig R
UTILITY 4.3403 1 .0372 .1970
FR .7335 1 .3917 .0000
GP 4.6382 1 .0313 .2092
EQUITY .0802 1 .7770 .0000
CHOICE 2.0443 1 .1528 .0271
RESPONIB .2136 1 .6440 .0000
WAITING 1.5764 1 .2093 .0000
LC .1010 1 .7506 .0000
HOSPITAL 2.4743 1 .1157 .0887
COMMUNIT 4.6328 1 .0314 .2090
NATIONAL 4.6828 1 .0305 .2110
EA 3.1775 • 1 .0747 .1398
DISCRESS 1.1691 1 .2796 .0000
PROVIDER 2.5097 1 .1132 .0919
COMMISSI 4.0305 1 .0447 .1835
LP 6.9986 1 .0082 .2880
CO2 5.1932 1 .0227 .2301
Variable(s) Entered on Step Number
2.. LP local straegy
Estimation terminated at iteration number 8 because
.og Likelihood decreased by less than .01 percent.
-2 Log Likelihood 38.322
Goodness of Fit 41.001
Cox & Snell - RA2 .373
Nagelkerke - RA2 .517
Chi-Square df Significance
Model 21.962 2 . 0000
Block 21.962 2 .0000
Step 7.233 1 .0072
Classification Table for PURCHASI
The Cut Value is .50
Predicted
. 0 1.0 Percent Correct
0 I 1
Observed 4' *“• — --- ---- —-+
.0 0 I 31 I 0 I 100.00%
+- ----------- +_ -+
1.0 1 I 10 I 6 I 37.50%
+ - ----------- + _—- +
Overall 78.72%
Page 6
Variables in the Equation
Variable B S.E. Wald df Sig R Exp(B)
NEEDS 10.5290 37.9332 . 0770 1 .7813 . 0000 37385.259
LP 2.1282 .8790 5. 8628 1 .0155 . 2531 8.4000
Constant -2.3514 .7400 10. 0970 1 .0015
------------------ Model if Term Removed —
Based on Conditional Parameter Estimates
Terra Log Significance
Removed Likelihood -2 Log LR. df of Log LR
NEEDS -27.282 16.242 1 . 0001
LP -23.108 7.894 1 . 0050
Page 7
Variables not in the Equation
Residual Chi Square not computed because of redundancies
Variable Score df Sig R
UTILITY 5.8896 1 .0152 .2540
FR .0690 1 .7928 .0000
GP 3.3057 1 .0690 . 1472
EQUITY .0015 1 .9691 .0000
CHOICE 1.3282 1 .2491 .0000
RESPONIB .9819 1 .3217 . 0000
WAITING .4848 1 .4863 . 0000
LC .1024 1 .7490 . 0000
HOSPITAL 1.2219 1 .2690 .0000
COMMUNIT 1.8448 1 .1744 .0000
NATIONAL 2.0101 1 .1563 .0129
EA 1.3235 1 .2500 .0000
DISCRESS 1.2690 1 .2600 .0000
PROVIDER .2876 1 .5917 .0000
COMMISSI . 6563 1 .4179 .0000
CO2 3.3101 1 .0689 .1474
Variable(s) Entered on Step Number
3.. UTILITY
Estimation terminated at iteration number 8 because 
Log Likelihood decreased by less than .01 percent.
-2 Log Likelihood 31.806
Goodness of Fit 27.231
Cox & Snell - RA2 .454
Nagelkerke - RA2 .629
Chi--Square df Significance
Model 28.478 3 .0000
Block 28.478 3 .0000
Step 6.516 1 . 0107
Classification Table for PURCHASI 
The Cut Value is .50
Predicted
. 0 1.0 Percent Correct
0 1 1
Observed +—-----------+__ ---------- +
.0 0 I 26 I 5 I 83.87%
4 w - + — -+




Variables in the Equation
Variable B S.E. Wald df Sig R Exp(B)
UTILITY 1.6396 .7405 4.9030 1 .0268 .2194 5.1531
NEEDS 8.9893 38.2680 .0552 1 . 8143 .0000 8016.9411
LP 2.7423 1.0742 6.5176 1 .0107 .2737 15.5232
Constant -5.5926 1.8860 8.7932 1 .0030
- Model if Term Removed -




Likelihood -2 Log LR df
Significance 
of Log LR
UTILITY -19.490 7.175 1 .0074
NEEDS -19.307 6.809 1 .0091
LP -21.072 10.339 1 .0013
Page 9
Variables not in the Equation
Residual Chi Square not computed because of rec
Variable Score df Sig R
FR .7272 1 .3938 .0000
GP 1.5260 1 .2167 . 0000
EQUITY .1247 1 .7240 .0000
CHOICE . 6671 1 .4141 .0000
RESPONIB 3.3048 1 .0691 .1471
WAITING 1.2873 1 .2566 .0000
LC .0085 1 .9265 .0000
HOSPITAL .8541 1 .3554 .0000
COMMUNIT . 1766 1 . 6743 . 0000
NATIONAL 2.8243 1 .0928 .1169
EA .7106 1 .3992 .0000
DISCRESS .4039 1 .5251 .0000
PROVIDER .1547 1 .6941 .0000
COMMISSI .2685 1 . 6043 .0000
CO2 1.8203 1 .1773 .0000
No more variables can be deleted or added.
Page 10
Appendix D The Final Data Set
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Key
Utility - Utility of care in terms of Health benefit - see chapter 9
Fr = first ranking
GP - GP ranking
Purchasi - presence or absence on the purchasing plan - the dependant variable 
Equity - a commission value see chapter 9 
Choice - a commission value see chapter 9
Responsib - personal responsibility a commission value see chapter 9 
Waiting - impact on the waiting list in Southampton 
Lc - access to local care
Hospital - increasing hospital activity
Community Increasing community activity
Needs -identified local health need - a commission value see chapter 9 
Discress - access to discretionary funds - either from region or copurchasers 
Provider - provider submitted bid
Commission - commission submitted bid
Cost - cost to the commission
Ea - extra activity purchased
Weighted - activity gained according to the efficiency index
Co2 - the transformed cost variable




fieldOOl programm utility fr 9P purchasi equity
1 1.0 communication service 3.0 16.0 35.0 ;1.0 1.0
2 2.0 contraception educati 3.0 17.0 5.0 1.0 1.0
3 3.0 carer information 2.0 3.0 9.0 1.0 1.0
4 4,0 equipment aids 3.0 32.0 28.0 1.0 .0
5 5.0 community mh teams 3.0 42.0 3.0 1.0 .0
6 6.0 palliative care 3.0 18.0 3.0 1.0 .0
7 7.0 multiagency preventio 2.0 12.0 49.0 .0 1.0
8 8.0 counseling 2.0 40.0 12.0 .0 .0
9 9.0 folic acid 3.0 4.0 26.0 .0 .0
10 10.0 specialist cancer tea 3.0 1.0 9.0 1.0 .0
11 11.0 safety aids 1.0 22.0 42.0 .0 1.0
12 12.0 stroke prevention 3.0 5.0 44.0 1.0 1.0
13 13.0 oral health 1.0 6.0 36.0 .0 1.0
14 14.0 oral hygiene 1.0 7.0 36.0 .0 1.0
15 15.0 cardiac rehab 2.0 23.0 11.0 1.0 .0
16 16.0 stroke rehab 2.0 38.0 5.0 1.0 .0
17 17.0 domiciliary care 2.0 31.0 15.0 .0 .0
18 18.0 respite care 2.0 39.0 7.0 .0 .0
19 19.0 supported housing 2.0 44.0 28.0 1.0 .0
20 20.0 depression manageme 2.0 13.0 39.0 .0 .0
21 21.0 diabetic retinopathy 2.0 26.0 28.0 .0 .0
22 22.0 child protection 2.0 8.0 33.0 .0 .0
23 23.0 protection assessment 2.0 14.0 18.0 .0 •o
24 24.0 a and e 1.0 35.0 27.0 1.0 1.0
25 25.0
_
detoxification 2.0 33.0 21.0 .0
I
26 26.0 brief interventionsI 2.0 2.0 33.0 .0 .01
27 27.0 asthma 2.0 9.0 18.0 .0 .0
28 28.0 sex education 2.0 19.0 13.0 1.0 1.0
L.
29 29.0 smoking advice
i 
2.0 10.0 28.0 .0
I I1
30 30.0 i comm orthpoedics | 1.0 34.0 24.0 I 0 .0
1-1
A:\finaldata.sav
choice responib waiting Ic hospital communit national
1 1.0 1.0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0
2 .0 1.0 .0 .0 .0 .0 1.0
3 1.0 1.0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0
4 .0 1.0 .0 1.0 .0 .0 1.0
5 1.0 .0 .0 1.0 -100.0 5000.0 1.0
6 1.0 .0 .0 1.0 -100.0 1000.0 .0
7 .0 1.0 .0 .0 -100.0 .0 1.0
8 1.0 1.0 .0 1.0 .0 .0 .0
9 .0 1.0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0
10 1.0 .0 .0 .0 .0 . .0 1.0
11 .0 1.0 .0 .0 .0 .0 1.0
12 .0 1.0 .0 .0 -50.0 .0 1.0
13 .0 1.0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0
14 .0 1.0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0
15 1.0 .0 .0 1.0 .0 1000.0 1.0
16 1.0 .0 .0 1.0 .0 1000.0 1.0
17 1.0 .0 .0 1.0 .0 1000.0 .0
18 1.0 1.0 .0 .0 40.0 .0 1.0
19 1.0 1.0 .0 .0 -100.0 1000.0 1.0 I
20 .0 .0 .0 1.0 .0 .0 1.0
21 .0 .0 .0 1.0 100.0 .0 .0
22 .0 .0 .0 1.0 .0 .0 1.0
23 .0 .0 .0 1.0 .0 .0 1.0
24 .0 .0 1.0 .0 .0 .0 1.0
25 .0 1.0 .0 1.0 -200.0 1000.0 .0
26 .0 1.0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0
27 .0 1.0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0
28 .0 1.0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0
I
29 .0 1.0 .0 .0 .0 .0 I 1.0
30 1.0 .0
I I . I o 1.0 .0 .0 .01
1-2
A:\finaldata.sav
needs ea discress provider commissi Ip co2
1 1.0 .0 .0 1.0 1.0 .0 - 1.70
2 1.0 .0 .0 .0 1.0 1.0 1.70
3 .0 .0 .0 .0 1.0 1.0 1.00
4 .0 .0 .0 .0 1.0 .0 2.18
5 .0 .0 1.0 .0 1.0 . 10 3.11
6 1.0 .0 1.0 1.0 .0 .0 1.70
7 .0 .0 .0 .0 1.0 1.0 1.43
8 .0 .0 .0 1.0 .0 .0 2.78
9 .0 .0 1.0 1.0 .0 .0 1.00
10 .0 .0 .0 1.0 .0 .0 2.54
11 .0 .0 1.0 .0 1.0 1.0 1.00
12 1.0 .0 1.0 .0 1.0 1.0 1.00
13 .0 .0 .0 .0 1.0 .0 1.00
14 .0 .0 .0 .0 1.0 .0 1.00
15 .0 .0 .0 .0 1.0 1.0 1.70
16 1.0 .0 1.0 .0 1.0 1.0 2.40
17 .0 .0 1.0 1.0 .0 .0 2.00
18 .0 .0 .0 .0 1.0 1.0 2.60
19 •0 .0 1.0 .0 1.0 1.0 3.23
20 •0 : .0 1.0 1.0 .0 .0 1.30
21 ! -° .0
i
.0 1.0 .0 .0 1.70
22 .0
I .0I
.0 .0 1.0 .0 1.00
23 1 .0 \ 0 1.0 .0 1.0 .0 1.30
24 ! .0 S .0 .0 1.0 1.0 1.0 2.14
25 ! .01 i -° .0 .0 1.0 1.0 3.00
26 s -° .0 .0 .0 1.0 1.0 .30
27 i .0t .0 1.0 .0 . 10 .0 1.00
28 : 1.0
.! ! .0 0 .0 1.0 1.0 1.60
29 .0 .0 1.0 .0 1.0 I .0 1.00
30 .0 .0 .0 1.0 .0 I '° 2.00
1-3
A:\finaldata.sav
fieldOOl programm utility fr gp purchasi equity
31 31.0 ortho rehab 1.0 41.0 15.0 .; .o .0
32 32.0 assisted conception .0 43.0 36.0 .0 1.0
33 33.0 paramedic obstetrics 1.0 20.0 25.0 .0 .0
34 34.0 skin cancer screening 2.0 25.0 43.0 .0 .0 :
35 35.0 needle exchange 2.0 21.0 39.0 .0 .0
36 36.0 waiting times 2.0 46.0 1.0 1.0 .0 =
37 37.0 community first aid 1.0 11.0 21.0 .0 .0 II
38 38.0 substance missuse 1.0 29.0 15.0 1.0 .0 1
39 39.0 skin cancer preventio 1.0 30.0 36.0 .0 .0 :
40 40.0 dietetics 1.0 24.0 47.0 .0 •°!
41 41.0 maternity care .0 37.0 28.0 .0 •0 1
42 42.0 Ibhu 1.0 45.0 45.0 .0 .0
43 43.0 immediate care 1.0 27.0 45.0 .0
1
•0 i
44 44.0 prevention info 1.0 28.0 48.0 1.0 •0 : 1
45 45.0 trauma centers 1.0 45.0 2.0 .0
t
.0
46 46.0 ambulance trials .0 47.0 14.0 .0 .0 I
47 47.0 preadmission clinics . 1.0 15.0 20.0 .0 .0
48 48.0 care attendants .0 7.0 .0 .0 ;
49 49.0 knee replacements 2.0 • 21.0 .0 .0
2-1
A:\finaldata.sav
choice responib waiting Ic hospital communit national
31 1.0 .0 .0 1.0 .0 .0 .' 0
32 1.0 .0 .0 .0 50.0 .0 .0
33 .0 .0 .0 1.0 .0 .0 1.0
34 .0 .0 1.0 .0 .0 .0 1.0
35 .0 1.0 .0 .0 .0 .0 1.0
36 .0 .0 1.0 .0 1900.0 .0 1.0
37 .0 1.0 .0 .0 .0 .0 1.0
38 .0 1.0 .0 .0 .0 .0 1.0
39 .0 1.0 .0 .0 100.0 .0 1.0
40 .0 1.0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0
41 • 1.0 .0 .0 1.0 .0 .0 1.0
42 1.0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 1.0
43 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 1.0
44 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 1.0
45 .0 .0 1.0 .0 .0 .0 1.0
46 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0
47 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0




.0 .0 .0 .0
2-2
A:\finaldata.sav
needs ea discress provider commissi IP co2
31 .0 .0 .0 1.0 .0 .0 2.76
32 .0 .0 .0 1.0 .0 .0 3.00
33 .0 .0 .0 1.0 .0 .0 1.40
34 .0 .0 .0 .0 1.0 .0 1.41
35 .0 .0 .0 .0 1.0 1.0 1.40
36 .0 1.0 1.0 .0 1.0 1.0 3.28
37 .0 .0 .0 .0 1.0 1.0 1.00
38 .0 .0 1.0 .0 1.0 1.0 1.60
39 .0 .0 .0 .0 1.0 .0 1.70
40 .0 .0 .0 1.0 .0 .0 1.40
41 .0 .0 .0 1.0 1.0 1.0 2.00
42 .0 .0 .0 .0 1.0 1.0 2.60
43 .0 .0 .0 1.0 .0 .0 1.30
44 .0 •0 •0 .0 1.0 1.0 1.43
45 .0 .0 .0 1.0 .0 1.0 1.70 !
46 .0 .0 .0 1.0 .0 .0 1.46 |
47 .0 .0 .0 1.0 .0 .0 .85
48 .0 .0 •0 1.0 .0 .0
—
49 .0 •0 1.0 .0 .0
2-3
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{Coefficients for PP=0 set to zero.)
Least squares starting values:
***** Outcome = PP=1
Variable Coefficient Std. Error T-ratio Prob|t|ox Mean of X Std.D.of X
ONE -,. 473415 .292123 -1.621 .10510 1.0000 .00000
UT .228613 .669736E-01 3.413 .00064 1.6735 .85117 ~
- GPR - .864628E-02 .411820E-02 -2.100 .03577 24.347 14.165 -
NATLP .750725E-01 .124303 . 604 .54588 .57143 .50000 —
■ LP .253927 .144579 1.756 .07903 .44898 .50254 -
„ COMSIP .469598 .249952 1.879 .06028 .63265 .48708 _
PROVP .405723 . 225890 1.796 ,07248 . 42857 .50000 —
Method=NEWTON; Maximum iterations = 25
Convergence criteria: Gradient = .1000000E-03
Function = .1000000E-05
Parameters^ .1000000E-04
Starting values: -.4734 .2286 -.8646E-02 .7507E-01 .2539
.4696 .4057
==> NEWTON Iterations
Iteration 1 Function 32.88765
Param -.473 .229 -.865E-02 .751E-01 .254 . 470 .406
Gradnt 12.4 13.7 382. 4.90 1.89 4.88 7.47
Iteration 2 Function 18.53447
Param -3.97 . 942 -.364E-01 . 322 1.03 1.94 1.67
Gradnt 2.55 1.65 82.9 . 568 -.271E-01 . 525 2.01
Iteration 3 Function 15.32620
Param -6.79 1.68 -.525E-01 .713 1.61 2.96 2.42
Gradnt .898 .590 28.0 . 143 -.721E-01 . 131 .752
Iteration 4 Function 14.28843
Param -9.49 2.35 -.652E-01 1.11 2.20 3.92 3.12
Gradnt .260 .220 8.19 .329E-01 -.448E-01 .230E-01 .229
Iteration 5 Function 14.13329
Param -11.0 2.70 -.730E-01 1.34 2.55 4.47 3.50
Gradnt .397E- 01 .430E-01 1.32 .325E-02 -.117E-01 .123E-02 . 370E-01
Iteration 6 Function 14.12861
Param -11.3 2.77 -.749E-01 1.38 2.63 4.59 3.57
Gradnt .129E- 02 .167E-02 .471E-01 .165E-04 -.551E-03 -.257E-04 .127E-02
Iteration 7 Function 14.12860
Parara -11.3 2.77 -.750E-01 1.39 2.63 4.59 3.58
Gradnt .154E-05 .220E-05 .607E-04 -.901E-07 -.820E-06 -.105E-06 .159E-05
** Gradient has converged.










Mean of X Std.D.o:Variable Coefficient Std. Error T-ratio Prob j 11ox
ONE -11.2847 4.06924 -2.773 .00555 1.0000 .00000
UT 2.77284 .956325 2.899 .00374 1.6735 .85117
GPR -.749821E-01 .419326E-01 -1.788 .07375 24.347 14.165
NATLP 1.38609 1.11910 1.239 .21551 .57143 .50000
LP 2.63042 1.39356 1.888 .05909 .44898 .50254
COMSIP 4.59377 2.42717 1.893 .05840 .63265 .48708
PROVP 3.57541 1.97839 1.807 .07073 .42857 .50000
Frequencies of actual & predicted outcomes 
Predicted outcome has maximum probability.
Predicted
Actual TOTAL 0 1
TOTAL 49 34 15
0 33 32 1
1 16 2 14
*-* LIMDEP *-* File created 05/22/98 / 14:00:19
MODEL COMMAND: LOGIT;LHS=PP;RHS=ONE,UT,GPR,NATLP, LP,COMSIP, PROVP, DISFUND$
2 Outcomes are: 
PP=0 PP=1
(Coefficients for PP=0 set to zero.)
Least squares starting values:
***** Outcome = PP=1
Variable Coefficient Std. Error T-ratio Prob|t|ox Mean of X Std.D.of X
ONE - .487987 .297877 -1.638 .10138 1.0000 .00000
UT .221435 .704787E-01 3.142 .00168 1.6735 .85117
GPR - .841430E-02 .420970E-02 -1.999 .04563 24.347 14.165
NATLP .670790E-01 .127504 .526 .59882 .57143 .50000 x
LP .257018 .146340 1.756 .07904 .44898 .50254
COMSIP . 478575 .253768 1.886 .05931 .63265 .48708
PROVP .417196 .230416 1.811 .07020 .42857 .50000
DISFUND . 473135E-01 .129720 .365 .71531 .28571 .45644 .
***********■*■*■**********•*:*****■*■*****************************■*■*******************
Method=NEWTON; Maximum iterations = 25
Convergence criteria: Gradient = .1000000E-03
Function = .1000000E-05
Parameters= .1000000E-04








Iteration 1 Function 32.87177
Param -.488 .221 -.841E-02 .671E- 01 .257 . 479 .417
. 473E-01
Gradnt 12.4 13.7 382. 4.90 1.89 4.88 7.47
1.69
Iteration 2 Function .18.47818
Param -4.02 . 913 -.355E-01 .290 1.04 1.98 1.72
. 184
Gradnt 2.57 1.67 8316 .578 -.305E-01 . 538 2.02
-.163E-01
Iteration 3 Function 15.14097
Param -6.97 1.63 -.505E-01 . 646 1.67 3.03 2.53
.403
Gradnt .920 . 593 28.6 . 141 -.906E-01 . 127 .779
-.560E-01
Iteration 4 Function 13.90286
Param -10.0 2.33 -.619E-01 1.02 2.40 4.08 3.34
.726
Gradnt .266 . 184 8.27 . 150E--01 -.806E-01 -.296E-02 .262
-.543E-01 -














. 554E-01Gradnt .408E-01 
.256E-01
Iteration 6 Function 13.60958
Param - 13.0
1.16
2.96 -.717E-01 1.37 3.20 5.09 4.11
Gradnt .161E-02 -.186E-02 .628E-01 -.198E-02 -.389E-02 -.256E-02 .399E-02
- .318E-02
Iteration 7 Function 13.60943
Param - 13.1
1.18
2.98 -.720E-01 1.38 3.22 5.12 4.13
Gradnt .413E-05 
.311E-04
-.319E-04 .277E-03 -.220E-04 -.366E-04 -.262E-04 .288E-04
Iteration. 8 Function 13.60943
Param - 13,1
1.18
2.98 -.720E-01 1.38 3.22 5.12 4.13
Gradnt - .164E-10 -.265E-08 .109E-07 -.166E-08 -.258E-08 -.190E-08 .178E-08
-.224E-08
** Gradient has converged. 
** Function has converged. 
** B-vector has converged.
Maximum Likelihood Estimates
Log-Likelihood....................................






Variable Coefficient Std. Error
.11600E-05
Mean of X Std.D.of XT-ratio Prob|t|ox
ONE -13.1089 5.03172 -2.605 .00918 1.0000 .00000
UT 2.97642 1.08883 2.734 .00626 1.6735 .85117
GPR -.719526E-01 .430957E-01 -1.670 .09500 24.347 14.165
NATLP 1.38085 1.13257 1.219 .22276 .57143 .50000 *
LP 3.22392 1.66340 1.938 .05260 . 44898 .50254
COMSIP 5.11692 2.59533 1.972 .04866 .63265 .48708
PROVP 4.12533 2.14516 1.923 .05447 .42857 .50000
DISFUND 1.17598 1.20749 . 974 .33011 .28571 .45644 <
Frequencies of actual & predicted outcomes 
Predicted outcome has maximum probability.
Predicted
Actual TOTAL 0 1
TOTAL 49 34 15
0 33 32 1
1 16 2 14
MODEL COMMAND: LOGIT;LHS=PP;RHS=ONE,UT,GPR,NATLP, LP, COMSIP, PROVP,DISFUND,NE 
EDS$
2 Outcomes are: 
PP=0 PP=1
(Coefficients for PP=0 set to zero.)
Least squares starting values:
***** outcome = PP=1
Variable Coefficient Std. Error T-ratio Prob(t|ox Mean of X Std.D.of X
ONE - .292502 .291676 -1.003 .31594 1.0000 .00000
UT .145263 .732075E-01 1.984 .04723 1.6735 .85117
GPR - .778755E-02 .397643E-02 -1.958 .05018 24.347 14.165
NATLP . 127525 .122646 1.040 .29844 .57143 .50000
LP . 199417 .139896 1.425 .15402 .44898 .50254
COMSIP .346550 .245085 1.414 .15736 .63265 .48708
PROVP .284917 .223673 1.274 .20273 .42857 .50000
DISFUND .237933E-01 .122652 . 194 .84618 .28571 .45644
NEEDS .449048 .181248 2.478 .01323 .12245 .33120
Method=NEWTON; Maximum iterations - 25


















-.779E-02 . 128 . 199 . 347 .285
Gradnt 12.3 13.6 381. 4.88 1.87 4.85 7 .46
1.67 -1.62
Iteration 2 Function 16.70294
Param - 3.12 . 581 -. 329E-01 . 560 .794 1.35 1 . 09
.678E-01 2.20
Gradnt 1.96 .745 70.6 . 160 -.370 . 113 1 .78
- . 110 -.550
Iteration 3 Function 13.63814
Param - 5.53 1.15 -.481E-01 1.07 1.32 2.21 1 . 69
. 151 3.06
Gradnt . 689 .180 21.7 .565E-02 -.187 -.327E-01 687
- . 112 -.207
Iteration 4 Function 12.44205
Param - 8.48 1.79 -.528E-01 1.57 1.99 3.09 2 . 37
.415 3.92













































































































1.94 2.57 3.80 2.91
.885E-02 -.258E-01 984E-02 .484E-01
2.06 2.79 4.08 3.11
.665E-03 -.654E-02 -.606E-02 -.124E-02
2.07 2.81 4.10 3.13
-.131E-03 -.200E-02 -.241E-02 -.213E-02
2.07 2.81 4.10 3.13
-.485E-04 -.735E-03 -.886E-03 -.789E-03
2.07 2.81 4.10 3.13
-.178E-04 -.271E-03 -.326E-03 -.290E-03
2.07 2.81 4.10 3.13
-.654E-05 -.995E-04 -.120E-03 -.107E-03
2.07 2.81 4.10 3.13
-.240E-05 -.366E-04 -.441E-04 -.393E-04
2.07 2.81 4.10 3.13
-.884E-06 -.135E-04 -.162E-04 -.144E-04
2.07 2.81 4.10 3.13
-.325E-06 -.495E-05 -.597E-05 - . 532E-05
2.07 2.81 4.10 3.13
-.120E-06 -.182E-05 -.220E-05 -.196E-05
Iteration 15 Function 12.05955
Param -11.8 2.46 -.576E-01 2.07 2.81 4.10 3.13
.816 15.0


















** Function has converged.
Maximum Likelihood Estimates
Log-Likelihood.................................... -12.060
Restricted (Slopes=0) Log-L. -30.953
Chi-Squared ( 8)............................... 37.787
Significance Level.............. .. .71750E-06
Variable Coefficient Std. Error T-ratio Prob|t|ox Mean of X Std.D.of X
ONE -11.7621 5.37474 -2,188 .02864 1.0000 .00000
UT 2.46188 1.16649 2.111 .03481 1.6735 .85117
GPR -.576230E-01 .430423E-01 -1.339 . 18065 24.347 14.165
NATLP 2.07155 1.37081 1.511 .13074 .57143 .50000 -
LP 2.80782 1.68038 1.671 .09473 .44898 .50254
COMSIP 4.10472 2.80172 1.465 .14290 .63265 .48708
PROVP 3.13167 2.36419 1.325 .18529 . 42857 .50000
DISFUND .816488 1.29172 .632 .52732 .28571 .45644 -
NEEDS 15.9579 1398.49 . 011 .99090 . 12245 .33120 <
Frequencies of actual & predicted outcomes 
Predicted outcome has maximum probability.
Predicted
Actual TOTAL 0 1
TOTAL 49 35 14
0 33 32 1
1 16 3 13 •




(Coefficients for PP=0 set to zero.)
Least squares starting values:
***** Outcome = PP=1
Variable Coefficient Std. Error T-ratio Prob 111ox Mean of X Std.D.of X
ONE - . 510322 . 300626 -1.698 .08960 1.0000 .00000
UT .217343 .710016E-01 3.061 .00221 1.6735 .85117
GPR - . 715408E-02 . 452358E-02 -1.582 . 11376 24.347 14.165
NATLP .615379E-01 .128298 .480 .63148 .57143 .50000
LP .242190 .148235 1.634 .10230 .44898 .50254
COMSIP . 477715 .254965 1.874 .06098 .63265 .48708
PROVP . 421620 .231568 1.821 .06865 . 42857 .50000
DISFUND .123471E-01 .137723 .090 . 92856 .28571 .45644
























-.715E-02 .615E-01 .242 . 478 . 422
Gradnt 12.4 13.7 382 . 4.89 1.88 4.87 7.47
1 . 68 -695.
Iteration 2 1Function 18.22080
Param -4 . 15 . 891 -.288E-01 ,264 . 960 1.98 1.74
639E-02 .117E-02
Gradnt 2 .27 1.11 77.2 . 373 -.196 . 329 1.93
- . 163 -324.
Iteration 3 Function 14.94292
Param -7 .01 1.59 -.425E-01 .633 1.55 3.00 2.52
210 .174E-02
Gradnt . 831 .459 27.3 ’ . 819E-01 -.132 . 719E-01 .746
- . 959E-01 -124 .
Iteration 4 Function 13.75667
Param -9 .90 2.23 -.539E-01 1.02 2.20 4.02 3.28
506 .234E-02
Gradnt . 241 . 155 7.93 .988E-03 -.889E-01 -.147E-01 .250
- . 627E-01 -39.0
Iteration 5 Function 13.50639
Param -11.9 2.65 -.620E-01 1.29 2.73 4.72 3.78
802 .259E-02
Gradnt . 380E-01 .144E-01 1.21 -.104E-01 -.337E-01 -.157E-01 .524E-01
- . 241E-01 -7.50
Iteration 6 Function 13.48886
Param -12.6 2.80 -.644E-01 1.38 2.93 4.95 3.96
928 .261E-02
Gradnt . 204E-02 -.966E-03 .538E-01 -.149E-02 -.344E-02 -.187E-02 .379E-02
- . 249E-02 -.519 -





.646E-01 1.38 2.95 4.97












-.646E-01 1.38 2.95 4.97
.128E-07 -.798E-09 -.177E-08 -.972E-09
3.97
. 172E-08
** Gradient has converged. 
** Function has converged. 




Restricted (Slopes =0) Log-L. -30.953
Chi-•Squared ( 8) . . 34.929
Significance Level .27551E-04
Variable Coefficient Std. Error T-ratio Prob111 ox Mean of X Std.D.o:
ONE -12.6643 4.90408 -2.582 .00981 1.0000 .00000
UT 2.81665 1.08724 2.591 .00958 1.6735 .85117
GPR -.645629E-01 .455590E-01 -1.417 .15645 24.347 14.165
NATLP 1.38398 1.14482 1.209 .22670 .57143 . 50000
LP 2.95102 1.70511 1.731 .08351 .44898 .50254
COMSIP 4.97465 2.55395 1.948 .05144 .63265 .48708
PROVP 3.97274 2.10003 1.892 .05852 .42857 .50000
DISFUND .940852 1.30314 .722 .47030 .28571 . 45644
WACT .260467E-02 .567373E-02 .459 .64618 87.429 268.55
Frequencies of actual & predicted outcomes
Predicted outcome has maximum probability.
Predicted
Actual TOTAL 0 1
TOTAL 49 33 16
0 33 31 2
1 16 2 14
MODEL COMMAND: LOGIT;LHS=PP;RHS=ONE,UT,GPR,NATLP,LP,COMSIP,PROVP,DISFUND,WT 
$
2 Outcomes are: 
PP = 0 PP=1
(Coefficients for PP=0 set to zero.)
Least squares starting values:
***** Outcome = PP=1
Variable Coefficient Std. Error T-ratio Prob|t|ox Mean of X Std.D.of
ONE -,.496626 .301607 -1.647 .09964 1.0000 .00000
UT .221414 .711962E-01 3.110 .00187 1.6735 .85117
GPR - .869806E-02 .430549E-02 -2.020 .04336 24.347 14.165
NATLP . 782634E-01 .131506 .595 .55176 . 57143 .50000
LP .260192 .148022 1.758 .07878 .44898 .50254
COMSIP .491266 .258114 1.903 .05700 .63265 .48708
PROVP .438531 .238200 1.841 .06562 .42857 .50000
DISFUND .426985E-01 .131498 . 325 .74540 .28571 .45644
WT - .792573E-01 .188000 -.422 .67333 .10204 .30584
*******************************************************************************
Method=NEWTON; Maximum iterations = 25 













Iteration 1 1Function 32.84961
Param -.497 .221 -.870E-02 .783E-01 .260 .491 .439
.427E-01 -.793E-01
Gradnt 12.4 13.7 382 . 4.90 1.89 4.88 7.47
1.69 . 985
Iteration 2 iFunction 18.43299
Param -4.06 . 916 -.367E-01 . 338 1.05 2.03 1.80
. 159 -.338
Gradnt 2.58 1.73 84.4 .581 -.378E-01 . 570 2.00
-.184E-01 . 140
Iteration 3 Function 15.13111
Param -6.96 1.62 -.520E-01 . 699 1.70 3.04 2.61
. 384 -.327
Gradnt .924 . 608 28.7 . 148 -.873E-01 . 135 .776
-.542E-01 .409E-01
Iteration 4 Function 13.89942
Param -10.0 2.31 -.629E-01 1.06 2.43 4.08 3.41
.712 -.253
Gradnt • .263 . 174 8.13 .142E-01 -.807E-01 -.748E-02 .262
-.554E-01 .120E-01
Iteration 5 Function 13.62584
Param -12.2 2.78 -.701E-01 1.31 3.00 4.83 3.96
1.02 -.204
Gradnt .374E-01 .791E-02 1.24 --.122E-01 -.350E-01 -.198E-01 .550E-01
-.271E-01 .179E-02
Iteration 6 Function 13.60592
Param -13.0 2.95 -.724E-01 1.39 3.22 5.09 4.15
1.15 -.190








-.726E-01 1.40 3.24 5.12
.185E-03 -.259E-04 -.391E-04 - -301E-04
Iteration 8 Function 13.60577
Param -13.1 2.97 -.726E-01 1.40 3.24 5.12
1.16 -.188
Gradnt -.382E-09 -.342E-08 .405E-08 -.200E-08 -.283E-08 -.223E-08
-.246E-08 -.183E-09
** Gradient has converged.
** Function has converged.







Restricted (Slopes =0) Log-L. -30.953
Chi- Squared ( 8).. 34.695
Significance Level .30390E-04
Variable Coefficient Std. Error T-ratio Prob|t|ox Mean of X Std.D.o
ONE -13.0985 5.02899 -2.605 .00920 1.0000 .00000
UT 2.96662 1.09247 2.716 .00662 1.6735 .85117
GPR -.725886E-01 .438057E-01 -1.657 .09751 24.347 14.165
NATLP 1.40358 1.16757 1.202 .22931 .57143 .50000
LP 3.24292 1.68552 1.924 .05436 .44898 .50254
COMSIP 5.11794 2.58635 1.979 .04783 .63265 .48708
PROVP 4.17247 2.19862 1.898 .05773 .42857 .50000
DISFUND 1.16443 1.21434 . 959 .33761 .28571 .45644
WT -.188171 2.19856 -.086 .93179 . 10204 .30584
Frequencies of actual & predicted outcomes
Predicted outcome has maximum probability.
Predicted
Actual TOTAL 0 1
TOTAL 49 34 15
0 33 32 1
1 16 2 14




(Coefficients for PP=0 set to zero.)
Least squares starting values:
***** Outcome = PP=1
Variable Coefficient Std. Error T-ratio Prob|t|ox Mean of X Std.D.of X
ONE -,.439575 .305718 -1.438 .15048 1.0000 .00000
UT .223214 .708571E-01 3.150 .00163 1.6735 .85117
GPR -.. 947204E-02 . 444315E-02 -2.132 .03302 24.347 14.165
NATLP .797852E-01 '. 129158 .618 .53675 .57143 .50000
LP . 232658 .150345 1.547 .12174 .44898 . 50254
COMSIP . 482881 .255058 1.893 .05833 .63265 .48708
PROVP .433810 .232515 1.866 .06208 .42857 .50000
DISFUND .533061E-01 .130576 .408 .68310 .28571 .45644
LC - .966055E-01 .124152 -.778 ,43650 .34694 . 48093
Method=NEWTON; Maximum iterations = 25
















Iteration 1 Function 32.79729
Param -.440 .223 -.947E-02 •798E-01 .233 .483 . 434
.533E-01 -.966E-01
Gradnt 12.4 13.7 382. 4.90 1.89 4.88 7.46
1.69 4.71
Iteration 2 Function 18.35870
Param -3.83 . 923 -.399E-01 .346 . 939 2.00 1.80
.201 -.404
Gradnt 2.57 1.75 82.2 .590 -. 330E-01 .490 2.06
.180E-01 . 867
Iteration 3 Function 15.09458
Param -6.78 1.62 -. 537E-01 . 668 1.54 3.12 2.59
. 394 -.355
Gradnt .916 .592 28.5 .14 3 -.864E-01 . 122 .781
-.532E-01 . 325
Iteration 4 Function 13.86868
Param -9.88 2.31 -.646E-01 1.03 2.26 4.21 3.39
.702 -.303
Gradnt .262 . 172 8.34 .143E-01 -.781E-01 .281E-02 .254
-.589E-01 . 116
Iteration 5 Function 13.59705
Param -12.1 2.78 - . 720E-01 1.28 2.84 4.96 3.96
1.01 -.290
Gradnt .387E-01 .101E-01 1.33 -. 102E-01 -.336E-01 -.152E-01 . 524E-01
-.279E-01 .251E-01
Iteration 6 Function 13.57737
Param -12.9 2.94 -.744E-01 1.37 3.06 5.23 4.16
1.13 -.290








-.746E-01 1.38 3.08 5.25
.243E-03 -.224E-04 -.363E-04 -.261E-04
Iteration 8 Function 13.57723
Param -12.9 2.96 -.746E-01 1.38 3.08 5.25
1.15 --.290
Gradnt -.1S0E-09 -.296E-08 .839E-08 -.168E-08 -.255E-08 -.189E-08
-.236E-08 .617E-09
** Gradient has converged.
** Function has converged.








Restricted (Slopes:=0) Log-L. -30.953
Chi-Squared ( 8).. 34.752
Significance Level .29672E-04
Variable Coefficient Std. Error T-ratio Prob 11!ox Mean of X Std.D.of X
ONE -12.9436 5.10207 -2.537 .01118 1.0000 .00000
UT 2.96013 1.09127 2.713 .00668 1.6735 .85117
GPR -.745616E-01 .445136E-01 -1.675 .09393 24.347 14.165
NATLP 1.37888 1.13199 1.218 .22318 ,57143 .50000
LP 3.07986 1.72834 1.782 .07475 .44898 .50254
COMSIP 5.25007 2.74103 1.915 . 05545 .63265 .48708
PROVP 4.17379 2.23443 1.868 .06177 .42857 .50000
DISFUND 1.14698 1.20638 .951 .34172 .28571 .45644
LC -.290029 1.14437 -.253 .79993 .34694 .48093
Frequencies of actual & predicted outcomes
Predicted outcome has maximum probability.
Predicted
Actual TOTAL 0 1
TOTAL 49 34 15
0 33 32 1
1 16 2 14
MODEL COMMAND: LOGIT;LHS=PP;RHS=ONE,UT,GPR,NATLP, LP,COMSIP,PROVP,DISFUND, EX 
A$
2 Outcomes are: 
PP=0 PP=1
(Coefficients for PP=0 set to zero.)
Least squares starting values:
***** Outcome = PP=1
Variable Coefficient Std. Error T-ratio Prob|t|ox Mean of X Std.D.of X
ONE - . 503016 .301376 -1.669 .09510 1.0000 .00000
UT .224877 .712904E-01 3.154 .00161 1.6735 .85117
GPR - .784246E-02 .435413E-02 -1.801 .07168 24.347 14.165
NATLP .622564E-01 .128798 .483 .62884 .57143 .50000
LP .254353 .147594 1.723 .08483 .44898 .50254
COMSIP . 474546 .255913 1.854 .06369 .63265 .48708
PROVP .419501 .232313 1.806 .07096 .42857 .50000
DISFUND . 334275E-01 .132892 .252 .80140 .28571 .45644
EXA .236520 .402920 .587 .55719 .20408E-01 .14286
Method=NEWTON; Maximum iterations = 25
Convergence criteria: Gradient = .1000000E-03
Function = .1000000E-05
Parameters= .1000000E-04










Iteration 1 Function 32.82823
Param -.503 .225 -.784E-02 .623E-01 .254 .475 . 420
.334E-01 .237
Gradnt 12.4 13.7 382 . 4.89 1.89 4.88 7.47
1.69 -.269
Iteration 2 Function 18.37107
Param -4.09 . 926 -.329E-01 .267 1.03 1.96 1.73
. 124 1.26
Gradnt 2.47 1.52 81.6 .510 -.895E-01 .470 1.99
-.684E-01 -.857E-01
Iteration 3 Function 15.09446
Param -6.98 1.63 -.478E-01 .621 1.65 3.00 2.53
. 356 1.60
Gradnt .883 .539 28.-1 .119 -.108 . 106 .765
-.735E-01 -.304E-01
Iteration 4 Function 13.88072
Param -9.97 2.31 -.601E-01 .997 2.37 4.04 3.32
. 690 1.82
Gradnt .264 . 180 8.30 .146E-01 -.800E-01 -.233E-02 .260
-.541E-01 -.111E-01
Iteration 5 Function 13.60685
Param -12.1 2.77 -.681E-01 1.26 2.94 4.79 3.88
1.00 2.18
Gradnt .436E-01 .204E-01 1.38 --.800E-02 -.326E-01 -.145E-01 . 564E-
-.239E-01 -.405E-02
















. 413E-02Gradnt .981E-03 
.398E-02
Iteration 7 Function 13.58380
Param - 13.0 2.95 -.707E-01 1.36 3.18 5.07 4.10
1.14 3.92
Gradnt - .535E-03 -.111E-02 -.236E-03 -.562E-03 -.577E-03 -.566E-03 . 296E-04
- . 572E-03 -.547E-03
Iteration 8 Function 13.58345
Param - 13.0 2.95 -.707E-01 1.36 3.18 5.07 4.10
1.14 4.92
Gradnt - .201E-03 -.403E-03 -.201E-03 -.201E-03 -.201E-03 -.201E-03 .176E-08
- .201E-03 -.201E-03
Iteration 9 Function 13.58333
Param - 13.0 2.95 -.707E-01 1.36 3.18 5.07 4.10
1.14 5.92
Gradnt - .741E-04 148E-03 -.741E-04 -.741E-04 -.741E-04 -.741E-04 -.467E-15
- .741E-04 -.741E-04
Iteration 10 Function 13.58328
Param - 13.0 2.95 -.707E-01 1.36 3.18 5.07 4.10
1.14 6.92
Gradnt - .272E-04 -.545E-04 -.272E-04 -.272E-04 -.272E-04 -.272E-04 -.465E-15
- .272E-04 -.272E-04
Iteration 11 Function 13.58326
Param - 13.0 2.95 -.707E-01 1.36 3.18 5.07 4 . 10
1.14 7.92
Gradnt - .100E-04 -.200E-04 100E-04 -.100E-04 -.100E-04 100E-04 -.114E-14
- .100E-04 -.100E-04
Iteration 12 Function 13.58326
Param - 13.0 2.95 -.707E-01 1.36 3.18 5.07 4.10
1.14 8.92
Gradnt - .369E-05 -.738E-05 -.369E-05 -.369E-05 -.369E-05 -.369E-05 .685E-15
.369E-05 -.369E-05
Iteration! 13 Function 13.58325
Param - 13.0 2.95 -.707E-01 1.36 3.18 5.07 4.10
1.14 9.92
Gradnt - .136E-05 -.271E-05 -.136E-05 -.136E-05 -.136E-05 -.136E-05 .160E-15
-.136E-05 -.136E-05
Iteration 14 Function 13.58325
Param -13.0 2.95
1.14 10.9
-.707E-01 1.36 3.18 5.07 4.10
Gradnt -.499E-06 -.998E-06 
-.499E-06 -.499E-06
** Function has converged.
-.499E-06 -.499E-06 -.499E-06 -.499E-06 -.867E-15
**^******* -A- + -Ar -Ar -A.* Ar *Ar A- -A- ★ 'AA'-A-ArA-A'ArA.-ArArArAr’A-ArAf
Maximum Likelihood Estimates
Log-Likelihood.................. ............. -13.583
Restricted (Slopes=0) Log-L. -30.953
XChi-Squared ( 8)... 
Significance Level.
Variable Coefficient Std. Error
34.740 
.29822E-04
Mean of X Std.D.ofT-ratio Prob|t|ox
ONE -12.9908 5.02404 -2.586 .00972 1.0000 .00000
UT 2,94980 1.08852 2.710 .00673 1.6735 .85117
GPR -.707050E-01 .434662E-01 -1.627 .10381 24.347 14.165
NATLP 1.35688 1.13516 1.195 .23196 .57143 .50000
LP 3.18205 1.66482 1.911 .05596 . 44898 .50254
COMSIP 5.07007 2.59709 1.952 .05091 .63265 . 48708
PROVP 4.09557 2.14090 1.913 .05575 .42857 .50000
DISFUND 1.14169 1.21447 . 940 .34718 .28571 .45644
EXA 10.9218 1415.56 . 008 .99384 .20408E-01 .14286
Frequencies of actual & predicted outcomes 
Predicted outcome has maximum probability.
Predicted
Actual TOTAL 0 1
TOTAL 49 34 15
0 33 32 1
1 16 2 14
MODEL COMMAND: LOGIT;LHS=PP;RHS=ONE,UT, GPR,NATLP,LP,COMSIP,PROVP,DISFUND, RE 
SP$
2 Outcomes are: 
PP=0 PP=1
(Coefficients for PP=O set to zero.
Least squares starting values:
***** Outcome = PP=1
Variable Coefficient Std. Error T-ratio Prob j 11ox Mean of X Std.D.o
ONE -.438537 .305665 • -1.435 .15137 1.0000 .00000
UT .230066 .716319E-01 3.212 .00132 1.6735 . 85117
GPR -.774832E-02 .431150E-02 -1.797 .07231 24.347 14.165
NATLP .187073E-01 .141872 . 132 .89509 .57143 .50000
LP .267355 . 147584 1.812 .07006 .44898 .50254
COMSIP .497819 .256078 1.944 .05189 .63265 .48708
PROVP .377686 .236769 1.595 .11068 .42857 . 50000
DISFUND . 457099E-01 .130328 . 351 .72579 .28571 . 45644
RESP -.105947 .133621 -.793 .42784 . 48980 .50508
Method=NEWTON; Maximum iterations — 25 





2301 -.7748E-02 .1871E-01 .2674
3777 . 4571E-01 -.1059
==> NEWTON Iterations
Iteration 1 Function 32.79438
Param - . 439 .230 -.775E-02 .187E-01 .267 .498 . 378
.457E-01 -.106
Gradnt 12.4 13.7 382. 4.90 1.89 4.88 7.47
1.69 5.94
Iteration 2 1Function 18.19111.
Param - 3.80 .948 -.329E-01 .794E-01 1.09 2.06 1.54
. 192 -.467
Gradnt 2.55 1.54 82.5 .533 -.916E-01 .498 2.04
- .390E-01 1.20
Iteration 3 Function 14.49558
Param - 6.68 1.77 -.435E-01 .226 1.88 3.16 2.17
.440 -.975
Gradnt . 884 . 456 27.6 •684E-01 -.166 .727E-01 . 801
- . 102 . 426
Iteration 4 Function 12.86481
Param - 9.97 2.66 -.496E-01 .406 2.93 4.31 2.79
.869 -1.65
Gradnt .222 .434E-01 6.88 -.713E-01 -.161 -.745E-01 .290
. 983E-01 . 105
Iteration 5 Function 12.32175
Param - 13.0 3.47 -.526E-01 . 575 4.01 5.33 3.29
1.38 -2.35
Gradnt .205E-01 -.573E-01. . 631 -.582E-01 -.851E-01 -.600E-01 .754E-01
- .477E-01 .479E-02
Iteration 6 Function 12.23334
Param - 14.8 3.95 -.533E-01 . 683 4.69 5.91 3.57
1.71 -2.77
Gradnt - .125E-02 -.158E-01 -.117E-01 -.124E-01 -.174E-01 -.125E-01 .916E-02
- .966E-02 -.237E-02
Iteration. 7 Function 12.23043
Param - 15.2 4.05 -.534E-01 .708 4.85 6.04 3.64
1.78 -2.86
Gradnt - .142E-03 -.673E-03 -.179E-02 -.484E-03 -.706E-03 -.479E-03 .208E-03
.412E-03 -.153E-03 ■
Iteration 8 Function 12.23043
Param -■15.2 4.06 -.534E-01 . 709 4.85 6.04 3.65
1.79 -2.86
Gradnt --.316E-06 -.108E-05 -.440E-05 -.710E-06 -.105E-05 - . 690E-06 . 140E-06
-.643E-06 -.278E-06 
** Gradient has converged. 
** B-vector has converged.
Maximum Likelihood Estimates
Log-Likelihood...................... .. . . . . 12.230
Restricted (Slopes=0) Log-L. -30.953
Chi-Squared ( 8).............................. 37.445
Significance Level......................... .87349E-06
Variable Coefficient Std. Error T-ratio Prob|t|ox Mean of X Std.D.of X
ONE -15.1946 6.16334 -2.465 .01369 1.0000 .00000
UT 4.05540 1.59762 2.538 . 01114 1.6735 . 85117
GPR -.534200E-01 .432731E-01 -1.234 .21702 24.347 14.165
NATLP .709471 1.26769 . 560 .57571 .57143 .50000
LP 4.85237 2.38427 2.035 .04183 .44898 .50254
COMSIP 6.04416 2.84938 2.121 .03390 .63265 .48708
PROVP 3.64501 2.18596 1.667 .09542 .42857 .50000
DISFUND 1.78720 1.52613 1.171 .24157 .28571 .45644
RESP -2.86178 1.93157 -1.482 .13845 . 48980 .50508
Frequencies of actual & predicted outcomes 
Predicted outcome has maximum probability.
Predicted
Actual TOTAL 0 1
TOTAL 49 34 15
0 33 31 2
1 16 3 13
MODEL COMMAND: LOGIT;LHS-PP;RHS=ONE,UT, GPR, NATLP, LP, COMSIP, PROVP,DISFUND, EQ 
U$
2 Outcomes are: 
PP=0 PP=1
(Coefficients for PP=0 set to zero.)
Least squares starting values:
***** Outcome = PP=1
Variable Coefficient Std. Error T-ratio Prob|t|ox Mean of X Std.D.of X
ONE - .373446 .294861 -1.267 .20533 1.0000 .00000
UT .208365 .686489E-01 3.035 .00240 1.6735 .85117
GPR - .104752E-01 ,422024E-02 -2.482 .01306 24.347 14.165
NATLP .157947 .132416 1.193 .23294 .57143 .50000
LP .203995 .144522 1.412 .15809 .44898 .50254
COMSIP .324058 .258911 1.252 .21071 .63265 .48708
PROVP .325079 .228464 1.423 .15477 . 42857 .50000
DISFUND .611460E-01 .125932 .486 .62729 .28571 .45644
EQU .279175 .146157 1.910 .05612 .22449 .42157
Method=NEWTON; Maximum iterations = 25 













Iteration 1 Function 32.45234
Param -.373 . 208 -.105E-01 . 158 .204 . 324 . 325
.611E-01 .279
Gradnt 12.3 13.6 381. 4.88 1.87 4.86 7.46
1.69 . 919
Iteration 2 3Function 17.47960
Param -3.54 . 874 -.450E-01 . 693 . 828 1.31 1.33
.212 1.24
Gradnt 2.45 1.65 81.8 . 602 -.178E-01 .433 1.98
-.259E-01 . 180
Iteration 3 Function 14.51262
Param -6.09 1.49 -.642E-01 1.03 1.26 2.39 ■ 2.03
. 436 1.49
Gradnt .865 .553 27.1 . 149 -.681E-01 . 112 . 739
-.622E-01 . 125
Iteration 4 Function 13.43906
Param -9.00 2.13 -.730E-01 1.33 1.91 3.47 2.81
.755 1.41
Gradnt .280 .210 8.54 .254E-01 -.557E-01 .377E-01 .237
-. 439E-01 .451E-01
Iteration 5 Function 13.18222
Param -11.2 2.61 -.781E-01 1.57 2.49 4.21 3.42
1.06 1.32
Gradnt .510E-01 .368E-01 1.66 --. 242E-02 -.265E-01 -.208E-02 . 520E-01
-.195E-01 -.643E-03
Iteration 6 Function 13.16320
Param -12.0 2.77 -.802E-01 1.66 2.71 4.46 3.63
1.18 1.32
Gradnt .285E-02 .101E-02 . 105 --.104E-02 -.308E-02 -.122E-02 .397E-02
-.246E-02 -.752E-03
Iteration 7 Function 13.16306
Param -12.1 2.79 -.804E-01 1.67 2.73 4.49 3.65
1.20 1.32
Gradnt .158E-04 -.326E-05 .666E-03 --.122E-04 --270E-04 -.137E-04 .287E-04
-.230E-04 -.738E-05
Iteration 8 Function 13.16306
Param -12.1 2.79 -.804E-01 1.67 2.73 4.49 3.65
1.20 1.32
Gradnt .770E-09 -.514E-09 .359E-07 - .853E-09 -.170E-08 -.935E-09 .165E-08
-.148E-08 -.460E-09 
** Gradient has converged. 
** Function has converged. 











Mean of XVariable Coefficient Std. Error T-ratio Prob 111ox
ONE -12.1168 5.31398 -2.280 .02260 1.0000 .00000
UT 2.78980 1.11706 2.497 .01251 1.6735 .85117
GPR -.803781E-01 .438970E-01 -1.831 .06709 24.347 14.165
NATLP 1.67328 1.24533 1.344 .17906 .57143 .50000
LP 2.73465 1.72045 1.589 .11195 .44898 .50254
COMSIP 4.48701 2.86636 1.565 .11749 .63265 .48708
PROVP 3.64711 2.47884 1.471 .14121 .42857 .50000
DISFUND 1.19598 1.18378 1.010 .31235 .28571 .45644
EQU 1.31665 1.42219 . 926 .35455 .22449 .42157
Frequencies of actual & predicted outcomes
Predicted outcome has maximum probability.
&V Predicted
Actual TOTAL 0 1
TOTAL 49 34 15
0 33 32 1
1 16 2 14
